Definition
A technical term of art in criminal pleading, historically required in any indictment charging forcible entry. The phrase signaled that the entry onto land was accomplished by force — not merely by trespass or stealth — and distinguished the offense from ordinary unlawful entry. No substitute language, paraphrase, or circumlocution was accepted as equivalent. An indictment for forcible entry that omitted the phrase "with strong hand" was defective on its face.
The Latin equivalent, manu forti, appears in older common law pleading and carries identical legal weight. The two expressions were interchangeable in practice, with "with strong hand" serving as the anglicized form in English-language indictments.
Common Language
Modern common usage (Wiktionary): "With strong hand" has no recognized entry as a standalone phrase in modern general usage. When encountered, it reads as archaic or literary language suggesting force, determination, or physical strength.
Historical common usage (Webster's 1913): The component words are ordinary English. "Strong hand" in historical common usage connoted power or armed force — used in biblical and literary contexts to describe coercive might, as in governing or compelling by superior strength.
The gap between common and legal meaning is narrow but consequential. Layered onto an already intuitive phrase was a rigid pleading requirement: the words were not merely descriptive but constitutive. Their absence voided an indictment regardless of how forcibly the entry was otherwise described. A researcher encountering "with strong hand" in a historical indictment is reading a term of art, not colorful language.
Common Confusion
"With strong hand" is occasionally confused with related forcible-entry concepts such as "with multitude of people" or "with force and arms" (vi et armis). These are distinct pleading phrases with distinct functions. "With force and arms" was a general averment of force used across many forms of action; "with strong hand" was specific to forcible entry indictments and carried a stricter necessity. Substituting one for the other — or treating them as interchangeable — was a recognized pleading error.
Why It Matters in Research
This term is almost exclusively a historical pleading artifact. Researchers will encounter it in three primary contexts: criminal indictments for forcible entry predating modern code pleading, treatises on common law pleading forms, and appellate decisions reviewing indictment sufficiency.
The critical research trap is assuming that synonymous-sounding language would have satisfied the requirement. Historical courts held firmly that no circumlocution would do. Any case or indictment you find that charges forcible entry without this exact phrase — or its Latin equivalent manu forti — was potentially vulnerable to challenge. When reading historical precedent on forcible entry, check whether the indictment's validity was contested on this ground before relying on the substantive outcome.
The term essentially disappears from practice with the adoption of code pleading and modern criminal procedure rules, which generally abolished the requirement that specific common law phrases appear verbatim. Post-code materials will not use this term as a pleading requirement, though it may appear in historical discussions or annotated statutes tracing the lineage of forcible entry law.
Because the phrase functioned as a pleading element and not a substantive legal standard, it has no significant jurisdictional variation in effect — its necessity derived from common law pleading uniformity across English and American courts. What varies is the point at which each jurisdiction's procedural reform eliminated the requirement.
Historical Dictionary Support
The historical sources are in strong agreement on all material points. Black's (both editions), Bouvier's, Rapalje & Lawrence, and Burrill's all treat "with strong hand" as an indispensable phrase in forcible entry indictments, and all confirm that no substitute language would suffice. This uniformity is itself instructive — it reflects a common law pleading rule so settled that the dictionaries simply report it without debate.
Burrill adds the useful notation of the Latin equivalent manu forti and cites Wharton's Precedents of Indictments as a practical pleading authority, pointing researchers toward the treatise literature for specimen forms. Black's (2nd Ed.) cites Rex v. Wilson, 8 Term R. 857, as the governing authority for the indispensability rule — a case worth locating if you need the doctrinal foundation.
What the historical dictionaries do not address is the transition away from this requirement under code pleading. They present the rule as current and operative because, at the time of their publication, it was. A researcher must supply the procedural context to understand when and why the term ceased to function as a mandatory pleading element.