Definition
An adverb of time meaning "before now" or "in time past." In legal drafting and instruments, heretofore designates acts, conditions, facts, or legal relationships existing prior to the present moment — typically prior to the date of the document, statute, or constitution in which the word appears. It has no fixed or precise boundary beyond marking the past in contrast to the present or future. The reference point is always contextual: in a constitution, heretofore means before the constitution's adoption; in a contract, before the contract's execution; in a statute, before the statute's effective date.
Common Language
Modern common usage (Wiktionary): Before now, until now, up to the present time; from the beginning to this point. Also used to refer to something stated earlier within the same text.
Historical common usage (Webster's 1913): Up to this time; hitherto; before; in time past.
The common and legal meanings are largely aligned, but a gap emerges in precision. Ordinary usage treats heretofore as a loose synonym for "previously" with no fixed anchor. Legal usage demands that the word be read against a specific temporal reference point — usually the operative date of the governing instrument — and courts have held that this anchor cannot be shifted arbitrarily. A researcher who reads heretofore as merely "sometime in the past" will miss the interpretive work the word is doing in legal context.
Common Confusion
Heretofore is frequently paired with, and occasionally confused with, its complement HEREAFTER (meaning from this point forward). The pair operates as a drafting unit: heretofore governs pre-existing conditions, hereafter governs future obligations. Confusing the two in construction of a statute or instrument can reverse the temporal scope of a provision entirely. Also compare HERETOFORE with HITHERTO, which carries the same general meaning but appears less commonly in American legal drafting and more commonly in older English legal sources.
Why It Matters in Research
The practical research challenge with heretofore is anchoring it correctly. The word itself says nothing about how far back in time it reaches — courts have consistently held that it has "no definite and precise signification" beyond marking the past. This means the reference point must be reconstructed from surrounding context every time the word appears.
In constitutional instruments, the anchor date is the constitution's adoption, not any predecessor document. Bouvier cites an early New York decision establishing that heretofore in a constitution adopted in 1846 cannot be read back to a prior constitution — the drafters meant before 1846, full stop. Researchers working with state constitutional history should be alert to this: when an earlier constitutional provision used the same word, courts will not collapse the two reference points.
In recording acts and registration statutes, heretofore has generated interpretive disputes over whether instruments that were already overdue for recording qualify under remedial provisions. Bouvier's entry flags precisely this context — a recording act providing for mortgages heretofore given was construed to include mortgages that should have been recorded but were not. The word can thus sweep in instruments that predate the statute by a considerable margin, making it a potentially expansive term in remedial contexts.
In contracts and instruments, the word most often appears in recital clauses establishing predicate facts ("the parties heretofore having entered into...") or in saving provisions distinguishing rights accrued before amendment from rights arising after. In either use, the temporal anchor is the instrument's effective date unless context compels otherwise.
Corpus researchers should note that heretofore is a high-frequency term in nineteenth and early twentieth century legal drafting and becomes progressively rarer in plain-language drafting reforms of the late twentieth century. Its presence in a document is itself a signal of drafting vintage or formality register.
Historical Dictionary Support
The historical dictionaries converge on the same core meaning with minimal variation. Black's (both editions) define the term as simply denoting time past, and the second edition explicitly endorses the principle that the word has "no definite and precise signification" beyond this, citing Andrews v. Thayer, 40 Conn. 157 — a real case from the Connecticut Supreme Court. Anderson's entry is skeletal, defining the term as "in time past" and cross-referencing the jury trial entry, which suggests the word appeared in a jury-related provision of a governing instrument.
Bouvier adds the most substantive guidance and is the most useful starting point for understanding how courts have actually applied the word. Bouvier distinguishes constitutional usage (anchored to the adoption date, not predecessor instruments) from statutory usage (capable of sweeping in transactions predating the statute if the legislative purpose supports it). The Bouvier entry also gestures at the word's role in recording acts, which is a context the other dictionaries do not address.
None of the historical dictionaries address the word's function in contract recitals, its appearance in saving clauses, or its drafting relationship to hereafter. For those dimensions, researchers should consult treatises on legal drafting rather than the dictionaries.
Encyclopedia Cross-Reference
See Law Mind Encyclopedia: Statutory Construction — Temporal Language; Legal Drafting — Words of Time.