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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 26-MC-23392-ALTONAGA
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER 2026-62
tah
IN RE: PETER BENJAMIN BERKMAN
FLORIDA BAR # 110330
_________________________________________/ Jul 22, 2026
ORDER OF SUSPENSION WPB
Background. On May 13, 2026, the Supreme Court of Florida suspended Peter Benjamin
Berkman from the practice of law. See Fla. Bar v. Berkman, No. SC2025-1941, 2026 WL
1330154, at *1 (Fla. May 13, 2026). On May 15, 2026, Mr. Berkman filed a Motion for Rehearing
of the Florida Supreme Court’s Suspension Order. (See Resp. [ECF No. 3] 2).
On May 19, 2026, the Clerk of this Court entered an Order to Show Cause [ECF No. 2],
providing Mr. Berkman 30 days to explain why reciprocal discipline should not be imposed. (See
id. 1).1 On June 23, 2026, Mr. Berkman filed a Response, contesting the imposition of reciprocal
discipline on three grounds and alternatively requesting that the Court stay these reciprocal
disciplinary proceedings pending resolution of his Motion for Rehearing in the Florida disciplinary
proceedings. (See generally Resp.).
On June 29, 2026, the Florida Supreme Court entered an order denying Mr. Berkman’s
Motion for Rehearing. See Fla. Bar v. Berkman, No. SC2025-1941, 2026 WL 1864140, at *1
(Fla. June 29, 2026).
Standard. Under Rule 8(e) of the Southern District of Florida Local Rules Governing the
Admission, Practice, Peer Review, and Discipline of Attorneys (“Attorney Rules”), a final
adjudication of misconduct in another court conclusively establishes the misconduct for purpose
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The Court uses the pagination generated by the electronic CM/ECF database, which appears in the headers
of all court filings.
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of a disciplinary proceeding in this Court — unless the attorney demonstrates, based on the face
of the record from the other court, that
(1) the procedure in that other jurisdiction was so lacking in notice or opportunity
to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due process; or (2) there was such an
infirmity of proof establishing misconduct as to give rise to the clear conviction
that this Court could not, consistent with its duty, accept as final the conclusion on
that subject; or (3) the imposition of the same discipline by this Court would result
in grave injustice; or (4) the misconduct established is deemed by this Court to
warrant substantially different discipline.
Id.
Discussion. The Court addresses each of Mr. Berkman’s arguments, which correspond to
Attorney Rules 8(e)(1)–(3), in turn. The Court then addresses his alternative request for a stay.
Due Process. Mr. Berkman first asserts the Florida Supreme Court’s suspension
procedure constituted a deprivation of due process, raising two points in support. First, Mr.
Berkman notes the Florida Supreme Court’s Suspension Order did not contain any written opinion,
statement of finding, or explanation that the applicable legal standard — Rule 3-5.3 of the Rules
Regulating The Florida Bar (“Rule 3-5.3”), which sets forth grounds for the suspension of a
member of The Florida Bar — had been met. (See Resp. 3). Second, Mr. Berkman argues that
Rule 3-5.3 was applied retroactively, violating principles of fair notice and affecting his decision
to waive his speedy trial rights. (See id.).
As to his due process argument, Mr. Berkman says nearly nothing about the relevant
inquiry: the procedures afforded to him in the Florida proceedings before the entry of the
Suspension Order. (See id. 3). While Mr. Berkman focuses on supposed deficiencies in the
Florida Supreme Court’s Suspension Order itself, Mr. Berkman fails to address the process he
received before he was suspended. (See id.); see also, e.g., Hesed-El v. McCord, No. cv-117-146,
2019 WL 1441624, at *6 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 29, 2019) (“Procedural due process generally requires
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some type of notice and hearing before the state deprives a person of liberty.” (alterations adopted;
quotation marks and citation omitted)); Sammy’s of Mobile, Ltd. v. City of Mobile, 928 F. Supp.
1116, 1123 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 6, 1996) (“Procedural due process refers to the requirement that an
individual be given notice and an opportunity to be heard before any judicial, executive, or
administrative action deprives him of a liberty or property interest.”).
The exhibits Mr. Berkman has filed together with his Response indicate he participated in
process afforded to him ahead of the Florida Supreme Court’s suspension. The Florida Supreme
Court issued an Order to Show Cause shortly after The Florida Bar petitioned to suspend Mr.
Berkman, and Mr. Berkman responded. (See Resp. 28–32).
Whether viewed as a challenge to the constitutionality of Rule 3-5.3 or one about the waiver
of his rights in the underlying criminal matter, Mr. Berkman’s retroactivity argument is not
responsive to Attorney Rule 8(e)(1), which focuses on “the procedure in th[e] other jurisdiction[.]”
Att’y Rule 8(e) (alterations added); (see also Resp. 3). Mr. Berkman’s citation to a Supreme
Court case indicating that retroactivity is generally disfavored in the law fails to persuade that
application of Rule 3-5.3 presents relevant retroactivity concerns, let alone that those concerns fall
within the scope of the Court’s review under Attorney Rule 8(e)(1).
Infirmity of Proof. Next, Mr. Berkman argues there is a substantial infirmity of proof
establishing his misconduct, as he has still not been convicted of anything. (See Resp. 3–4). But
as he notes, the Florida Supreme Court ordered his interim suspension based on Rule 3-5.3. See
Berkman, 2026 WL 1330154, at *1. Rule 3-5.3(a) authorizes the Florida Supreme Court to
suspend a lawyer “charge[d] . . . with a felony by an indictment or information in state or federal
court that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law.” Id. (alterations and emphasis
added). While Mr. Berkman attempts to dispute the merits of the underlying criminal action, he
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CASE NO. 26-23392-MC-ALTONAGA
does not argue that there was an infirmity of proof establishing what Rule 3-5.3(a) requires: the
existence of felony charges. (See Resp. 3–4).
Grave Injustice. Mr. Berkman also contends grave injustice would result if reciprocal
discipline is imposed because it would compound the negative effects the Florida Suspension
Order has had on his law practice, clients, and reputation. (See id. 4). While the Court is mindful
of the effects reciprocal suspension may have on Mr. Berkman’s practice, Mr. Berkman fails to
raise any considerations beyond those normally present in attorney discipline cases or to otherwise
explain why the injustice reciprocal discipline would impose upon him would be grave. (See id.).
Request for Stay. As an alternative to his request that the Court not impose reciprocal
suspension, Mr. Berkman requests the Court stay this reciprocal discipline action until resolution
of his Motion for Rehearing pending before the Florida Supreme Court. (See id.). Considering
the Florida Supreme Court’s denial of Mr. Berkman’s Motion for Rehearing, his alternative request
is moot. See Westmoreland v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 833 F.2d 1461, 1462 (11th Cir. 1987)
(requested relief becomes moot when it cannot be granted because of later events).
Conclusion. Attorney Rule 8(d) provides that after considering a response to an Order to
Show Cause, “the Court may impose . . . identical discipline or may impose any other sanction the
Court may deem appropriate.” Id. (alteration added). Under Attorney Rule 8(d) and the Court’s
inherent authority to oversee membership in its bar and safeguard the public interest, see Chambers
v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (citation omitted), it is
ORDERED as follows:
1. Mr. Berkman is suspended from the practice of law in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Florida, effective immediately. He may not resume practice before this
Court unless and until reinstated by court order. See Att’y R. 12(a).
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2. Within 14 days of receipt of this Order, Mr. Berkman shall notify the Clerk of Court
of any active cases in which he appears as counsel or co-counsel of record in this District.
3. The Clerk is directed to STRIKE Mr. Berkman from the roll of attorneys authorized
to practice before this Court and to immediately revoke his CM/ECF credentials.
4. The Clerk shall promptly attempt service of this Order via certified mail to Mr.
Berkman’s court record address and any addresses on file with The Florida Bar.
DONE AND ORDERED in Miami, Florida, this 22nd day of July, 2026.
________________________________________
CECILIA M. ALTONAGA
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
cc: All South Florida Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals Judges
All Southern District of Florida District Judges, Bankruptcy Judges, and Magistrate Judges
United States Attorney
Circuit Executive
Federal Public Defender
Clerks of Court – District, Bankruptcy, and Eleventh Circuit
Florida Bar and National Lawyer Regulatory Data Bank
Library
Peter Benjamin Berkman
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