Definition
A phrase appearing in agreements for a lease, indicating that when the formal lease is drawn up, it will include all covenants typically found in leases of that type and all covenants that are reasonable under the circumstances. The phrase operates as a contractual placeholder: where parties have agreed in principle on a lease but have not yet reduced it to final form, this language signals that the eventual instrument will be populated with the standard terms and protections that such a tenancy ordinarily carries, without requiring the parties to enumerate every covenant at the stage of preliminary agreement.
The phrase does two things simultaneously. First, it incorporates by reference the body of customary leasehold covenants recognized by practice and usage — covenants to pay rent, to repair, to permit landlord's entry, quiet enjoyment, and similar standard obligations. Second, it adds a reasonableness gloss, meaning that even covenants not universally standard may be included if a court would regard them as reasonable given the nature and circumstances of the particular letting.
Common Confusion
This phrase should not be confused with an agreement that all covenants will be implied by law. The law implies only a narrow set of covenants into a lease absent express agreement. "With all usual and reasonable covenants" goes further: it is an express contractual commitment to include the full range of customary covenants, and its scope is determined by trade usage and reasonableness rather than by the limited default rules of property law. Disputes arising under this phrase typically concern whether a particular covenant proposed for inclusion in the formal lease is in fact "usual" or "reasonable" — a question of fact and practice, not pure legal implication.
Why It Matters in Research
This phrase appears almost exclusively in the context of agreements for a lease — preliminary contracts binding parties to execute a formal lease at a future date — rather than in the lease itself. Researchers encountering the phrase in historical conveyancing documents or case law should recognize that the operative question is usually whether the formal lease, when drawn, conforms to what the preliminary agreement promised. Litigation under this phrase typically arises when one party refuses to execute the formal lease, arguing that the other party's proposed draft includes covenants that are neither usual nor reasonable, or omits covenants that should have been included.
The phrase is most common in English and early American equity practice, where courts of equity would decree specific performance of an agreement for a lease. In that context, the phrase gave courts room to assess what the formal lease should contain. Researchers working in equity reports from the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries will encounter disputes about whether a particular covenant — a covenant to insure, a covenant against assignment, a forfeiture clause — qualified as "usual and reasonable" for the type of property and letting at issue.
Because the phrase is a term of practice rather than statute, its content varied over time and by locality. What was "usual" in a commercial letting in London in 1800 differed from what was usual in a rural agricultural tenancy or in an American city at the same period. Researchers should not treat "usual" as a fixed or universal set of covenants; it is always relative to the trade, the period, and the locality.
The phrase also appears as a drafting trap: parties who used it in a preliminary agreement sometimes discovered that courts disagreed about which covenants were "usual," leading to contested specific performance proceedings. A researcher tracing a title or analyzing a conveyancing dispute should check whether any preliminary agreement used this or similar language and whether the formal lease that followed was contested.
Historical Dictionary Support
Rapalje & Lawrence flag the phrase in the context of an agreement for a lease, citing 3 Anstr. 700 — a reference to Anstruther's English Exchequer Reports, a source squarely in the equity and conveyancing tradition. The entry appears in a cluster of similar phrase-entries (WITH EFFECT, WITH FORCE, WITH INTEREST) that the dictionary treats as terms requiring judicial construction rather than definition by ordinary meaning. This placement is itself informative: it signals that the phrase's legal significance lies entirely in how courts interpreted its scope, not in any technical statutory meaning.
The historical dictionaries do not attempt a comprehensive list of which covenants are "usual and reasonable." That omission is appropriate: the question was always one of evidence and practice, answered by reference to what conveyancers and courts recognized as customary for the particular type of tenancy. Researchers should not expect the historical sources to resolve the content question; they will need to consult contemporary conveyancing manuals, form books, and equity reports for the period and jurisdiction in question.
Jurisdictional Note
The phrase originates in English equity practice and was carried into American conveyancing. Its practical content — which covenants are "usual" — varied between English and American jurisdictions and between commercial, residential, and agricultural lettings. American courts applying the phrase in the nineteenth century sometimes looked to English equity precedent but adapted the standard to local practice.