WOMAN - The Law Mind Legal Dictionary

WOMANAuthored

The Law Mind • 1321 words

Definition

An adult female human being. In law, the term has carried both biological and social meaning, and its legal significance has shifted substantially across time as courts and legislatures have grappled with questions of personhood, legal capacity, civil rights, and statutory interpretation.

In historical legal usage, "woman" most often appeared in one of three functional contexts: (1) as a subject of protective legislation (statutes governing labor conditions, property rights, contracts, and criminal offenses such as rape); (2) as a term of legal incapacity, reflecting the common law doctrine of coverture under which a married woman's legal identity merged with her husband's; and (3) as a term of inclusion or exclusion in statutes that defined who held rights, duties, or qualifications under law.

Common Language

Modern common usage (Wiktionary): An adult female human; all female humans collectively; sometimes extended to female sentient beings in non-literal contexts; also informally used for a wife or female attendant.

Historical common usage (Webster's 1913): "An adult female person; a grown-up female person, as distinguished from a man or a child; sometimes, any female person."

The common and legal meanings appear deceptively close, but the gap is significant. Ordinary usage assumes legal personhood and capacity as a background condition. Legal usage, particularly before the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, did not. The word "woman" in a statute could simultaneously recognize a person's existence and deny her legal agency — she might be the subject of a law's protection without being its rights-bearing beneficiary. A researcher who reads historical statutory language through a modern lens risks missing this distinction entirely.

Common Confusion

Three recurring confusions affect research on this term.

First, "woman" and "female" have been used interchangeably in some statutes and distinctly in others. Modern legislative drafting increasingly prefers "female" or "person" in contexts involving biological classification, while some jurisdictions have adopted "woman" or "women" as a defined term in anti-discrimination or reproductive-rights contexts. The terms are not always synonymous in law and should not be assumed equivalent across different codes or time periods.

Second, "woman" as a legal status was historically shaped by marital condition. A feme sole (unmarried woman) possessed substantially different legal capacities than a feme covert (married woman). The bare word "woman" in pre-twentieth-century sources often implied the feme covert default, unless the text specified otherwise. See FEME COVERT, FEME SOLE.

Third, in modern constitutional and statutory litigation, courts have distinguished biological sex from gender identity in ways that affect how "woman" is defined for purposes of particular laws. The meaning of "woman" in, for example, a prison classification statute may differ from its meaning in a Title IX context. Researchers must read definitional provisions, not assume a universal legal meaning.

Recognized Forms

/SUBTYPES

Woman with child: A recognized statutory phrase, treated historically as synonymous with "pregnant woman." Rapalje & Lawrence notes this equivalence with reference to 83 N.Y. 464. The phrase appeared in criminal statutes affecting the timing of execution, in poor-law provisions, and in protective labor legislation. Researchers encountering this phrase in nineteenth-century sources should not assume it carries any meaning beyond pregnancy.

Why It Matters in Research

This term is a navigational minefield in historical legal sources, and researchers must approach it with period-sensitivity and jurisdictional precision.

Statutory interpretation trap: Rapalje & Lawrence states that "the mention of a male in a statute usually includes the female." This canon of construction — common in nineteenth-century American and English law — operated asymmetrically. Male terms were often read to include females for purposes of obligation and liability; they were far less consistently read to include females for purposes of rights, office-holding, or franchise. The rule was a tool of inclusion for burdens and exclusion for benefits. A researcher reading nineteenth-century cases on statutory construction must identify which direction the interpretive rule was being applied.

Capacity doctrine: The common law doctrine of coverture meant that for much of American legal history, "woman" in a legal instrument often signaled a need to inquire further: Is she married? If so, her capacity to contract, sue, hold property, or execute instruments may have been limited or eliminated entirely. Married Women's Property Acts, adopted in most U.S. states between roughly 1839 and 1900, progressively dismantled coverture, but the timeline varies by jurisdiction and the reforms were partial and piecemeal in many states. Historical sources that treat "woman" as a legally capable actor may reflect a post-reform jurisdiction or a post-reform era; those that do not may reflect the common law baseline.

Criminal law context: In statutes defining rape, the term "woman" historically imposed a sex-specific element on the offense. Rapalje & Lawrence flags the Ohio statute as an example. Nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century rape statutes were generally limited to female victims, and the definition of "woman" for purposes of those statutes was occasionally litigated. Modern rape and sexual assault statutes in most jurisdictions are sex-neutral.

Modern research: In contemporary legal databases, "woman" appears frequently in constitutional litigation (sex discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause), reproductive rights, employment law (Title VII, Title IX), and increasingly in gender-identity jurisprudence. Researchers should flag that these bodies of law are actively evolving and that corpus materials from even the recent past may not reflect current doctrine.

Historical Dictionary Support

Rapalje & Lawrence provides the most direct entry, defining "woman" simply as "the female of human kind" and noting the asymmetric statutory interpretation canon. The reference to the Ohio statute for rape and the New York case for "woman with child" reflects the practical focus of that dictionary on statutory construction issues of the period. The entry is notably brief, which itself reflects the assumption of the era: woman as a legal category required little elaboration because her legal incapacity was treated as a baseline, not a problem to be defined.

Bouvier's Law Dictionary does not appear to provide a direct entry for "woman" in the excerpt supplied; the Bouvier text reproduced here concerns idiots and lunatics in equity proceedings — likely a retrieval artifact or adjacent entry. Researchers consulting Bouvier directly should locate the entries for FEME, COVERTURE, and MARRIED WOMEN for the substantive treatment of women's legal status in that source.

Anderson's Dictionary of Law similarly does not yield a direct entry from the excerpt provided; the Anderson text references attorney disbarment cases and related federal court decisions. The absence of a substantive entry in Anderson may reflect that dictionary's more procedural orientation, or that the term was indexed under related headings (feme, wife, coverture) rather than under "woman" as a free-standing entry.

Across the historical shelf, the most significant gap is structural: none of these sources treat "woman" as a term whose meaning was contested or evolving. The contested legal personhood of women — whether women were "persons" entitled to hold office, practice law, or vote — generated substantial litigation in precisely the period when these dictionaries were compiled, yet the dictionary entries reflect the conservative doctrinal position rather than the debate. Researchers should consult primary sources and period-specific treatises on domestic relations and constitutional law alongside the historical dictionaries.

Jurisdictional Note

The legal capacity of women, the scope of coverture's abrogation, and the definitions operative in sex-specific statutes all varied significantly by state and shifted across different legislative waves from the 1840s through the twentieth century. Federal constitutional doctrine on sex discrimination did not develop meaningful force until the 1970s. Researchers working in any pre-1975 American legal context should treat state law as the controlling framework and verify the specific jurisdiction's reform history.

Encyclopedia Cross-Reference

See Law Mind Encyclopedia: Coverture; Feme Covert and Feme Sole; Married Women's Property Acts; Sex Discrimination.

WOMANmain

Rapalje & Lawrence • 1883

- The female of human kind. The mention of a male in a statute usually includes the female. 102. WOMAN, (in act defining rape). 22 Ohio St. WOMAN WITH CHILD, (synonymous with "pregnant woman"). 83 N. Y. 464. WONG.-A field. - Spel. Gloss. WOOD, (defined). 72 Me. 464.

WOMANmain

Bouvier's Law Dictionary • 1928

Idiots and lunatics may be joined or not in bills by their committees, at the election of the committee, to set aside acts done by them whilst under imbecility; 1 Ch. Cas. 112; 1 Jac. 377; 7 Johns. Ch. 139. They must be joined in suits brought for the par- tition of real estate; 3 Barb. Ch. 24. In England it seems to be the custom to join; 2 Vern. 678. See Story, Eq. Pl. § 64, and note; Story, Eq. Jur. § 1836, and note. Infants. Several may join in the same bill for an account of the rents and profits of their estate; 2 Bland 68. Trustee and cestui que trust should join in a bill to recover the trust fund: 5 Dana 128; but need not to foreclose a mortgage; 5 Ala. 447; 4 Abb. Pr. 106; nor to redeem one made by the trustee; 2 Gray 190. And see 3 Edw. Ch. 175; 7 Ala. N. s. 386. An appeal may be prosecuted by one party to the record, as against another, without joining other parties who are in no way interested in the controversy; 80 Fed. Rep. 961.

WOMANmain

Anderson's Dictionary of Law • 1890

1 Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 354 (1871); Re Paschal, 10 id. 491 (1870); Randall v. Brigham, 7 id. 540 (1868); Exp. Garland, 4 id. 378 (1866); Exp. Steinman, 95 Pa. 220-39 (1880), cases, Sharswood, C. J. 2 Exp. Wall, 107 U. S. 265, 273, 280, 287 (1882), cases, Bradley, J.; s. c. 13 F. R. 814, 820-23, cases. See also People v. Appleton, 105 III. 474 (1883); Farlin v. Sook, 30 Kan. 409 (1883). See generally, Weeks, Attorneys; Forsyth, Hist. Lawyers. FEME; or FEMME. F. A woman; a wife. Feme is the older form: L. femella, femina, a young woman. Plural, femes, femmes. Feme covert, or feme-covert. A married woman. By marriage, husband and wife are one person in law. Under his protection and "cover," she does everything; and is therefore called in law-French a feme-covert; while her condition is called "coverture," q. v. Feme sole, or feme-sole. A single woman: one who has never been married, who has been judicially separated from her husband, or whose marriage has been dissolved by divorce from, or by the death of, the husband. cases, Hammond, J. See United States v. Staats, 8 How. 44-45 (1850); United States v. Watkids, 7 Saw. 90-94 (1881), cases; People v. Lyon, 99 N. Y. 210 (1885). 1 United States v. Coppersmith, ante. 2 People v. Lyon, 99 N. Y. 216 (1885). 3 See Reed v. State, 14 Tex. Ap. 664 (1883); State v. Yates, 21 W. Va. 763 (1883); 64 N. C. 273; 34 N. H. 510; 2 Utah, 457. 41 Bl. Com. 442; 2 id. 292, 433, 497; 32 Barb. 258; 63 Compare LIBERTY, Civil. 1 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 8-26 (1883). Dissenting opinion by Harlan, J., ib. 26-62. 2 Ibid. 14, 17, 25. See also United States v. Buntin, 10 F. R. 730, 738 (1882), cases. See Penn. Act 19 May, 1887 (P. L. 72); 7 Alb. Law J. 355 (1873); 8 id. 3 (1873). Common right. When it is said that a franchise is a privilege which does not belong to individuals by “ common right," the meaning is that the privilege is not a right which pertains to the citizens by common law. "This common law of England is sometimes called right, sometimes common right, and sometimes common justice." 1 In her own right. Added to the words "femesole owner," merely repeats one of the necessary qualities of ownership. The phrase neither enlarges, abridges, nor qualifies the meaning of the word "owner." There is no greater necessity for its use than for the addition of "absolute" to " fee-simple."" Legal right. A right which is recognized and protected by a court of common law. Equitable right. A right recognized and protected by a court of equity.3 Petition of right and of right. See under PE- party, attaches his signature to it; or, a person who, though not so present, yet subsequently in the presence of the party, who acknowledges the signature and requests him to sign, affixes his signature.1 At common law a subscribing witness was to be called to prove the execution of the instrument, but never as to a collateral matter; a party was not sufficient, except when the subscribing witness was incapacitated. He is not called when an opponent produces a writing on notice and claims an interest under the writing, nor when he refuses to produce the writing, nor where an acknowledgment makes a writing evidence. An attesting witness proves his own signature only.2 Swift witness. A witness who is very eager to testify. Zealous witness. A witness who evinces partiality for the party who calls him. The tendency is to admit all persons to testify who can furnish relevant, material evidence, leaving the jury to judge of the credibility of each witness. "In the courts of the United States no witness shall be excluded in any action on account of color, or in any civil action because he is a party to or interested in the issue tried." 3 That enactment was intended to admit the testimony of witnesses previously incompetent on account of interest or of being parties. It introduced a principle extensively adopted in the States. "Provided, that in actions by or against executors, administrators, or guardians, in which judgment may be rendered for or against them, neither party shall be allowed to testify against the other, as to any transaction with, or statement by, the testator, intestate, or ward, unless called to testify thereto by the opposite party, or required to testify thereto by the court. In all other respects the laws of the State in which the court is held shall be the rules of decision as to the competency of witnesses in the courts of the United States in trials at common law, and in equity, and admiralty." The purpose in preventing a party from testifying, where the adverse party is an executor or administrator, is to guard the estates of decedents against fraudulent defenses and claims, or unfounded causes of action.. • Huston v. Ticknor, 99 Pa. 238 (1881), Paxson, J.; 1 Greenl. Ev. § 569 a, cases; Cussons v. Skinner, 11 M. & W. 168 (1843); Hollenback v. Fleming, 6 Hill, 304 (1844), cases. 21 Whart. Ev. §§ 705-40, cases; 1 Greenl. Ev. §§ 27278, cases. Act 2 July, 1864, § 3: R. S. § 858. United States v. Ten Thousand Cigars, Woolw. 125 (1867); Rison v. Cribbs, 1 Dill. 184 (1870). In trials at common law a party to the record could not be a witness for or against himself or his adversary. The purpose of the statutes is to put the parties on a footing of equality with other witnesses, that is, to make all admissible to testify for themselves, and compellable to testify for others. The statutes are remedial, and to be construed accordingly. See INTEREST, 1. The exception of executors, administrators, and guardians leaves other suitors, including the United States, under the operation of the common law.2 A wife is not given capacity to testify for (or against) her husband. In a criminal case the defendant, at his own request, shall be a competent witness. But failure to make himself a witness shall create no presumption against him." Like remedial statutes have been enacted in all the States, Delaware and New Mexico excepted. In a few States persons charged with homicide may not testify in their own behalf. In civil suits a witness may demand prepayment of expenses. Non-attendance, after a subpœna has been duly served, is an offense against public justice, and a contempt of court, for which an attachment may issue and a fine, or a fine and imprisonment, be imposed. A writ of habeas corpus will secure the attendance of an imprisoned witness. By common law in criminal cases, and by statutes in civil cases, a witness likely to disappear before trial may be required to give bail for his appearance." On calling witnesses before either house of Congress or a committee thereof, see R. S. § 859, and CONTEMPT, 2. See further AGED; ANCIENT, 2; ARREST, 2 (2, 3); CALL, 1; COMMUNICATION, Privileged, 1; CONFRONT; CONTEMPT, 1; CRIME; DECISION, Rules of; DEPOSITION; DUMB; EXAMINATION, 9; EXPERT; EVIDENCE; FALSUS, In uno; GOING; HUSBAND; IMPEACH, 3; INFAMY; INFANT; INSANITY, 2 (1): LETTERS, 4, Rogatory; OATH; OPINION, 1; PARTY, 2; QUESTION, 1; REFRESH; REPUTATION; SLANDER, 1; SUBPŒNA, 3; TESTIFY; TESTIMONY; TESTIS; TURPITUDE; VOUCH; WHEN. May mean any human being of the female sex, or an adult female. In the United States unmarried women have all the civil rights of men: they may make contracts, sue and 1 Texas v. Chiles, 21 Wall. 490-91 (1874), Swayne, J. * Green v. United States, 9 Wall. 658 (1869); 1 Whart. Εν. §§ 457-90, cases. • Lucas v. Brooks, 8 Wall. 452 (1873). Act 16 March, 1878: 1 Sup. R. S. 312. 1 Whart. Ev. §§ 464-72, cases; 27 Cent. Law J. 328-32 (1888), cases; 4 Cr. Law M. 333, 897. • O'Neil v. Kansas City, &c. R. Co., 31 F. R. 666 (1887); Act 3 March, 1865: R. S. § 858, cases. See also Rice 1 Whart. Eν. § 464. v. Martin, 7 Saw. 338-40 (1881), cases. • Roberts v. Briscoe, 44 Ohio St. 601 (1887); Dudley v. Steele, 71 Ala. 426 (1882). As to testifying to communications with deceased persons, see 33 Alb. Law J. 84 90 (1886), cases. 1 Whart. Ev. §§ 381-85, 414, cases. As to privileges of witnesses, see 31 Alb. Law J. 144, 183, 244, 323, 344, 383, 403 (1885), cases; as to "utterances," 27 Am. Law Reg. 714-19 (1888), cases, and 26 Cent. Law J. 2-3 (1888), cases.

WOMANn.

Websters Unabridged Dictionary (1913) • 1913

An adult female person; a grown-up female person, as distinguished from a man or a child; sometimes, any female person. Women are soft, mild pitiful, and flexible. Shak. And the rib, which the Lord God had taken from man, made he a woman. Gen. ii. 22. I have observed among all nations that the women ornament themselves more than the men; that, wherever found, they are the same kind, civil, obliging, humane, tender beings, inclined to be gay and cheerful, timorous and modest. J. Ledyard. The female part of the human race; womankind. Man is destined to be a prey to woman. Thackeray. A female attendant or servant. " By her woman I sent your message." Shak. Woman hater, one who hates women; one who has an aversion to the female sex; a misogynist. Swift.

WOMANv.

Websters Unabridged Dictionary (1913) • 1913

To act the part of a woman in; -- with indefinite it. Daniel. To make effeminate or womanish. [R.] Shak. To furnish with, or unite to, a woman. [R.] "To have him see me woman'd." Shak.

womannoun

Wiktionary (English) • 2026

Wiktionary contributors • CC BY-SA 4.0 • via Kaikki
Extracted and formatted for display by Law Mind. Source link opens the current Wiktionary page and its contributor history; it is not a frozen copy of this extract.

An adult female human. | All female humans collectively; womankind. | A female person, usually an adult: a (generally adult) female sentient being, whether human, supernatural, elf, alien, etc. | A wife (or sometimes a fiancée or girlfriend). | A female person who is extremely fond of or devoted to a specified type of thing. (Used as the last element of a compound.) | A female attendant or servant.

womanverb

Wiktionary (English) • 2026

To staff with female labor. | To make effeminate or womanish. | To furnish with, or unite to, a woman. | To call (a person) "woman" in a disrespectful fashion.

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