TALES - The Law Mind Legal Dictionary

TALESAuthored

The Law Mind • 1035 words

Definition

A tales (from the Latin for "such" or "such men") is a supplementary panel of jurors summoned to make up a deficiency when the original jury panel cannot be completed — typically because too few qualified jurors have appeared, or because challenges have reduced the panel below the number required to proceed. Either party to an action could pray a tales, formally requesting the court to summon additional persons to fill the gap. Those summoned in response are called talesmen (or, in some sources, tales de circumstantibus — literally, "such of the bystanders"), and were historically drawn from persons present in or about the courthouse. The writ by which such persons were summoned was also referred to as a tales.

At common law, a tales could be awarded even if only one of the originally summoned jurors had appeared, and a jury could in theory be composed entirely of talesmen if circumstances required it.

Common Language

Modern common usage (Wiktionary): The word "tales" in ordinary contemporary English is simply the plural of "tale" (a story or narrative), or the third-person singular present tense of the verb "to tale" — neither of which has any connection to jury procedure.

Historical common usage (Webster's 1913): Webster's 1913 recognized the legal sense directly: persons added to a jury from those in or about the courthouse to make up a deficiency in the regular panel, along with the writ by which such persons were summoned.

The gap here is essentially total. A modern researcher encountering "tales" in a historical trial record or pleading document should not interpret it in any ordinary English sense. The word is a Latin legal term of art that traveled into English court practice wholesale and bears no relationship to storytelling or narration.

Common Confusion

Tales and venire are related but distinct concepts. A venire (or venire facias) is the original writ commanding a sheriff to summon a jury panel; a tales is the supplementary mechanism invoked when that panel proves insufficient. Researchers should also distinguish talesmen — those actually summoned under a tales — from the original jurors on the panel, as older records may use these terms inconsistently or interchangeably. Additionally, tales de circumstantibus specifically denotes talesmen drawn from bystanders present in court, which was the most common historical practice but not the only permissible source of talesmen.

Why It Matters in Research

This term is almost exclusively encountered in historical trial records, common law pleading documents, and pre-twentieth-century procedural materials. Modern jury selection statutes have largely absorbed and renamed the function served by the tales, so the term itself rarely appears in contemporary legal writing or decisions. Researchers working in colonial American records, early federal court documents, or English common law sources will encounter it regularly.

The practical trap: "tales" in a historical document almost never means what a modern reader assumes. Its appearance in a trial record signals a jury panel problem — challenges, non-appearance, or disqualification — and the document may reflect the procedure used to remedy it. Understanding whether a tales was prayed by the plaintiff or defendant, and how it was fulfilled, can be material to understanding the legitimacy of the verdict in historical litigation research.

Jurisdictional variation matters here historically. English common law practice, colonial American practice, and individual state statutes diverged on procedural details — how many talesmen could be summoned, from what sources, on whose motion. Researchers should not assume uniform procedure across jurisdictions or time periods.

The Anderson's Dictionary entry for tales is unhelpfully sparse in the source material — it appears to have run into a page reference cluster rather than a substantive definition. Rely instead on Burrill and Blackstone (3 Bl. Com. 364–365) for the best classical exposition.

Historical Dictionary Support

Black's Law Dictionary (both the 1st and 2nd editions) offer essentially identical, concise definitions drawn from Brown's legal dictionary, anchoring the term in its Latin origin ("such men") and correctly identifying the prayer for a tales as the mechanism by which the deficiency is addressed. The 2nd edition adds case citations — State v. McCrystol, 43 La. Ann. 907 — which are useful for researchers seeking judicial application of the doctrine in American courts.

Burrill's Law Dictionary provides the most substantive treatment among the historical shelf sources, correctly noting that talesmen were "commonly taken from the bystanders or persons in court," citing Blackstone's Commentaries at 3 Bl. Com. 364–365, and flagging the extreme case — at common law, the entire jury could be composed of talesmen. This is an important data point that Black's omits.

Webster's 1913 is notably useful here because, unlike most general dictionaries, it preserved the legal sense of the term with sufficient accuracy to be a reliable secondary check. It correctly identifies both meanings (the persons summoned and the writ by which they were summoned) and references Blount and Blackstone as authorities.

None of the historical dictionaries address the procedural sunset of the tales in modern statutory practice — that gap is left entirely to the researcher.

Jurisdictional Note

The tales was a creature of English common law that American jurisdictions received and modified unevenly. Federal courts and most states replaced or supplemented the procedure through jury statutes, and the term itself has largely disappeared from modern procedural codes. Researchers working in Louisiana or other civil-law-influenced jurisdictions should be particularly attentive to whether and how tales practice was adopted locally.

TALESmain

Black's Law Dictionary • 1891

Lat. Such; such men. When, by means of challenges or any other cause, a sufficient number of unexceptionable jurors does not appear at the trial, either party may pray a “tales," as it is termed; that is, a sup- ply of such men as are summoned on the first panel in order to make up the deficiency. Brown.

TALESmain

Black's Law Dictionary (2nd Ed.) • 1910

Lat. Such; such men. When, by means of challenges or any other cause, a sufficient number of unexceptionable jurors does not appear at the trial, either party may pray a “tales,” as it is termed; that is, a supply of such men as are summoned on the first panel in order to make up the deficiency. Brown. See State v. McCrystol, 43 La. Ann. 907, 9 South. 922; Railroad Co. v. Mask, 64 . Miss. 738, 2 South. 360.

TALESmain

Anderson's Dictionary of Law • 1890

1 Woodward v. London, &c. R. Co, L. R., 3 Ex. D. 121 (1877). 2 Arthur v. Jacoby, 103 U. S. 677 (1880). 3 See 2 Bl. Com. 294; 3 id. 394; 4 id. 349. * See Hadley, Rom. Law, 10-15; 1 Bl. Com. 82; Hare, Maine, Ancient Law, 313. See Hadley, Rom. Law, Contr., Index. 72 Bl. Com. 445. See 22 Wall. 215; 107 U. S. 544; 60 Md. 436; 76 Va. 520. 53 Bl. Com. 353; Coke, Litt. 158 b. • Beasley v. People, 89 111. 575 (1878). People v. Coyodo, 40 Cal. 592 (1871). D The word "injured," in the constitution (art. XVI, § 8) of Pennsylvania of 1874, in the phrase "property taken, injured or destroyed" by corporations, etc., refers to such legal wrong done as would be the subject of an action for damages at common law; to injuries which, though consequential, are yet actual, positive, and visible, the natural and necessary result of original construction or of enlargement, and of such certain character that compensation may be ascertained immediately, and be paid for or secured in advance. Hence, in that State, a railroad company is not liable for indirect injuries, the result of the operation of its road in a lawful way, without negligence, unskillfulness, or malice, upon its own property.1 Acts done in the proper exercise of governmental powers, and not directly encroaching upon private property, though their consequences may impair its use, are universally held not to be a taking." Thus, the State may take a portion of a man's property by way of taxation for support of the government.3 Destroying a building to prevent a conflagration is not viewed as a taking. But statutes make it this, in some States. See FIRE. A lot abutting on a street may be "damaged " by citing many Illinois cases, and relying chiefly upon the unanimous opinion in Chicago & Western Indiana R. Co. v. Ayres, 106 Ill. 518 (1883), and Rigney v. Chicago, 102 id. 64 (1882). Under the constitution of 1848, which provided for compensation for property "taken or applied" to public use, it was held that recovery could not be had for merely consequential damages, provided the improvement had the sanction of the legislature,-125 U. S. 164-65, cases. In the same State, damages for an actual appropriation are payable in advance; an injury sustained in common with the public at large is not a subject of claim; and any special injury must be remedied by an action at law, as it cannot be by an injunction, - Lorie v. North Chicago City R. Co., 32 F. R. 270 (1887). Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Marchant, 119 Pa. 541, 553 (1888), one justice dissenting. (Counsel for plaintiff cite many English and American cases.) The railroad company had invested a large sum on the south side of Filbert street, Philadelphia, in purchasing property and in constructing a depot and elevated tracks. The defendant owned a dwelling-house upon the north side of the street, fifty-one feet from the railroad; and claimed damages for loss of light, for the noise, jarring, smoke, etc. The decision of the lower court, which was in his favor, was reversed. Occupation of the street itself, in front of his house, would have constituted the subject of a claim in the nature of special damages. The words used in the constitution of 1838 were "taken or applied" to a public use, and it was held that some portion of one's private property had actually to be taken - an immunity not enjoyed by individuals, and occasioning great hardships. See Marchant's case annotated, 27 Am. Law Reg. 391-400 (1888). • Northern Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 99 U. S. 642 (1878), cases: Elinois constitution of 1848, as to which see supra. 3 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 145 (1876). Surroco v. Geary, 3 Cal. 73 (1853). laying tracks and running railroad cars through the street. 1 Where realty is actually invaded by superinduced additions of water, earth, sand, or other material, or by having any artificial structure placed on it, so as to effectually destroy or impair its usefulness, it is a taking. That is, a serious interruption to the common and necessary use of property may be equivalent to taking it, as, by overflowing land with back-water." An entry upon land for a survey, preliminary to locating a railroad, is not such a taking as entitles the owner to compensation for the fee; but he may claim for the temporary occupation.3 The right to enter upon and use is complete as soon as the property is actually appropriated under authority of law, but the title does not pass from the owner until compensation is made. Taking differs from a sale, in that the transfer of title may be compelled, and the amount of compensation be determined by a jury or officers appointed for that purpose. A taking is an exchange of property for an equivalent. Only such estate is taken as is necessary to carry out the purposes for which the land is used. This estate is an easement; the fee remains in the original owner. The object must be a public one." The particular use for which the land is first taken cannot be departed from. See further BRIDGE; COMPENSATION, 3; DOMAIN, Eminent; LEVEE; PROPERTY; RIPARIAN. L. Plural of talis, such, of such a kind: additional jurors. If, from any cause, a sufficient number of unexceptionable jurors do not appear at the trial, or if a panel is exhausted by challenges before a jury is obtained, either party, at common law, may pray a tales, that is, more of such men as were summoned upon the first panel, to make up the deficiency. Talesman. One of such additional jurors.9 1 Frankle v. Jackson, 30 F. R. 398 (1887), cases. 2 Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. 181, 179-80 (1871), cases, Miller, J.: Illinois constitution of 1848; 28 Minn. 540. 3 Bonaparte v. Camden, &c. R. Co., Baldw. 225 (1830); Polly v. Saratoga, &c. R. Co., 9 Barb. 457 (1850). 4 Kennedy v. Indianapolis, 103 U. S. 602 (1880). • County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 703 (1880). • Attorney-General v. Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Corporation, 133 Mass. 365 (1882), cases. 7 Cole v. La Grange, 113 U. S. 6 (1885), cases; Varner v. Martin, 21 W. Va. 551-52 (1883), cases. As to one railroad condemning land for another, see 27 Cent. Law J. 207-12 (1888), cases. • Oregon Ry. & Nav. Co. v. Oregon Real Estate Co., 10 Oreg. 445 (1882), cases. [3 Bl. Com. 364-65; 4 id. 354; O'Connor v. State, 9 Fla. 225 (1860).

TALESn.

Websters Unabridged Dictionary (1913) • 1913

Persons added to a jury, commonly from those in or about the courthouse, to make up any deficiency in the number of jurors regularly summoned, being like, or such as, the latter. Blount. Blackstone. (b) syntactically sing. The writ by which such persons are summoned. Tales book, a book containing the names of such as are admitted of the tales. Blount. Craig.  -- Tales de circumstantibus Etym: [L.], such, or the like, from those standing about.

talesverb

Wiktionary (English) • 2026

Wiktionary contributors • CC BY-SA 4.0 • via Kaikki
Extracted and formatted for display by Law Mind. Source link opens the current Wiktionary page and its contributor history; it is not a frozen copy of this extract.

third-person singular simple present indicative of tale

talesnoun

Wiktionary (English) • 2026

plural of tale

talesnoun

Wiktionary (English) • 2026

A person available to fill vacancies in a jury. | A book or register of people available to fill jury vacancies. | A writ to summon people to court to fill vacancies in a jury.

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