Definition
A Latin term from Roman civil law meaning "to will," "to be willing," or "to consent." In legal usage, *velle* expresses the act of genuine, voluntary willing — the presence of true consent or intent in a legal transaction or obligation. The concept was significant in distinguishing authentic legal will from mere compliance compelled by the authority of another. A person who acts under the command of a father or master (*patria potestas* or dominical authority) was not legally regarded as having exercised *velle* in any meaningful sense; the will was treated as absent or negated by the overriding authority.
The term functions primarily as a doctrinal building block within Roman civil law analysis of consent and volition, and appears in conjunction with its counterpart *nolle* (to be unwilling; to refuse). Together they frame the poles of legally recognized will.
Common Confusion
VELLE / VOLO: These are grammatically distinct forms of the same Latin verb but appear as separate headwords in some historical dictionaries. *Volo* (I will/wish) is the form most often encountered in legal maxims; *velle* is the infinitive. In research, treat them as part of a single doctrinal concept and search both forms.
VELLE / VOLUNTAS: *Voluntas* refers to the will as a capacity or disposition — the general faculty of willing — while *velle* refers to the specific act of willing in a given transaction. Civilian sources use them in distinct ways, and conflating them can distort interpretation of Roman law passages on consent.
Why It Matters in Research
This is a term of Roman civil law encountered almost exclusively in civil law treatises, Digest commentaries, and maxim collections rather than in common law casebooks or statutes. Researchers working in historical American or English legal sources will find *velle* appearing mainly in Latin maxim discussions or in scholarly works on civil law influence.
The most important navigational point: Anderson's Dictionary of Law simply redirects to VOLO, the first-person singular present form of the same verb ("I will" / "I wish"), which was more commonly cited in legal maxims. Researchers encountering *velle* (the infinitive form) and *volo* (the conjugated form) should treat them as part of the same doctrinal cluster and search both headwords in historical sources.
The Digest maxim preserved in Burrill — *Velle non creditur qui obsequitur imperio patris vel domini* — is a significant substantive rule, not mere vocabulary. It encodes the Roman law principle that obedience to paternal or dominical command negates the legal presumption of voluntary will. This has downstream relevance to discussions of duress, undue influence, and the conditions required for valid consent in contract and obligation. Researchers tracing the intellectual genealogy of duress doctrine or the development of will theory in contract law may find this maxim a useful anchor point.
Be cautious with historical sources that treat *velle* as interchangeable with general notions of "intent." Roman civil law drew precise distinctions between *voluntas* (will as a general faculty), *velle* (the act of willing in a specific transaction), and *animus* (intent or purpose). These distinctions mattered to civilian jurists and should not be collapsed when reading primary or secondary civil law texts.
Historical Dictionary Support
Burrill provides the substantive entry, giving the Latin definition and reproducing the Digest maxim with its source citation (*Digest* 50.17.4). This is consistent with Burrill's general practice of preserving civil law vocabulary with direct reference to the Corpus Juris Civilis. Anderson, by contrast, offers no independent definition and defers entirely to VOLO — suggesting that by the time of Anderson's compilation, *velle* was considered either derivative or sufficiently covered under the conjugated form. Neither source attempts to translate the concept into American or English common law application, which is appropriate given that *velle* remained a civilian term without a naturalized common law equivalent. Researchers should not expect further elaboration in standard common law dictionaries; Black's Law Dictionary and its predecessors give little or no treatment to this term outside of the associated maxim.