Definition
Latin: "by virtue whereof." A formulaic clause appearing in common law pleadings, particularly in actions involving entry upon land, by which the pleader justified the entry by alleging it was made by virtue of an order or authority from a person entitled to grant it. The phrase introduced the specific legal basis — typically a command, license, or authority — under which the defendant claimed the right to act.
In practice, the clause functioned as the connective language tying the source of authority to the act claimed to be lawful. A defendant in trespass quare clausum fregit, for example, would plead that he entered the plaintiff's land virtute cujus — "by virtue whereof" — meaning by virtue of the authority previously identified in the plea.
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Common Confusion
The phrase should not be confused with similar Latin justification language such as vi et armis (by force and arms) or ex officio (by virtue of office). Those phrases describe the manner or capacity of an act; virtute cujus describes the derivative authority by which a specific act was authorized. It is also distinct from a general license or right claimed independently — the clause is specifically relational, anchoring the actor's authority to an identified source.
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Why It Matters in Research
This is a term of technical common law pleading, not a substantive legal concept. Researchers encountering it in historical records — particularly in English and early American case reports involving trespass and land entry — should treat it as a structural signal within a plea, not a standalone legal doctrine.
The practical significance is navigational: when reading early pleadings in printed reporters or manuscript court records, virtute cujus marks the moment in the plea where the pleader connects the grant of authority to the act being justified. If the clause is defective — if the authority cited was insufficient, improperly pleaded, or traced to someone without standing to grant it — the justification failed and trespass liability attached. Understanding the clause's function helps researchers correctly parse what was actually being argued and what the court was evaluating.
The phrase appears almost exclusively in pre-19th-century pleading records. By the time code pleading replaced common law forms in American courts (beginning with New York's Field Code in 1848 and spreading across jurisdictions thereafter), this formulaic Latin dropped out of practice. Researchers working in post-reform materials will not encounter it as live pleading language, though it may appear in treatises discussing historical pleading forms.
English equity and ecclesiastical records may use similar connective Latin phrasing, but virtute cujus as a technical pleading clause is specific to common law actions at law, particularly trespass.
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Historical Dictionary Support
The four source dictionaries are in full agreement on meaning and function. All define the phrase as "by virtue whereof" and identify it as a justification clause in pleading land entry. Black's (both editions) and Burrill rely on Wharton's law dictionary and early English reporters for support. Rapalje & Lawrence add the most useful research guidance, providing references to both American and English authorities, including 1 Hill (N.Y.) 81 — an early New York case — and multiple volumes of the English reporters, which confirm the clause's use across both jurisdictions in the common law period.
None of the dictionaries elaborate on the procedural consequences of a defective virtute cujus clause or the specific standards for adequately pleading the chain of authority. Historical sources treat the term as self-evident to readers trained in common law pleading, which they were. Modern researchers will need to consult pleading treatises — Chitty's Pleading or Stephen's Principles of Pleading are natural starting points — to understand the full technical context the dictionary entries assume.
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Jurisdictional Note
The clause originates in English common law and was carried into American practice in the colonial and early republic periods. American usage is documented primarily in New York and other states that retained common law pleading forms before code reform. After code pleading took hold across American jurisdictions in the latter half of the 19th century, the phrase ceased to have practical application in U.S. courts.
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