4. In the law of sealed instruments, the final, absolute transfer to the grantee of a complete legal instrument sealed by the grantor, covenantor, or obligor. As a popular word, signifies mere tradition.2 A deed takes effect only from its tradition or delivery, which may be absolute or conditional. Absolute delivery. A delivery to the grantee himself. Conditional delivery. To a third person to hold till some condition is performed by the grantee.3 In the latter case the instrument is delivered as an "escrow" - as a scrowl or writing, not to take effect as a deed till the condition is performed.3 A delivery of a legal obligation made upon condition does not become a legal delivery until the condition is fulfilled.4 The delivery of a deed is essential to the transfer of title. It is the final act, without which other formalities are ineffectual. The grantor must part with possession of the deed or the right to retain it; registry may justify a presumption of delivery. While a delivery of a deed is essential to pass an estate, and there can be no delivery without surrender of the instrument or the right to retain it, such delivery will be presumed, in the absence of direct evidence, from the concurrent act of the parties recognizing a transfer of the title.. Surrender and acceptance are necessary to a complete delivery." Its importance arises from the fact that the deed has taken the place of the livery of seisin of feudal times, when, to give effect to the feoffment of the new tenant, the act of delivering possession in a public manner was the essential evidence of the investiture of title to the land. This diminished in importance until the manual delivery of a piece of turf, and other "symbolic" acts, became sufficient. When all this passed away and the creation and transfer of estates by a written instrument, called the act or "deed" of the party, became the usual mode, the instrument was 1 United States v. McCready, 11 F. R. 225, 234 (1882). * Black v. Shreve, 13 N. J. E. 461 (1860), Whelpley, J. 3 [2 Bl. Com. 307; 30 Wis. 646. • McFarland v. Sikes, 54 Conn. 250 (1886). • Younge v. Guilbeau, 3 Wall. 641 (1865), Field, J.; 5 id. 81; 79 Pa. 15; 4 Del. Ch. 311. Gould v. Day, 94 U. S. 412 (1876), Field, J. See Ireland v. Geraghty, 15 F. R. 45-46 (1883), cases, - note by M. D. Ewell. Best v. Brown, 25 Hun, 224 (1881); 6 Barb. 195; 102 3. The connection between persons descended from a common ancestor; course of descent. Direct line. Persons immediately de scended one from the other. Collateral line. Persons descended from the same ancestor, but not from each other. Paternal line. Descent as traced through the father. Maternal line. Descent traced through the mother. These lines are in turn spoken of as ascending, and descending: proceeding upward, and downward. Lineal; lineage. Lineal implies immediate descent, direct course of descent: 5 as, 1 McDonald v. Hovey, 110 U. S. 621 (1884), cases: R.S. 3 Weber v. Harbor Commissioners, 18 Wall. 70 (1873); United States v. Thompson, 98 U. S. 489 (1878); United States v. Nashville, &c. R. Co., 118 id. 125 (1886), cases; § 1008. United States v. Beebe, 17 F. R. 36, 39-41 (1883), cases: 127 U. S. 344-47 (1888), cases. United States v. Taylor, 104 U. S. 222 (1881), cases; 4 Hughes, 312, 317; 37 N. J. E. 144; 59 Tex. 150, cases. • Speidel v. Henrici, 120 U. S. 386 (1887), cases, Gray, J. 2 Retzer v. Wood, 109 U. S. 187 (1883), cases. L. linea, thread, string. 4 Hamlin v. Pairpoint Manuf. Co., 141 Mass. 56 (1886), cases. See 2 Bl. Com. Ch. XIV. ν. Τo write afar off or at a distance. A wire or wires used for the purpose of telegraphic communication, with any casing, coating, tube, or pipe inclosing the same, and any apparatus connected therewith for the purpose of such communication.4 Includes any apparatus for transmitting messages or other communications by means of electric signals. See CABLE. 1Gk. technicos', belonging to an art. 23 Stephen's History Crim. Law Eng. 347-48. Gk. tēle, afar; graph'ein, to write., 426 & 27 Vict. c. 112 - Telegraph Act of 1863. $32 & 33 Vict. c. 73-Telegraph Act of 1869. See In Dryburg's case, the message, as sent from New York city, read "Send two hand bouquets, very handsame, one of five, one of ten dollars." As received in Philadelphia it read: "Send two hundred bouquets," etc. Before the error was discovered, Dryburg, a florist, had cut flowers to the amount of one hundred dollars, as a jury found.¹ A telegram, like a letter, may constitute an admission, and complete a contract. To charge the sender the original craft must be produced. The sending operator may be called to prove the sender's presence. The company or operator may be compelled to disclose the contents of a dispatch, unless a statute provides otherwise. Any telegraph company organized under the laws of any State, shall have the right to construct, maintain, and operate lines through and over any portion of the public domain, over and along any military or post-road, and over, under, or across the navigable streams or waters of the United States; the lines not to obstruct navigation, or interfere with ordinary travel.1 Acceptance of that provision, as far as government business is concerned, makes the company agent of the United States.2 But the privilege conferred does not involve ex emption from the ordinary burdens of taxation in a State within which a company may own or operate An accepted telegram is a sufficient memorandum lines. 3 within Statute of Frauds Congress may regulate communication by telegraph between the States. And where a State has given exclusive privileges to one company, which would preclude free intercourse, Congress, under the powers "to regulate commerce " and "to establish post-offices and post-roads," may provide for the construction of competing lines. See COMMERCE. A telegraph company holds the same relation to commerce as a carrier of messages that a railroad company holds as a carrier of goods. Both companies are instruments of commerce, and their business is commerce itself. From their essentially different characteristics, the regulations suitable for one of these kinds of commerce would be inapplicable to the other. Within the reservation that it does not encroach upon the exercise of the powers vested in Congress, a State may make such provisions in respect to the buildings, poles and wires of the companies within its jurisdiction as the comfort and convenience of the community may require.7 cases; 2 Kent, 12 ed. [829], cases; 2 Pars. Contr. 6 ed. 257f; Shearm. & Redf. Neg. §§ 549-71; 11 F. R. 1, 10; 27 Iowa, 451; 113 Mass. 301; 15 Mich. 532; 37 Mo. 472; 48 N. Y. 132; 62 Pa. 88; 5 S. C. 358; 19 id. 71; Allen's Tel. Cases; Scott & Jarn. Tel. 1 New York & Wash. Tel. Co. v. Dryburg, 35 Pa. 208 (1860). See further, as to negligence by operator, Wabash R. Co. v. McDaniels, CARRIER, Common. * Trevor v. Wood, 36 N. Y. 307 (1867): 93 Am. Dec. 514-17 (1887), cases; Utley v. Donaldson, 94 U. S. 29 (1876); 4 Biss. 357; 1 Woods, 286; 4 Dill. 431; 39 Iowa, 39; 103 Mass. 327; 20 Mo. 254; 35 Barb. 463; 36 N. Y. 307; 37 id. 457; 41 id. 544; 30 Wis. 605. See 14 Cent. Law J. 262-65 (1882), cases; 3 Dill. 571; 40 Conn. 363; 25 III. 591; 82 id. 73; 49 Ind. 223; 15 La. An. 668; 7 Allen, 548; 37 Miss. 682; 48 N. H. 488; 40 Pa. 9; 29 Vt. 127; 40 Wis. 431; 18 U. C., Q. B. 60. 27 Am. Law Reg. 65-79 (1879), cases; 5 South. Law Rev. 473-520 (1879), cases; 3 Dill. 567; 15 F. R. 713; 58 Me. 267; 7 W. Va. 544; 2 Pars. S. Cas. 274; 13 West. Jur. 122; 20 Law Times, 421. 5 Godwin v. Francis, L. R., C. P. 293 (1870); Reuss v. Picksley, L. R., 1 Ex. 312 (1866); 39 L. J., C. P. 121; 4 H. & C. 588; 6 U. C., C. P. 221. A railroad being a post-road that act of 1866 is paramount over any agreement for the exclusive use of a road by one company. A State may not tax inter-State messages: they are commerce, as well as in the nature of postal service, and exempt from State regulations, except as to regulations of a strictly police character. Any regulation by way of a tax upon the occupation or business of transmitting messages between different States, or as a license to transact business, is unconstitutional.5 Nor may a State tax a company's receipts from inter-State messages." Whether the poles, wires, and instruments are part of the realty to which they are annexed, depends upon the intent with which they were erected." A city may determine the conditions upon which a company shall pass through its limits. After expiгаtion of the time for erecting poles, etc., in pursuance of an ordinance, express direction from the city council, and notice to the company, should be given, before the mayor proceeds to remove the poles. It is no part of the corporate duty of a company to collect and send out market reports. R. S. § 5263: Act 24 July, 1866. 2 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S. 464 (1881). 3 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Massachusetts, 125 U. S. 530 (1888). Western Union Tel. Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio Tel. Co., 19 F. R. 660 (1884), Wallace, J.; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Burlington, &c. R. Co., 3 McCrary, 135 (1852),