WIRES - The Law Mind Legal Dictionary

WIRESAuthored

The Law Mind • 1070 words

Definition

"Wires" appears in legal contexts primarily in two ways:

1. Physical wires: Electrical, telegraph, and telephone transmission lines strung along or beneath public streets and rights-of-way. In this sense, the term refers to the physical infrastructure of communications and electrical companies, and legal questions cluster around the right to occupy public streets, the duty not to obstruct travel or navigation, and the liability to abutting property owners for interference with their rights.

2. Colloquial shorthand for wire communications or wire fraud: In modern criminal law and federal practice, "the wires" or "over the wires" refers to electronic transmission — telephone calls, fax, internet, and similar communications. "Wires" in this sense is the predicate transmission mechanism in wire fraud prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 1343.

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Common Language

Modern common usage (Wiktionary): Third-person singular simple present indicative of "wire" (e.g., "she wires money to the account").

Historical common usage (Webster's 1913): Metal drawn into thread form; also, a telegraph line or system (colloquial).

The legal gap worth noting: In ordinary speech, "wires" most often means the physical cables themselves, or describes the act of sending a wire transfer. In federal criminal law, "the wires" has become a term of art referring broadly to any interstate electronic transmission, well beyond the original telegraph wire that gave wire fraud its name. A researcher seeing "wires" in a nineteenth-century legal source is almost certainly reading about physical infrastructure and street rights; the same word in a modern federal criminal context usually points to transmission medium, not physical cable.

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Common Confusion

WIRES vs. WIRE (singular, as statutory term): The federal wire fraud statute (18 U.S.C. § 1343) uses "wire communication" and "wire, radio, or television communication," not "wires" as a standalone term. Researchers should not assume that colloquial references to "the wires" track the precise statutory language. The phrase has expanded through case law well beyond its literal telegraph-era meaning.

WIRES (infrastructure) vs. EASEMENT/RIGHT-OF-WAY: The right of a telegraph or electrical company to string wires along a public street is not a simple license — it has been characterized as a species of easement or statutory right of way, with consequences for both the company's duties and the property rights of abutting landowners. Conflating general street-use permissions with the specific legal status of wire-stringing rights leads to analytical error in historical property research.

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Why It Matters in Research

Researchers face a significant temporal split when this term appears in the corpus. Nineteenth- and early twentieth-century materials — including Bouvier's — treat "wires" almost exclusively as a property and infrastructure question: who owns the space above and below the street, what duties attach to wire-stringing companies, and what remedies belong to abutting owners. Federal eminent domain doctrine and state statutory regimes governing telegraph and electrical companies are the relevant frameworks in that era.

By the mid-twentieth century, the term migrates into criminal law vocabulary. When reading cases or secondary sources from the New Deal era forward, "wires" increasingly signals the wire fraud context. The two bodies of doctrine rarely intersect in the sources, but a researcher moving between periods without awareness of this shift will misread sources.

Key navigational traps:

— Bouvier's treatment of wires is entirely in the infrastructure/property register. There is no criminal law dimension in the Bouvier entries. Do not read backward from modern wire fraud doctrine into Bouvier-era discussions.

— The Revised Statutes § 5363 provision cited in Bouvier (requiring electrical companies to construct and maintain lines so as not to obstruct ordinary travel or navigation) is a federal statutory baseline, but state legislatures retained authority to impose additional requirements — including mandatory underground placement. This federal-state layering matters for historical research into utility regulation.

— The street ownership question (abutting owners presumptively own to the centerline of the street) directly affects whether a wire-stringing easement burdens the fee owner, not just the public easement holder. This is a live issue in historical chain-of-title work and condemnation research.

— In modern criminal research, the corpus connection is to wire fraud, where "wires" is the jurisdictional hook for federal prosecution. The interstate nexus requirement — that a wire transmission cross state lines — is a recurring litigation point that has been interpreted broadly.

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Historical Dictionary Support

Bouvier's Law Dictionary addresses wires in its property and street-use context, cross-referencing the eminent domain entry for compensation questions involving city street use. The entries reflect the late nineteenth-century regulatory moment when telegraph and electrical infrastructure was expanding rapidly into public rights-of-way, generating friction between utility companies, municipal governments, and abutting landowners.

Bouvier notes the centerline presumption for street ownership — that abutting owners on opposite sides of a street presumptively own to the center — which bears directly on what rights are affected when wires are strung overhead or underground. The grantor-grantee presumption (a grant of land "by" or "along" a highway carries fee to the centerline if the grantor owns that far) is a background rule that shapes the compensation analysis.

The Bouvier entry also reflects the dual regulatory character of wire infrastructure: federal statute set a baseline non-obstruction duty, while state legislatures could add requirements such as underground placement mandates. This federal-floor, state-ceiling structure was contested in the courts and is reflected in the federal reporter citations Bouvier includes.

What Bouvier does not address — predictably, given its era — is anything resembling wire fraud or the use of "wires" as a communications-medium concept in criminal law. Any researcher looking to historical dictionaries for wire fraud doctrine will find nothing of use there.

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Jurisdictional Note

State law governs the property rights of abutting owners and the specific conditions under which wire-stringing companies may occupy public streets, producing significant variation in historical sources. In the criminal wire fraud context, federal law is uniform nationally, but application of the interstate nexus requirement has produced a substantial body of circuit-level case law that a researcher should not assume is consistent across jurisdictions.

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Encyclopedia Cross-Reference

Wire Fraud and Mail Fraud (18 USC 1341, 1343), The Law Mind Criminal Law Encyclopedia

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WIRESmain

Bouvier's Law Dictionary • 1928

As to other uses of city streets and compensation to abutters for damages re- sulting therefrom, see EMINENT DOMAIN. The owners on the opposite sides prima facie own respectively to the centre line of the street; 33 Pa. 124; 86 Hun 424; 17 N. J. Eq. 75. And a grant of land "by," or "on," or "along" a highway carries, by presumption, the fee to the centre line, if the grantor own so far, though this pre- sumption may be rebutted by words show- ing an intention to exclude the highway, such as, "by the side of," " by the margin of," or other equivalent expressions; Ang. Highw. § 315; 11 Me. 463; 4 Day 228; 13 N. H. 381; 8 Metc. 266; 2 R. I. 508; 60 N. Y. 609; 5 Whart. 18. But, while in most of the states this is the rule, there are excep- tions as, in Kansas and Nebraska, where the fee of highways is vested in the county; 25 Pac. Rep. (Kan.) 894; 46 N. W. Rep. (Neb.) 627; and in New York city where by act of 1813 the fee is vested in the mu- nicipality in trust for the public; 27 N. Y. 188; 45 id. 732; 68 id. 593; 125 id. 164; and in Illinois, in the municipality in trust for the public; 75 Ill. 301; 11 id. 554; 67 id. 439; and it is held that even where the abut- ting owner does not own the fee in the highway, he has special easements therein not enjoyed by the public, as those of light, air, and access; 36 Hun 427; 34 id. 121; 9 id. 246; 4 Paige 510; 102 Ill. 64; 21 Fed. Rep. 309; 7 Wall. 272; 7 Col. 113; 39 Ohio St. 333; 41 Hun 117; 44 N. J. Eq. 120; 108 Ind. 29. See FRONTAGE. Where the fee of a highway is in the adjoining owner, it reverts to him upon a discontinuance, vaca- tion, or abandonment; 8 Bosw. 372; 4 Mass. 429; 110 Pa. 370; 36 Barb. 136; 10 Pet. 26; 15 Johns. 447; 28 Kan. 470. But in Illinois it is held that such land reverts to the orig- inal owner and not to the abutter who ac- quires title to it after the establishment of the way; 75 III. 301. In England, the inhabitants of the sev- eral parishes are prima facie bound to re- pair all highways lying within them, unless by prescription or otherwise they can throw the burden upon particular persons; Shelf. Highw. 44; 5 Burr. 1700; 12 Mod. 409. In this country, the English parochial system being unknown, this feature of the common law does not prevail. The liability to repair is here determined by statute, and, in most of the states, devolves upon the towns, or other local municipalities; 8 Barb. 645; 13 Pick. 343; 1 Humphr. 217; 125 Pa. 24; 74 Iowa 644. The liability being thus created, its measure is likewise to be ascertained by statute, the criterion being, generally, safety and convenience for travel, having reference to the natural characteristics of the road and the public needs; Ang. Highw. § 259; 2 W. & M. 337; 19 Vt. 470; 4 Cush. 307, 365; 14 Me. 198. For neglect to repair, the parish in England, and in this country the town or body chargeable, is indictable as for a nuisance; 2Wms. Saund. 158, n. 4; 28 Ν. Η. 195; Ang. Highw. § 275; and, in many states, is made liable, by statute, to an action on the case for damages in favor of any person who may have suffered spe- cial injury by reason of such neglect; 17 How. 161; 3 Cush. 174; 22 Pa. 384; 31 Me. 299; Ang. Highw. § 286; 83 Va. 355; 71 Tex. 280. But to make a county liable, the defect in the highway must have been the sole cause of the injury; 81 W. Va. 477. Contributory negligence defeats recovery for injuries caused by a defective highway; 29 S. C. 140; 97 Mo. 151; 31 W. Va. 477; 77 Ga. 288. The duty of repair may, in this country, rest on an individual to the exclu- sion of the town; 23 Wend. 446; or on a corporation who, in pursuance of their charter, build a road, and levy tolls for the expense of maintaining it; 7 Conn. 86. The taking of toll is prima facie evidence of the duty; 1 Hawks 451. In Pennsylvania any one or more tax- payers in a township or road district may, upon proper proceedings, and giving a bond, acquire a right to make, repair, etc., all the roads, and thereupon be free from road taxes for a year; act of June 12, 1893. Any act or obstruction which incom- modes or impedes the lawful use of a high- way by the public, except such as arises by necessity from unloading wagons, putting up buildings, etc., is a common-law nui- sance; 4 Steph. Com. 294; 1 Hawk. Pl. Cr. c. 76; Ang. Highw. § 345; 1 Denio 524; 8 Ohio St. 358; 29 Am. L. Reg. 342; 145 Pa. 453; 23 (Atl. Rep. (Pa.) 1115; 43 Pac. Rep. (Cal.) 196; 46 Ill. App. 67. A fruit stand on a city street is an obstruction; 6 Gill 425; 73 Ind. 185. The drawing large crowds before a shop window; 1 S. & R. 219; the stopping teams or vehicles for such a time or at such a place as unreasonably to inter- fere with public travel; 3 Campb. 226; 54 Md. 148; 39 Ohio St. 333; 85 N. C. 522; (but a reasonable necessity will justify a tem- porary obstruction; 72 Wis. 199); collecting a noisy and disorderly crowd by music or speaking; 19 Pa. 412; 64 N. H. 48; con- ducting an execution sale on the street; 13 S. & R. 403; are nuisances an

WIRESmain

Bouvier's Law Dictionary • 1928

By the provisions of the Re- vised Statutes § 5363, electrical companies must so construct and maintain their lines as not to obstruct ordinary travel or navi- gation. This act grants to the companies which accept its provisions a species of easement or right of way; 38 Fed. Rep. 552. It does not prevent state legislatures from enacting statutes requiring telegraph wires to be placed underground; 125 N. Y. 641; 145 U. S. 175; and when declared a nuisance, they may be forcibly removed, although the subways are not in a condi- tion to receive them; 125 N. Y. 641. The attachment of wires to the roof of a building may be prohibited by municipal ordinance in the exercise of the police power; 45 Fed. Rep. 493; and the company is liable to the owner of the premises for making such attachment without permis- sion; 114 Mass. 149. Although not an insurer of safety to travellers all reasonable precautions must be taken in stringing wires; 2 Col. 148; 91 U. S. 495; and in investigating promptly detached or grounded wires; 161 Mass. 583; 27 S. W. Rep. (Tex.) 66; and in removing dead wires in the case of fire or accident: 33 Minn. 340; but the mere fact that one was killed by a hanging wire does not prove negligence; 34 Atl. Rep. (N. J.) 1069; contra, 114 N. C. 203. In many of the states the insulation of the wire is made the subject of statutory provision, and even in the absence of such provision, it has been held that non-insula- tion is negligence; 161 Mass. 583. The company will be liable for damages if a dead wire, coming into contact with a live wire of another company, becomes charged and causes injury or death; 27 S. W. Rep. (Tex.) 66. One whose occupation requires his prox- imity to an electric wire may presume it to be insulated; 44 La. Ann. 692; and he is not required to make an examination in order to ascertain if such be the case; 107 Cal. 120. A traveller may pick up a wire from the street and throw it outside the regular line of travel without being guilty of contributory negligence; 156 Mass. 893; 114 N. C. 208; 27 S. W. Rep. (Tex.) 66. For injuries so received damages may be re- covered either from the city: 156 Mass. 898; or from the company; 27 S. W. Rep. (Tex.) 66. But in order to sustain an action for damages, it must be clearly shown that there was no contributory negligence; 9 So. Rep. (La.) 433. It has been considered contributory negligence to step on a live wire after a warning; 9 Houst. 306. The wires of electric light and electric railway companies, unlike those of tele- graph and telephone companies, carry a strong and dangerous current, and such companies are bound to the highest degree of care in the pursuit of their business; 114 N. C. 203. If a telephone wire has been negligently allowed to drop across a trolley wire, the owner of the latter is jointly liable with the owner of the telephone wire for in- juries to a third person caused by electric- ity conveyed through it from the trolley wire; 33 S. W. Rep. (Ark.) 426. See 31 L. R. A. 566; 9 Harv. L. Rev. 505; Keasbey, Electric Wires; Croswell, Electricity; ELECTRIC LIGHT; TELEGRAPH; TELEPHONE; NEGLIGENCE; MASTER AND SERVANT.

wiresverb

Wiktionary (English) • 2026

Wiktionary contributors • CC BY-SA 4.0 • via Kaikki
Extracted and formatted for display by Law Mind. Source link opens the current Wiktionary page and its contributor history; it is not a frozen copy of this extract.

third-person singular simple present indicative of wire

wiresnoun

Wiktionary (English) • 2026

plural of wire

Wiresname

Wiktionary (English) • 2026

plural of Wire

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