Definition
Tail general is a form of fee tail — a hereditary estate in land — in which the property descends to the grantee and the heirs of his body generally, meaning all legitimate issue from any and all marriages. The defining characteristic is that the class of potential heirs is unrestricted as to which spouse produced them: every child born of the donee's body, regardless of which marriage produced that child, stands in line to inherit in successive order according to the original grant.
The classic formulation grants land to a person "and the heirs of his body begotten." Because no particular spouse or line of descent is specified, the tail runs generally through whatever issue the grantee produces across a lifetime of marriages. This distinguishes tail general from tail special, where the grant names a specific spouse and limits inheritance to issue of that particular union only.
Like all fee tail estates, tail general descends by the form of the gift (per formam doni) rather than by ordinary inheritance rules. The estate cannot be freely alienated in the traditional common law framework — the grantee holds it for life and passes it to qualifying issue, who hold it on the same terms.
Common Confusion
TAIL GENERAL vs. TAIL SPECIAL: These two forms of fee tail are frequently collapsed in casual reading of historical sources. Tail special restricts descent to the issue of a named spouse — typically the wife married at the time of the grant — so the line fails if that union produces no surviving issue. Tail general imposes no such restriction. A grantee in tail general who outlives a first spouse and remarries may pass the estate to children of the second marriage just as freely as to children of the first. Historical sources sometimes use "tail" without qualification; researchers should examine the original grant language to determine which form applies.
TAIL GENERAL vs. FEE SIMPLE: A fee simple carries no restriction on alienation or inheritance — the holder owns absolutely and may transfer or devise at will. Tail general, by contrast, ties the land to the bloodline of the original donee, limiting who may inherit and constraining the holder's power to convey a permanent title.
Why It Matters in Research
Tail general appears almost exclusively in historical property records, English common law sources, and early American colonial and state materials. By the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, American states began abolishing or converting fee tail estates by statute — many converting tail estates into fee simples either automatically upon creation or upon the birth of issue. Researchers working with pre-abolition land records, conveyancing instruments, or equity proceedings must identify which form of tail applies before tracing chain of title, since the class of heirs capable of inheriting differs materially between tail general and tail special.
A key trap in historical research: deed language using "heirs of the body" without further qualification creates a tail general at common law, but the same language in a post-abolition jurisdiction may be construed as a fee simple or a life estate with remainder, depending on the statute. The date of the grant relative to the applicable jurisdiction's abolition statute is therefore critical.
Tail general also surfaces in equity proceedings — particularly common recovery and fine actions — which were the principal common law mechanisms for barring a fee tail and converting it into a fee simple. Understanding the type of tail (general versus special) affects the scope of the barring action and who must be made a party.
For researchers using Black's Law Dictionary across editions, coverage of fee tail terminology is consistent but thin. The entry tracks Blackstone closely and does not address American statutory developments in detail.
Historical Dictionary Support
Black's Law Dictionary defines tail general by direct reference to Blackstone's Commentaries (2 Bl. Comm. 113), which remains the canonical common law treatment of the concept. Blackstone's formulation — that the donee's issue "in general by all and every such marriage" is capable of inheriting — supplies the essential distinction from tail special and has been reproduced with little variation across editions of Black's.
Historical legal dictionaries treating this term offer narrow, consistent definitions that largely restate the Blackstone passage. None of the standard historical dictionary sources substantially extend the Blackstone analysis or address the American statutory modifications that transformed or eliminated fee tail in most United States jurisdictions. Researchers should treat historical dictionary entries on tail general as a starting point for understanding the common law baseline, then consult jurisdiction-specific statutory history and equity treatises for the full picture.
Jurisdictional Note
Fee tail, including tail general, has been abolished or substantially modified by statute in nearly every American jurisdiction, with most states converting the estate either into a fee simple or a life estate upon creation or upon the birth of issue. A small number of jurisdictions — most notably Maine, Massachusetts, and Delaware — retained modified forms of fee tail into the modern era. English law formally abolished fee tail by the Law of Property Act 1925. Research into any live dispute touching on tail general will almost certainly require reference to the applicable jurisdiction's abolition statute and its effective date.
Encyclopedia Cross-Reference
The Law Mind Insurance Law Encyclopedia entry on Policy Period, Retroactive Dates, and Extended Reporting Periods (Tail Coverage) addresses "tail" in an insurance context — an unrelated usage. No Law Mind Encyclopedia entry directly addresses fee tail or tail general as a property law concept.