Definition
Real things are things that are substantial and immovable, together with the rights and profits annexed to or issuing out of them. The category encompasses land and everything permanently affixed to it, as well as incorporeal interests that derive from or attach to land — such as easements, rents, and profits à prendre.
The concept belongs to the broader Roman-law-influenced division of all things into "real" and "personal." Real things are defined primarily by their immovability and their connection to the earth. Personal things, by contrast, are movable and not tied to a specific location or parcel.
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Common Language
Modern common usage (Wiktionary): "Real things" is simply the plural of "real thing," an ordinary English phrase meaning things that actually exist, as opposed to imagined or fictitious items.
Historical common usage (Webster's 1913): "Real" in common 19th-century usage carried the primary sense of "actually existing" or "genuine," with no necessary connection to land or immovability.
The gap is substantial. In law, "real" derives from the Latin res (thing) by way of the Medieval Latin realis, referring specifically to land and immovable property. A legal reader encountering "real things" in a historical source is not reading a claim about authenticity or existence — they are reading a classification of property by its physical and legal character.
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Common Confusion
REAL THINGS vs. REAL PROPERTY: These are closely related but not identical. Real things is the broader civilian-influenced term encompassing both the physical objects (land, fixtures) and the rights issuing from them. Real property is the more common Anglo-American term, typically used in modern practice to describe the same subject matter but emphasizing ownership and title rather than the nature of the thing itself. In historical sources — particularly those drawing on civil law or early common law — "real things" appears where modern writers would say "real property" or "realty."
REAL THINGS vs. PERSONAL THINGS: The distinction between real and personal things is foundational to property law. Real things are immovable; personal things (or chattels) are movable. The practical consequence is significant: different legal rules have historically governed succession, conveyance, and legal remedies depending on which category applies. A researcher must not assume that rules governing personal things apply by analogy to real things without confirming the classification.
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Why It Matters in Research
This term is a classifier, not a standalone doctrine. Its importance in the Law Mind corpus lies in its role as a gateway concept: identifying something as a "real thing" historically determined which body of law applied — which courts had jurisdiction, which forms of action were available, and how the subject matter passed at death or by conveyance.
Researchers working in historical sources, particularly pre-20th century American and English legal materials, will encounter "real things" as part of the foundational taxonomy of property. Bouvier and Stephen's Commentaries use it to organize entire branches of property law. Modern sources have largely replaced it with "real property" or "realty," so a researcher reading older treatises must recognize that "real things" and its cognates map onto what contemporary materials call real property law.
The phrase "rights and profits annexed to or issuing out of" real things is particularly important. It brings incorporeal hereditaments — incorporeal rights that run with or derive from land — within the definition. This means that an easement, a rent charge, or a profit à prendre is a "real thing" even though it has no physical substance. Researchers should not assume that "real things" means only physically tangible land.
Jurisdictional caution applies when crossing between common law and civil law systems. In civilian jurisdictions (and in early American materials influenced by civilian thinking), the real/personal division may be drawn differently, and the term "real things" may carry a more explicitly Roman-law character.
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Historical Dictionary Support
Bouvier's entry is minimal but precise: "Things substantial and immovable, and the rights and profits annexed to or issuing out of them," citing 1 Stephen's Commentaries 167. The formulation tracks Stephen's own organization of property law, which divides things into real and personal as the foundational first cut.
What Bouvier's entry does not do is explain why the classification matters — it assumes the reader already knows that classifying something as "real" triggers a distinct body of rules. Historical legal dictionaries generally treat this term as a node in a larger system rather than a self-contained concept. Researchers who stop at the dictionary definition will miss the doctrinal architecture it points toward.
No significant divergence exists across historical sources on the core definition, but sources vary in how broadly they draw the category of incorporeal rights that qualify as real things. Later authorities have narrowed some of the older incorporeal hereditaments or absorbed them into modern property concepts, so the full scope of "real things" in a given historical source depends on when and where it was written.
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Encyclopedia Cross-Reference
The Law Mind Property Law Encyclopedia — Real Estate Transactions (property_48, property_49)
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