Definition
An obsolete Law French term meaning "will" or "volition," derived from the Latin *voluntas*. Appearing in early English legal records, *volunt* was used to express the deliberate intention or choice of a person—most commonly in phrases such as *per sa volunt* ("by his will") and *fist son volunt* ("made his will"). The term reflects the older legal preoccupation with distinguishing acts done by deliberate choice from those done under compulsion, mistake, or incapacity.
As a standalone entry, *volunt* is primarily of historical and linguistic interest. Its significance lies less in its own direct use than in the doctrinal framework it anchors: the requirement that legal acts and legal liability generally attach only to voluntary conduct.
Common Confusion
*Volunt* is easily confused with *voluntas*, its Latin parent, and with the modern English adjective "voluntary." These terms share a root and a concept but occupy different registers. *Voluntas* appears in formal Latin maxims and civilian-influenced legal writing; *volunt* is the Law French adaptation used in early common law pleading and records; "voluntary" is the anglicized descendant used in modern doctrine. A researcher encountering any of the three in a historical source should not assume the others carry identical legal weight in context.
The entry in Burrill also introduces *voluntarius dæmon*—a compound Latin phrase using the same root—which is discussed separately below under Historical Dictionary Support and should not be conflated with *volunt* itself.
Why It Matters in Research
Researchers will encounter *volunt* almost exclusively in pre-modern English legal records, Year Books, and early pleading materials. Its appearance signals that the document is operating in a Law French register, which affects interpretation across the board—not just for this word. Because Law French spelling was highly variable and scribal conventions were inconsistent, the same concept may appear as *volunt*, *volunté*, *voluntas*, or anglicized variants depending on the period and the copyist.
The doctrinal stakes are higher than the word's obscurity suggests. Any inquiry into early common law treatments of intent, consent, testamentary capacity, or criminal mens rea will pass through vocabulary in this family. When Coke applies the phrase *voluntarius dæmon* to a drunkard—finding him a "voluntary madman" who has brought incapacity on himself—he is making a normative argument about the legal irrelevance of self-induced incompetence. That argument depends entirely on the meaning of *volunt*/*voluntas* as deliberate, chosen conduct. Tracing how courts and commentators treated self-induced states requires understanding this root concept.
Researchers using Law Mind corpus sources for early criminal law, testamentary law, or the law of contract formation should treat *volunt* and its cognates as indexing a cluster of issues around free will, capacity, and consent rather than as a narrow technical term with a fixed procedural meaning.
Historical Dictionary Support
Burrill's Law Dictionary provides the primary entry. Burrill correctly identifies the Law French origin and Latin derivation, gives two illustrative phrase examples with citations (*T. Jon. 107* for *per sa volunt*; *1 And. 3* and *Bendl. pl. 3* for *fist son volunt*), and immediately attaches the *voluntarius dæmon* discussion as a natural extension.
The *voluntarius dæmon* passage is the more substantive doctrinal item in Burrill's entry. Coke's characterization in *Co. Litt. 247* and Blackstone's adoption of the concept in *4 Bl. Com. 25* together represent the classical common law position: that voluntary intoxication does not excuse otherwise culpable conduct because the actor chose to enter the incapacitated state. The phrase itself—"voluntary madman"—captures the paradox that concerned courts: the actor lacks present reason but is held responsible because he voluntarily destroyed it.
Burrill offers no discussion of how the concept of *volunt* traveled into equity or chancery doctrine, nor does he address its relationship to the maxim *volenti non fit injuria* (to one who consents, no injury is done), which shares the same root and a closely related logic. Researchers should not assume that Burrill's entry exhausts the term's legal resonance.
Jurisdictional Note
*Volunt* as a Law French term is specific to the English common law tradition and its direct descendants. The underlying concept—that legal consequences attach to voluntary acts—is universal across common law jurisdictions, but the word itself has no operative role in modern American, Canadian, or Australian legal usage. Its relevance is confined to historical research in the English common law corpus.