Definition
Things real are the category of legal property consisting of land, tenements, and all rights and interests that are permanently fixed to, annexed to, or issuing out of immovable property. The defining characteristic is permanence and immobility: things real cannot be carried from place to place. They stand in contrast to things personal, which are movable or transitory in nature.
The classical formulation, drawn from Blackstone, limits things real to "such things as are permanent, fixed, and immovable." Stephen's refinement — adopted by later commentators and generally preferred — expands the category to include not only tangible, immovable objects (land and buildings) but also incorporeal rights appurtenant to or issuing out of those objects, such as easements, profits à prendre, rents, and similar interests. The Stephen formulation is the more accurate working definition for legal research purposes.
Things real thus encompass:
1. CORPOREAL HEREDITAMENTS — Physical, tangible land and the structures permanently affixed to it.
2. INCORPOREAL HEREDITAMENTS — Non-physical rights and interests annexed to or derived from land, including easements, rents, tithes, offices, and franchises running with the land.
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Common Confusion
THINGS REAL vs. REAL PROPERTY: The terms are closely related but not interchangeable in historical usage. Real property is the broader possessory concept — the legal estate or ownership interest in land. Things real is the classificatory concept — the object itself (or right issuing from it) that falls within the category of immovable property. In modern usage the distinction has largely collapsed, and real property has displaced things real as the operative term in statutes and practice.
THINGS REAL vs. THINGS PERSONAL: The boundary matters most for inheritance, attachment, and jurisdiction. Under common law, the mode of descent, the court of competent jurisdiction, and the applicable law all varied depending on whether a right was classified as real or personal. Certain interests — such as leaseholds — created persistent classification problems: a leasehold is a possessory interest in land but was historically treated as personal property (a chattel real), not as a thing real in the strict sense.
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Recognized Forms
/SUBTYPES
CORPOREAL HEREDITAMENTS: Land itself and permanent physical fixtures. The paradigm case of a thing real.
INCORPOREAL HEREDITAMENTS: Rights issuing out of land without physical substance — easements, profits, rents, advowsons, tithes, franchises. The Blackstone definition was criticized precisely because it appeared to exclude these; Stephen's correction brought them explicitly within things real.
CHATTEL REAL: A hybrid category. Leaseholds were classified as chattels real — personal property in the eyes of the law despite being interests in land. They are not things real in the traditional sense, though they occupy an intermediate position in the taxonomy.
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Why It Matters in Research
The term things real is primarily encountered in historical sources — English common law treatises, early American property texts, equity materials, and 18th and 19th century case law. Modern statutes and decisions have almost entirely replaced it with real property or real estate. Researchers working in pre-20th century materials, particularly on inheritance, descent and distribution, attachment, or conflict of laws, will encounter things real as a live operative term and must understand its precise scope.
The Blackstone/Stephen divergence is a practical research trap. Sources citing Blackstone's definition may appear to exclude incorporeal rights from the category, while sources following Stephen include them. When reading historical cases or treatises on whether a particular right (a rent charge, an easement, a franchise) could be seized on execution, was subject to dower, or passed to the heir rather than the executor, the question often turned on whether that right was classified as a thing real. An entry citing only Blackstone may reach a different result than one following Stephen.
The chattel real problem is a second trap. Researchers examining leaseholder rights, landlord-tenant disputes, or the devolution of long terms of years in historical sources will find that courts explicitly refused to treat leaseholds as things real despite their obvious connection to land. This affected dower rights, curtesy, execution by creditors, and choice of law in conflict of laws cases.
The taxonomy of things real versus things personal also connects to the jurisdictional split between courts of common law and equity, and between ecclesiastical courts (which administered personal estate) and common law courts (which governed real property). Researchers in probate history need to track this boundary carefully.
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Historical Dictionary Support
Black's Law Dictionary preserves both the Blackstone and the Stephen definitions, and correctly notes that the Blackstone formulation was "objected to as not embracing incorporeal rights." This is one of the more candid admissions in legal lexicography that a foundational definition was inadequate. The entry does not resolve which definition controls in any given jurisdiction — a limitation researchers should note.
The underlying sources (Blackstone's Commentaries Book II and Stephen's Commentaries) are the primary authorities. Both are in the historical canon and widely available. The Stephen definition at 1 Steph. Comm. 156 is the more complete and analytically coherent formulation and was generally adopted by American treatise writers following Kent and Story.
Historical dictionaries are consistent in treating things real as a category term rather than a term of art with independent operative force — it classifies; it does not itself confer rights. This means researchers should look past the dictionary definition to the underlying doctrine governing the specific right at issue (dower, descent, execution, conflict of laws) to determine the legal consequences of the classification.
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Jurisdictional Note
The things real / things personal taxonomy was carried into American common law from English sources but was progressively displaced by statutory definitions of real property beginning in the 19th century. American jurisdictions varied in their treatment of fixtures, mineral rights, and growing crops at the boundary of the category. Researchers working in a specific American jurisdiction before the mid-20th century should consult that state's property statutes and case law rather than relying on the English common law formulation directly.
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Encyclopedia Cross-Reference
The Law Mind Property Law Encyclopedia — Real Estate Transactions: Fraud and Misrepresentation in Real Estate (property_49)
The Law Mind Property Law Encyclopedia — Real Estate Transactions: Real Estate Brokers (Licensing, Duties, Commission) (property_48)
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