Definition
A thing in action (also rendered as "chose in action" from the French) is a right to recover money or other personal property through judicial proceedings — that is, a right that exists in law but can only be reduced to possession by bringing a legal action. The term encompasses any intangible personal property right enforceable by lawsuit, as distinguished from a "thing in possession," which is property already held and enjoyed without the need for litigation.
The category is broad. A debt owed but not yet paid, a contractual right to future performance, a claim for damages, a negotiable instrument, a share of stock, a patent right, a judgment not yet satisfied — all are classic things in action. The common thread is that the holder has a legal right but not yet the actual physical enjoyment of the thing to which that right entitles them.
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Common Language
Modern common usage (Wiktionary): Defined simply as the plural of "thing in action" — no independent entry provides a lay definition, reflecting that this phrase has no meaningful life outside legal discourse.
Historical common usage (Webster's 1913): No independent entry. The phrase is legal terminology without an established lay counterpart.
Editorial note: This is pure legal jargon. The ordinary English words "thing" and "action" combine here in a technical sense that bears no intuitive relationship to their everyday meanings. A lay reader encountering the phrase might guess it describes a tangible object involved in a lawsuit — precisely the opposite of what it means.
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Common Confusion
THINGS IN ACTION vs. THINGS IN POSSESSION: The two form a classical binary in personal property law. A thing in possession is property physically held; a thing in action is a right that must be pursued to be realized. The confusion matters in historical research because early common law treated these categories very differently — particularly regarding assignability and grantability.
THINGS IN ACTION vs. CHOSE IN ACTION: These are functional synonyms. "Chose in action" (from Law French chose, meaning "thing") is the more common form in English legal literature and in most historical dictionaries. "Thing in action" is the anglicized equivalent, favored in American statutory drafting (notably in California's Civil Code and later in the Uniform Commercial Code). Researchers should search both forms; historical sources overwhelmingly prefer "chose in action," while modern American codes often use "thing in action."
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Why It Matters in Research
The term sits at the intersection of property law, contract law, and civil procedure, which means it appears across a wide range of corpus materials in ways that require care.
First, the anglicization problem: Before the nineteenth century, legal texts almost universally use "chose in action." The shift to "things in action" in American sources accelerates after codification movements of the 1850s–1870s. A corpus search limited to one form will miss large swaths of relevant material.
Second, the assignability evolution is critical for historical research. The early common law rule — that a bare thing in action could not be assigned, because assignment was seen as trafficking in litigation (maintenance) — was a major limitation on commercial activity. This rule eroded steadily through equity, mercantile custom, and eventually statute. The New York citation in Black's ("things in action, entry, or re-entry cannot be granted over") reflects a remnant of this older common-law hostility. Researchers reading nineteenth-century cases must understand whether a given court was applying the old rule, an equity exception, or a statutory override.
Third, the UCC transformation: Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code expressly brings many things in action — particularly "general intangibles" and payment rights — within its secured transactions framework. Post-UCC materials use different vocabulary than pre-UCC materials addressing the same underlying concepts. The research trail can appear to break when it has only been relabeled.
Fourth, the tort connection is subtle but real: In negligent infliction of emotional distress doctrine, the California Supreme Court's decision in Thing v. La Chusa (1989) introduced what practitioners call the "Thing factors" for bystander recovery. This is a coincidence of nomenclature, not etymology — but researchers working in NIED doctrine will encounter "Thing" as a case name alongside "things in action" as a property concept. The encyclopedia cross-reference above addresses the NIED context specifically.
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Historical Dictionary Support
Black's Law Dictionary supplies the baseline: a thing in action is "a right to recover money or other personal property by a judicial proceeding," citing California Civil Code § 953. The definition is workmanlike and accurate but thin. It captures the modern American statutory formulation without tracking the doctrinal history that gives the term its texture.
Black's correctly flags the no-grant rule — that things in action, entry, or re-entry could not be "granted over" — but presents it as a statement of law rather than a historical artifact in decline. By the time most editions of Black's were in circulation, statutory assignments of choses in action were widely permitted, and the common-law restriction survived mainly in specialized contexts.
The absence of Bouvier, Burrill, or other historical dictionaries from the available source base is a meaningful gap here. Bouvier's Law Dictionary (editions from 1839 forward) treats "chose in action" at length and traces the maintenance-based rationale for the non-assignability rule in greater depth than Black's. Researchers needing the full doctrinal genealogy should consult Bouvier directly alongside Black's.
What the available historical sources miss: the equitable exception allowing assignment in equity even when law courts refused to recognize it, and the commercial paper carve-out that emerged early and powerfully in mercantile contexts. These developments are essential to understanding why the modern rule looks so different from the classical rule.
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Jurisdictional Note
American states diverge on terminology and statutory treatment. California's Civil Code § 953 (cited in Black's) codified the term "thing in action" early and influenced western state codes. New York and other eastern states long retained common-law "chose in action" language. Under UCC Article 9, "payment intangibles" and "general intangibles" have largely displaced both phrases in secured transactions practice, though "chose in action" survives in insurance, estate, and assignment contexts across all common-law jurisdictions.
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Encyclopedia Cross-Reference
The Law Mind Torts & Personal Injury Encyclopedia — Defamation and Privacy Torts: NIED — Bystander Recovery Rules (Dillon/Thing Factors): Addresses the Thing v. La Chusa framework for negligent infliction of emotional distress; relevant only to the NIED doctrine context, not to the property law meaning of the term.
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