Definition
A demonstrative pronoun or adjective used in legal instruments to refer to something previously expressed or immediately at hand. In legal drafting and textual interpretation, "this" carries a technical rule of reference: when "this" and "that" appear in the same sentence or clause and both refer to antecedents, "this" points to the thing last mentioned, and "that" points to the thing first mentioned. The word functions as a simple word of relation and is construed according to its ordinary grammatical meaning — courts will not extend that meaning to reach something other than the antecedent to which "this" naturally relates.
Common Language
Modern common usage (Wiktionary): Used to indicate degree or extent, or as a demonstrative pointing to something present or nearby.
Historical common usage (Webster's 1913): A demonstrative pronoun denoting something present or near in place or time, something just mentioned, or something about to be mentioned.
The gap between ordinary and legal usage is narrow but consequential. In everyday speech, "this" loosely gestures at whatever the speaker has in mind. In legal instruments, courts apply a precise antecedent rule: the word locks onto the most recently named referent, not the most prominent or most important one. A drafter who relies on intuitive emphasis rather than structural proximity may produce an instrument that courts read differently than intended.
Common Confusion
"This" and "that" are routinely treated as interchangeable in ordinary drafting, but they are not interchangeable once an interpretive dispute arises. Under the rule recognized by all four historical sources, the two words point in opposite directions when both appear in a sentence referring back to prior matter: "this" reaches the nearer antecedent; "that" reaches the farther one. The companion phrase "these others" adds a further wrinkle — it refers to persons or things distinct from those just mentioned, not to those just mentioned themselves. Drafters who use "this" and "that" without attention to antecedent sequence invite exactly the kind of ambiguity that requires judicial resolution.
Why It Matters in Research
The practical weight of this entry falls almost entirely on document interpretation rather than substantive law. A researcher encountering a disputed instrument — a deed, will, contract, or statute — where the referent of "this" is contested should treat the antecedent-proximity rule as the governing baseline. Courts applying the rule do not ask what the drafter most likely meant; they ask what "this" grammatically reaches given the order in which things were mentioned.
The historical sources all trace the rule to the same Pennsylvania authority (Russell v. Kennedy, 66 Pa. 251), which means the rule has a common-law pedigree rather than a statutory one and has been absorbed into general drafting doctrine rather than any particular jurisdiction's code. The English authority cited by Bouvier (14 Q.B.D. 720) reinforces the same limiting principle — "this" will not be stretched to cover something outside its grammatical reach — and gives the rule transatlantic grounding useful when researching instruments under English-influenced equity or trust law.
Researchers in the Law Mind corpus should be alert to one trap: older instruments, particularly pre-twentieth-century deeds and wills, sometimes use "this" and "that" interchangeably as a matter of stylistic habit rather than intentional distinction. In those cases, the antecedent-proximity rule may produce a result that reflects grammatical accident more than drafting intent, and courts have occasionally noted that the rule is a default rather than an absolute command. Look for surrounding context and the overall structure of the instrument before treating the rule as dispositive.
Historical Dictionary Support
All four sources converge on the same core proposition: "this" = last mentioned; "that" = first mentioned. The formulations are nearly identical across Black's (both editions), Anderson, and Bouvier, suggesting the rule was treated as settled and uncontroversial by the late nineteenth century.
Bouvier adds the most useful refinement. First, it introduces the "these others" construction, which the other sources either omit or handle only obliquely. Second, and more importantly, Bouvier cites the limiting principle from English case law — that "this" is "a simple word of relation" whose "ordinary grammatical meaning will not be extended so as to include something else than that to which it relates." This formulation has interpretive significance beyond the proximity rule: it cuts off arguments that "this" should be read expansively to serve the evident purpose of an instrument. The word means what it grammatically points to, nothing more.
Anderson's note to "Compare Hic" is worth following for researchers working with Latin legal instruments or older equity pleadings, where the Latin demonstrative hic carries equivalent function and the same directional rules apply.
What the historical sources do not address is the interaction between the proximity rule and modern canons of construction, particularly the canon that a court will choose the reading that gives effect to the whole instrument. When strict application of the "this/that" rule produces absurdity or contradiction, modern courts may override it. The historical dictionaries treat the rule as categorical; contemporary practice treats it as presumptive.
Jurisdictional Note
The rule derives from common-law interpretation doctrine and is not codified in most jurisdictions. The Pennsylvania precedent (Russell v. Kennedy) is widely cited but not universally binding. Jurisdictions with comprehensive statutory interpretation acts may have codified rules for resolving ambiguous pronoun references in statutes, which could displace or supplement the common-law baseline in that specific context.