Definition
In criminal law, thrusting means pushing or driving with force using a weapon or object. The term appears in criminal statutes—particularly those governing assault and battery with a weapon—and carries a broader meaning than popular usage might suggest: thrusting is not confined to attacks made with a pointed or edged weapon. Any forceful pushing or driving motion, regardless of whether the instrument has a sharp point, may satisfy the statutory definition.
Common Language
Modern common usage (Wiktionary): Present participle and gerund of "thrust"—to push or drive with force; to lunge forward.
Historical common usage (Webster's 1913): "The act of pushing with force." Webster's also notes a secondary agricultural/dairy sense (pressing curd by hand to expel whey), unrelated to legal usage.
The common meaning and the legal meaning are closely aligned in their core sense of forceful pushing. The legal distinction worth noting is narrower and practical: everyday usage might naturally associate "thrusting" with a stabbing or lunging motion implying a pointed object, but the legal definition expressly rejects that limitation. A weapon need not be sharp or pointed for a blow or drive to constitute a thrust within the meaning of a criminal statute.
Common Confusion
Thrusting is sometimes read as synonymous with stabbing, implying the presence of a pointed weapon. Courts have rejected this conflation. The legal definition is broader: the focus is on the manner of force—pushing or driving—not on the geometry of the instrument. A blunt object driven forcefully can constitute a thrust in the statutory sense.
Why It Matters in Research
This term appears almost exclusively in older criminal law materials, particularly in the context of statutes that enumerate specific acts of violence—such as "cutting, stabbing, or thrusting"—as aggravated forms of assault or battery. Researchers working with nineteenth- and early twentieth-century indictments, jury charges, or appellate opinions must read "thrusting" in its statutory context carefully. A defendant charged with "thrusting" under such a statute could not successfully argue that no pointed weapon was used; the Louisiana Supreme Court's interpretation in State v. Lowry settled this construction, and both editions of Black's Law Dictionary carry that holding forward as the operative definition.
The term is largely absent from modern statutory language, which tends toward more general formulations ("assault with a deadly weapon," "use of force"). Researchers encountering "thrusting" in historical indictments should treat it as a term of art drawn from the specific statutory text of the jurisdiction, not as a descriptive word with its plain English meaning. Check the relevant statute's enumerated acts, since "thrusting" often appeared alongside "cutting" and "stabbing" as a distinct category—each with its own proof requirements.
Cross-jurisdictional consistency on this definition appears limited to the Black's formulation derived from Louisiana. Other jurisdictions may have applied the term differently or not construed it at all. Do not assume uniform interpretation outside sources that expressly adopt the Lowry construction.
Historical Dictionary Support
Both editions of Black's Law Dictionary reproduce substantially the same entry, with the second edition adding the full citation to State v. Lowry, 33 La. Ann. 1224. The definition is narrow and case-specific: a single Louisiana appellate decision furnishes the entire doctrinal basis. Neither edition attempts a broader synthesis or notes variation across other jurisdictions, which limits the entry's utility as a general statement of law. The first edition presents the holding without attribution; the second edition corrects this by supplying the case name and reporter citation—a meaningful improvement for research verification.
Webster's 1913 provides no legal dimension, and its dairy-related secondary definition is entirely irrelevant to legal usage. The primary Webster's sense (forceful pushing) does, however, align with the legal core and helps confirm that the legal definition was not a radical departure from ordinary English but rather a clarification against a narrower popular assumption.
Jurisdictional Note
The published legal definition derives entirely from a Louisiana case. Other common law jurisdictions that used "thrusting" in criminal statutes may have reached similar conclusions on functional grounds, but no broader authority appears in the Black's entries. Researchers should verify the statutory and case law of the specific jurisdiction before relying on the Louisiana construction.