the court’s inherent authority to reject most pro se submissions by a represented
defendant. See United States v. Hage, 74 F.4th 90, 94 (2d Cir. 2023) (Nardini, J., in
Joint Local Rules, S.D.N.Y. and E.D.N.Y.
Effective January 2, 2026
chambers) (explaining that allowing pro se submissions by a represented defendant, at
least when “the defendant makes no claim that his counsel was not adequately
representing him,” is “not only unnecessary; it is also unwise”) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Second, it protects defendants from unwittingly disclosing information
that is privileged or making statements that could be used against the defendant in the
case. Third, it establishes an efficient default process for dealing with what in some
cases may be numerous pro se submissions from a represented defendant, yet provides
judges with the flexibility to deviate from the default and handle any such submission
as they see fit. Cf. United States v. Tutino, 883 F.2d 1125, 1141 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that
the “decision to grant or deny ‘hybrid representation’ lies solely within the discretion of
trial court”). Fourth, by ensuring that any pro se submission is forwarded to counsel for
the defendant, it gives counsel the opportunity to take appropriate action, including but
not limited to pursuing any matter set forth in the submission or explaining to the
defendant why any matter in the submission should not be pursued. Finally, it ensures
that any pro se submission by a represented party is made part of the record in case it
should it be relevant in later proceedings.
