SUBJECT TO AND CHARGED AND CHARGE

2 definitions found across Law Mind sources

SUBJECT TO AND CHARGED AND CHARGEAuthored
The Law Mind • 1158 words
Definition
A cluster of conveyancing and testamentary phrases used to signal that property passes encumbered — that is, the transferee takes title with an existing obligation attached, rather than receiving the property free and clear. Each phrase has a distinct application: 1. SUBJECT TO (in deeds and mortgages): Language indicating that a grantee receives title burdened by an existing lien, mortgage, easement, covenant, or other encumbrance. The grantee takes the property with notice of and bound by the encumbrance, but does not personally assume the underlying obligation unless assumption language is separately included. The distinction between "subject to" and "assuming" a mortgage is legally significant: the former preserves the grantor's personal liability while the latter shifts it. 2. CHARGED (in wills and conveyances): Language placing a financial obligation on property or on a beneficiary taking under an instrument. A devise "charged" with payment of debts or legacies means the devisee holds the property subject to a legal duty to satisfy those obligations from the land or its proceeds. The charge operates in rem — it burdens the property itself, not merely the person. 3. CHARGE (as a noun): An encumbrance, lien, or claim upon property. In equity, a charge may be created expressly by instrument or arise by operation of law. It gives the chargee the right to resort to the charged property for satisfaction of a debt or obligation, functioning similarly to a lien but often without the formalities of a mortgage. Taken together, these terms form a recurring phrase set in older deeds, wills, and leases: property transferred "subject to and charged with" a mortgage, annuity, rent charge, or legacy — meaning both that the encumbrance exists on the title and that the new holder is legally obligated to satisfy it from the property.
Common Confusion
"Subject to" and "assuming" a mortgage are frequently conflated in deed drafting and in reading older instruments. They are not interchangeable. A grantee who takes "subject to" a mortgage is not personally liable on the debt; the mortgagee's only recourse if the grantee defaults is foreclosure against the land. A grantee who "assumes" the mortgage becomes personally liable alongside the grantor. Historical instruments often omit assumption language entirely, and researchers should not infer personal liability from "subject to" language alone. Similarly, a "charge" on land is not the same as a mortgage. A charge does not convey legal title to the creditor; it creates an equitable right to look to the property for payment. Historical equity practice treated the two as distinct, and older English authorities on charges may not map cleanly onto American recording-act regimes.
Why It Matters in Research
These phrases appear constantly in deeds, wills, and leases from the eighteenth century through the early twentieth, and their precise effect depends heavily on context — the type of instrument, the jurisdiction, and the period of drafting. In deed research: "Subject to" language in a chain of title is a critical signal. It tells you an encumbrance survived the conveyance. When tracing title in older abstracts, locating the original instrument creating the encumbrance is essential — the "subject to" language alone tells you the burden exists, not what it requires or when it expires. In probate and will research: "Charged" devises are a recurring feature of nineteenth-century American wills. A testator might devise a farm to one child "charged with" payment of a legacy to another, or with the support of a surviving spouse. Identifying whether the charge is personal to the devisee, runs with the land, or is enforceable only during the devisee's ownership requires reading the instrument as a whole and, in many cases, consulting equity decisions of the period. In mortgage and lien research: The Rapalje & Lawrence entry flags the phrase "subject to B.'s mortgage" as a term of art with judicial gloss — the Massachusetts authority cited (104 Mass. 249) illustrates that courts construed this language to fix the grantee's obligations precisely, without implying personal assumption. Researchers working with pre-twentieth-century mortgage disputes should check whether the operative instrument used "subject to," "assuming," or both, as courts drew sharp lines. Traps for researchers: Do not assume that "charged" in an older will creates a lien enforceable under modern recording-act priority rules. Equitable charges in older instruments may not have been recorded and may not have survived subsequent bona fide purchasers under the applicable state's race-notice or notice statute. The enforceability question is distinct from the question of whether the charge was validly created.
Historical Dictionary Support
Rapalje & Lawrence treat these phrases as terms of art defined by their judicial construction rather than by abstract definition. Their entry is spare — essentially a set of case citations organized by context — which reflects the period's approach: meaning was fixed by how courts had applied the language, not by general principle. The entries cluster around four distinct contexts: wills ("able with"), mortgages ("subject to B.'s mortgage"), statutes ("subject to execution"), and leases ("subject to payment of rent"). This taxonomy is useful because it confirms that by the 1880s, American courts already recognized that identical language could carry different legal weight depending on the instrument type. The phrase "subject to execution" in a statutory context — governing debtor discharge on oath — had nothing to do with real property encumbrances, yet used the same root term. What historical dictionaries do not address is the modern merger of these concepts in standard form transactional documents, or the complications introduced by recording acts, title insurance, and UCC Article 9 (for personal property charges). For those dimensions, historical sources are a starting point only.
Jurisdictional Note
The distinction between "subject to" and "assumption" language in mortgage conveyances is universally recognized, but the consequences vary. Some states have anti-deficiency statutes that limit a lender's recourse regardless of assumption language. The enforceability of equitable charges against subsequent purchasers depends entirely on the applicable state's recording act and whether the charge was properly recorded.
Encyclopedia Cross-Reference
The Law Mind Real Estate Transactions & Construction Encyclopedia, Prorations — Taxes, Insurance, Rents, HOA Assessments, and Utility Charges (for the treatment of ongoing obligations that run with property at closing and appear in "subject to" clauses). The Law Mind Business Organizations & Corporate Law Encyclopedia, LLCs — Transferability of LLC Membership Interests and Charging Orders (for the modern "charging order" as a descendant concept: a creditor's right to reach a debtor's interest in an entity, analogous in structure to a charge on land).
Related Terms
Encumbrance; Lien; Mortgage; Assumption of Mortgage; Charge (equitable); Charged Devise; Conveyance; Deed; Subject-To Clause; Easement; Covenant Running with the Land; Charging Order; Defeasance
SUBJECT TO AND CHARGED AND CHARGEsubentry
Rapalje & Lawrence • 1883
ABLE WITH, (in a will). 3 Bing. 392. SUBJECT TO B.'S MORTGAGE, (in a mortgage). 104 Mass. 249. SUBJECT TO EXECUTION, (as used in statute allowing discharge of debtor on his oath). 6 Blackf. (Ind.) 163. SUBJECT TO PAYMENT OF RENT, (in a perpetual lease). 5 Pa. St. 204.

Explore the full Law Mind legal research platform.

SubscribeEncyclopediaSign In