(626) courts. Cowell. Spelman. person who had been outlawed, he being against vert and venison, at the forest said to carry a wolf's head; implying that he had forfeited the protection of the law, as a man, and might be destroyed like a wild beast, in case he resisted being taken. See Caput lupinum. WONG, Wang. Sax. In old records. A field, (campus, arvum.) Spelman. Cowell. WOOD, [Lat. boscus; Fr. bois,] that is, growing wood, is distinguished from trees, in conveyancing. A grant or devise of an interest in growing wood is said to convey an interest in the soil itself. Shaw, C. J. 13 Pick. R. 44. Co. Litt 4 b. Shep. Touch. 94. But it is otherwise with a grant or reservation of trees. 11 Co. 49 b, 50, Liford's case. 1 Hilliard's Real Prop. 56, [10.] (627) wreckum, wrectum; Lat. naufragium; Fr. from the circumstance] whether it be found naufrage, bris, échouément.] In English shut or open, where it could conveniently law. Goods which, after a shipwreck at be shut; and so of like cases.) Bract. fol. sea, are by the sea cast upon the land. 5 120. See Fleta, lib. 1, c. 43, § 2. This Co. 106 b, Constable's case. 2 Inst. 167. definition of wreck seems to be nearly or Goods cast ashore from a wrecked vessel, where no living creature has escaped from the wreck alive; and which are forfeited to the crown, or to persons having the franchise of wreck. Cowell. 1 Crabb's Real Prop. 507, § 656; 509, §§ 658, 659. 1 Bl. Com. 290, 291. In American law. Goods cast ashore by the sea, and not claimed by the owner within a year, or other specified period; and which, in such case, become the property of the state. 2 Kent's Com. 322. See Wreckum. WRECK, Wrec. [L. Lat. wreccum, wreckum.] In old English law. Any thing thrown up on the land by the sea, (maris ejectus.) Spelman. Lib. Rames. § 95, cited ibid. Called in some old charters, seupwerp, quasi sea-up-werp. Spelman. Corwell. A thing thrown out of a vessel, with the intention of throwing it away, and which is afterwards found; a thing derelict. Bract. fol. 120. See Wreckum. (628) goods shall be saved and kept, &c. So can law with Bracton, see 2 Kent's Com. that, if any sue for those goods, and after322. wards prove that they were his, or perishLord Mansfield, in the case above quoed in his keeping, within a year and a ted, observed, in allusion to the language day, they shall be restored to him without of the statute, and the construction of it contended for on the part of the defendant, that there was no ground for a forfeiture of the goods upon the distinction between a man or other animal coming to shore alive, or not alive; that the coming to shore of a dog or a cat alive, could be no better proof than if they should come ashore dead; that the escaping alive made no sort of difference; and that if the owner of the dog, or cat, or other animal was known, the presumption of the goods belonging to the same person would be equally strong, whether the animal was alive or dead. That an importance, however, was attached to the circumstance of life in the animal, in such cases, seems clear, not only from the language of the statute, but from the express words of Bracton, who enumerates it as one (and, indeed, mentions no other) of the indicia and signa by which the owner might prove his property, supposing there were no marks upon the goods themselves. Si canis vivus inveniatur, if the owner's dog were found alive on the shore, the behavior of the animal towards his master would furnish in itself a natural indicium of the greatest importance in identifying him, so that constare possit quod talis sit dominus illius canis, and then the presumption followed, that the owner of the dog was the owner of the goods that came ashore with the dog. Such, at least, seems to be the reasonable interpretation of the passage, otherwise it is difficult to explain why the canis vivus is so prominently mentioned by this author. delay. And if not, they shall remain to the king.) Stat. Westm. 1, c. 4. See Fleta, lib. 1, c. 44, § 2. These two passages have often been quoted together, that of Bracton being relied on by those who have contended for a broader view of the law of wreck than seems to be authorized by the letter of the statute. Both mention the escape of a live animal from the vessel, as a circumstance which would take from the goods the character of wreck; the statute declaring it to be the absolute criterion by which it was to be determined whether the goods were wreck or not; but Bracton mentioning it only as a means of proof by which the owner might show his property. Bracton, however, it will be seen, goes farther than the statute, laying down the doctrine, in the important clause with which the passage quoted from him concludes, that if the owner could prove his property by marks upon the goods, they were not to be considered as wreck. In the case of Hamilton and Smith v. Davis, (5 Burr. 2732,) this clause was relied upon by the plaintiffs' counsel as an authority to show that the goods were no wreck, there being, in that case, marks apparent upon them. The defendant's counsel rested upon the strict letter of the statute, and contended that as no living creature had come from the ship to the shore, the goods were legally wreck; arguing, also, that Bracton had mis-stated the law, and was unsupported by any other writer, and was contradicted by the Mirror, ancient charters and ancient acts of parliament. Lord Mansfield, in delivering the opinion of the It may be observed in addition, that in court, adopted the more liberal view of a writ in the Register, on the subject of Bracton, which he considered as according with the common law before the statute, (the statute itself having always been recognized as declaratory of the common law.) See 2 Kent's Com. 322. It will be observed that Blackstone is quoted by the defendant's counsel in this case, as favoring the stricter interpretation of the statute, in opposition to Bracton. But, in the editions of Blackstone since published, the decision in this very case is quoted with approval, as settling the doctrine on the more liberal basis. 1 Bl. Com. 291, 292. As to the accordance of the Ameriwreck, the escape of a live animal from the ship is expressly made a criterion whether the goods washed ashore were forfeitable as wreck; the persons to whom it is directed being instructed to inquire whether any person escaped alive from the ship to land or not, and to award the goods to the claimants on their making proof of property, provided, however, some animal have escaped alive from the said ship, (dum tamen aliquod animal à dicta navi vivum evaserit.) Reg. Orig. 126.