New promise to pay debt barred. There is another important class of exceptions, not made by the statute, but by the courts, wherein, although the statutory limitation may have expired, parties bringing them- selves within the exception have always been allowed to recover. In actions of as- sumpsit, a new express promise to pay, or an acknowledgment of existing indebted- ness made under such circumstances as to be equivalent to a new promise and within six years before the time of action brought, will take the case out of the operation of the statute, although the original cause of action accrued more than six years before that time; Poll. Contr. 625; 3 Tex. Civ. App. 445. And this proceeds upon the ground that as the statutory limitation merely bars the remedy and does not dis- charge the debt, there is something more than a merely moral obligation to support the promise, to wit, a pre-existent debt, which is a sufficient consideration for the new promise; 2 Mas. 151; 8 Gill 155; 19 Ill. 109; 26 Vt. 230; Ans. Contr. 100; 9 S. & R. 128; 85 Tenn. 561. The new promise upon this sufficient consideration consti- tutes, in fact, a new cause of action; 4 East 399; 6 Taunt. 210; 1 Pet. 351; Hare, Contr. 259. This was undoubtedly a liberal construc- tion of the statute; but it was early adopt- ed, and has maintained itself, in the face of much adverse criticism, to the present time. While, however, at an early period there was an inclination of the courts to accept the slightest and most ambiguous expres- sions as evidence of a new promise, the spirit and tendency of modern decisions are towards greater strictness, and seem to be fairly expressed in the learned judg- ment of Mr. Justice Story, in the case of Bell v. Morrison, 1 Pet. 351. "It has often been matter of regret, in modern times, that, in the construction of the statute of limitations, the decisions had not proceeded upon principles better adapted to carry into effect the real objects of the statute; that, instead of being viewed in an unfavorable light, as an unjust and discreditable de- fence, it had [not] received such support as would have made it, what it was intended to be, emphatically a statute of repose. It is a wise and beneficial law, not designed merely to raise a presumption of payment of a just debt from lapse of time, but to afford security against stale demands after the true state of the transactions may have been forgotten, or be incapable of explana-