A partial dissolution of the marriage relation. By the ecclesiastical or canon law of England, which had exclusive jurisdiction over marriage and divorce, marriage was regarded as a sacrament and indissoluble. This doctrine originated with the church of Rome, and became established in England while that country was Catholic: and thougn arter the reformation it ceased to be the doctrine of the church of England, yet the law re mained unchanged until the recent statute of 20 & 21 Vict. (1857) c. 85, and amendments; Bish. Marr. & D. §§ 65, n., 225; 1 Bish. M. Div. & S. § 1877. Hence, as has been seen in the article on divorce, a valid marriage could not be dissolved in England except by what has been termed the omnipotent power of parliament. This gave rise, in the ecclesiastical courts, to the practice of granting divorces from bed and board, as they used to be called, or judicial separation, as they are called in the recent statute 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, §7; Bish. Marr. & D. §§ 65, n., 225; 1 Bish. М. D. & S. § 1377. From England this practice was in- troduced into this country; and though in some of the states it has entirely given way to the divorce a vinculo matrimonii, in others it is still in use, being generally granted for causes which are not sufficient to authorize the latter. The only causes for which such a divorce is granted in England are adultery and cruelty. In this country it is generally granted also for wilful desertion, and in some states for other causes. The legal consequences of a separation from bed and board are much less exten- sive than those of a divorce a vinculo matri- monii or a sentence of nullity. Such a separation works no change in the relation of the parties either to each other or to third persons, except in authorizing them to live apart until they mutually come together. In coming together, no new marriage is required; neither, it seems, under the general law, are any new pro- ceedings in court necessary; but the rec- onciliation, of its own force, annuls the sentence of separation; 5 Pick. 461;4 Johns. Ch. 187; 2 Dall. 128; Cro. Eliz. 908. Nor does such a separation, at common law and without statutory aid, change the relation of the parties as to property. Thus, it neither takes away the right of the wife to dower, nor the right of the husband to the wife's real estate, either during her life or after her death, as tenant by the curtesy; neither does it affect the hus- band's right in a court of law to reduce into possession the choses in action of the wife; though in equity it may be other- wise; 2 Pick. 316; 5 id. 61; 6 W. & S. 85; Cro. Eliz. 908; 4 Barb. 295. It should be observed, however, that in this country the consequences of a judicial separation are frequently modified by stat- ute. See Bishop. Marr. & D. §§ 660-695, Bish. M. D. & S. § 1832. Of those consequences which depend upon the order and decree of the court, the most important is that of alimony. See ALIMONY. In respect to the custody of children, the rules are the same as in case of divorce a vinculo matrimonii; Bish. Marr. & D. c. 25. See DIVORCE; 2 Bish. M. D. & S. § 1185: Macq. Husb. & W. 220; Browne, Div. 29.