Definition
Of little worth or importance; trifling; inconsiderable. In law, the term appears most often as a threshold concept: a matter so minor in value or consequence that it falls below the level warranting legal cognizance or judicial attention. It is closely associated with the equitable maxim *de minimis non curat lex* — the law does not concern itself with trifles.
In equity practice specifically, triviality functioned as a procedural ground for dismissal. A defendant could demur to a bill in equity on the basis that the matter in dispute was trivial — meaning its value or significance was so slight as to be beneath the dignity of an equity court to hear. This was not a defense on the merits but a threshold objection: the court should not be occupied with petty claims when its jurisdiction was reserved for substantial controversies.
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Common Language
Modern common usage (Wiktionary): Of little significance or importance; unimportant; commonplace.
Historical common usage (Webster's 1913): Of little worth or importance; inconsiderable; trifling; petty; paltry. Also, in older usage: found anywhere; common; ordinary.
The legal and common meanings are close but not identical in function. In everyday use, "trivial" is a descriptor of degree — something that is simply not very important. In legal and equitable usage, triviality carried procedural force: a finding that a matter was trivial could terminate proceedings altogether, invoking the de minimis doctrine as a jurisdictional or discretionary bar. The gap is between characterization and consequence.
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Common Confusion
TRIVIAL vs. DE MINIMIS: These concepts overlap substantially but are not identical. "Trivial" describes the qualitative character of a matter — its smallness or insignificance. "De minimis" is the legal doctrine built on that concept, expressing the principle that the law will not act on trifles. A researcher encountering "trivial" in older equity materials should check whether the court is making a factual characterization, invoking the de minimis maxim, or treating triviality as a technical ground for demurrer. The three uses appear in the sources with varying precision.
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Why It Matters in Research
Researchers working in equity materials from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries will encounter "trivial" as a semi-technical term with procedural significance that the word no longer carries in modern legal writing. The equitable demurrer for triviality is largely obsolete as a distinct procedural device, absorbed into modern rules governing dismissal for failure to state a claim or lack of jurisdictional minimum. When a historical equity source uses "trivial" to describe a bill or matter in dispute, it may be signaling this specific procedural posture — not merely editorializing about the importance of the claim.
The connection to the de minimis maxim is consistently flagged by Bouvier, who cross-references "trivial" directly to the de minimis entry. Researchers should trace both terms in any equity research project involving threshold or dismissal questions. In modern materials, "trivial" appears in tort law (particularly in the context of whether a defect is too trivial to create liability), in intellectual property (trivial variations insufficient to defeat similarity), and in constitutional law (trivial burdens insufficient to trigger heightened scrutiny). These modern uses are functional descendants of the same threshold concept but operate in very different procedural frameworks.
The first entry under Black's Law Dictionary — "Otherwise called 'dies fasti'" with a citation to Blackstone — appears to be a misplaced or corrupted entry unrelated to "trivial" as a substantive legal term. Researchers should disregard it as a source artifact.
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Historical Dictionary Support
The historical dictionaries are consistent in their core definition: trivial means of small importance or worth. Black's (both editions) and Bouvier converge on the same proposition — that in equity, a demurrer lies to a bill where the matter is trivial, citing the same passage from Bouvier's Institutes. This uniformity suggests the definition was well-settled in nineteenth-century equity practice rather than contested.
What the historical sources do not address is how courts actually calibrated the triviality threshold — what value or degree of insignificance triggered the doctrine. The sources treat it as self-evident, which likely reflects a period when equity courts exercised wide discretion over their own dockets. Modern researchers should not expect the historical dictionaries to supply a workable standard; the concept was inherently flexible.
Bouvier's cross-reference to the de minimis maxims entry is the most instructive navigational signal in the historical material, pointing researchers toward the broader doctrinal framework within which triviality operated.
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Jurisdictional Note
The equitable demurrer for triviality was a feature of courts exercising traditional equity jurisdiction. With the merger of law and equity under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (and equivalent state reforms), the procedural mechanism disappeared in most American jurisdictions, though the underlying de minimis principle persists across contexts. Researchers working in jurisdictions that retained separate equity courts longer — including some state chancery courts — may encounter the doctrine in later materials than the federal timeline suggests.
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