Definition
In legal usage, "think" functions as a verb of mental conviction, equivalent in force to "believe," "consider," or "esteem." Its primary legal significance arises in the context of jury findings and verdicts: when a jury states that it "thinks" a particular fact to be true or false, that expression has been held legally sufficient to communicate a definitive factual conclusion, not merely tentative opinion. The word carries enough positiveness in a special finding to satisfy the requirement that the jury's determination be clear and decisive.
Common Language
Modern common usage (Wiktionary): To ponder or go over something in one's mind; to hold a statement in one's mind; to be of the opinion that something is true while remaining open to uncertainty; to guess or reckon; to plan or intend.
Historical common usage (Webster's 1913): To employ the higher intellectual faculties; to exercise reasoning beyond simple sensory perception; to call something to mind; to remember.
The gap matters. In everyday English, "I think" frequently signals hedging — uncertainty, tentativeness, or approximation. In legal proceedings, particularly jury findings, courts have rejected the argument that "think" is too equivocal to constitute a proper verdict. Where a jury uses the word "think" in a special finding, it is treated as expressing the same degree of conviction as "believe" or "find." Researchers encountering this distinction in older trial records should not read ordinary hesitancy into the jury's use of the term.
Why It Matters in Research
This is a narrow but specific term of art for researchers working with jury records, trial transcripts, and appellate opinions reviewing the sufficiency of verdicts. The legal treatment of "think" matters in at least two research contexts:
First, when examining special verdicts and special findings in historical case records, researchers may encounter jury language that appears informal or uncertain — "we think," "we believe," "we are of opinion." Courts generally treated these formulations as legally equivalent. Finding that a jury used "think" rather than "find" does not necessarily indicate a defective or conditional verdict. Appellate opinions from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries sometimes address this exact issue when reviewing whether a special finding was sufficiently definite to support judgment.
Second, researchers tracing the judicial treatment of mental-state language — in contexts ranging from negligence to criminal intent — will find "think" appearing in evidentiary discussions about what a party knew, believed, or intended. In those settings, "think" connects to broader doctrinal categories: intention, malice, premeditation, and discretion. Anderson's cross-references make this linkage explicit.
The Iowa case referenced in all three source dictionaries (59 Iowa 414) is the anchoring authority. Researchers working in Midwestern state court records from this period will find this precedent cited when verdict language is challenged on appeal.
Historical Dictionary Support
All three historical dictionaries — Black's, Anderson's, and Bouvier's — converge on the same core proposition: "think" means "believe, consider, esteem," and a jury finding expressed in these terms is legally sufficient. The agreement is unusually tight across these sources, which reflects the fact that the underlying legal point was settled by a single well-known case rather than developed through broad doctrinal evolution.
Black's is the most precise, emphasizing that the word expresses the jury's conclusion "with sufficient positiveness." Anderson's is notable for flagging the cross-references to DISCRETION, INTENTION, MALICE, and PREMEDITATION — suggesting that the editors understood "think" to carry significance beyond verdict language and into the broader domain of mental state doctrine. Bouvier's tracks Anderson's closely, citing the same Iowa authority.
What the historical dictionaries do not address is the flip side: contexts where courts found verdict language too equivocal. Researchers should not read these entries as establishing that any use of "think" in a jury finding is automatically sufficient under all circumstances. The historical sources document the winning argument in a favorable case; they do not map the outer boundaries of acceptable verdict language across jurisdictions.
Jurisdictional Note
The specific holding on jury findings using "think" derives from Iowa case law. Other jurisdictions applied similar reasoning during the same period, but researchers working outside the Midwest should verify whether local appellate courts addressed the question independently. The broader principle — that informal mental-state verbs in jury findings are not automatically defective — was widely accepted, but the precise formulation varied.