Definition
A Latin term meaning "let it stand." In legal usage, STET refers to a formal entry on the record by which a court stays all further proceedings in an action, effectively suspending or terminating the case without a final judgment on the merits. Historically, it appeared as *stet processus* — "let the process stand" — and operated as a plaintiff's agreement, entered by leave of court, that no further steps would be taken in the litigation.
In modern American practice, the term survives most prominently in criminal procedure, particularly in Maryland and a handful of other jurisdictions, where a stet functions as an indefinite postponement of prosecution. The case is placed on an inactive docket — neither dismissed nor prosecuted — typically subject to conditions. The charge may be reactivated if the defendant violates those conditions within a set period.
Common Language
Modern common usage (Wiktionary): A symbol used by proofreaders and typesetters to indicate that a word or phrase that was crossed out or changed should remain as it was.
Historical common usage (Webster's 1913): "Let it stand — a word used by proof readers to signify that something once erased, or marked for omission, is to remain."
The proofreading and legal meanings share the Latin root and the same core instruction — leave it as it is — but operate in entirely different directions. In editing, *stet* preserves text that was about to be changed. In law, *stet* preserves a case's suspended state: it is not restored to active prosecution, it simply sits. A researcher encountering *stet* in a legal document should not import the editorial connotation of restoration or reinstatement.
Common Confusion
STET is sometimes confused with a nolle prosequi (nol pros), which is a formal declaration by a prosecutor that the case will not be pursued — a true termination of the charge, at least in effect. A stet is not a dismissal. The charge remains on the record, and prosecution may resume. In jurisdictions where stet dockets exist, the distinction carries real consequences for the defendant: a nolle prosequi is generally more favorable to expungement and does not hang over the defendant in the same conditional way. Researchers working with criminal dockets should treat these as distinct procedural outcomes and not assume that a stet entry functions as a de facto acquittal or dismissal.
Why It Matters in Research
Researchers face two separate problems with *stet* depending on the era and jurisdiction of the materials.
In historical civil records and older federal and state court filings, *stet processus* appears as a docket notation that can be easily misread as a final disposition. It is not. When Anderson's source note references the 1881 and 1875 cases, the procedural significance is that a stet entry protected a plaintiff from certain consequences — specifically, it could prevent a defendant who became insolvent from escaping liability by forcing a premature termination. The mechanics are intricate and tied to now-obsolete insolvency and execution practice. Researchers parsing 19th-century dockets should treat any *stet* notation as a suspension of action, not a resolution, and look for subsequent entries.
In modern criminal docket research, *stet* is almost entirely a Maryland phenomenon at the state level, though analogous inactive-docket practices exist elsewhere under different names. Maryland's stet docket is a recognized procedural device under Maryland Rule 4-248. Researchers working on criminal record studies, expungement eligibility analyses, or recidivism data should flag stet dispositions separately: they are neither convictions nor dismissals, and automated coding systems frequently miscategorize them.
The term also appears occasionally in appellate editing and legal publishing contexts — manuscript annotation — where it carries the proofreading meaning. A researcher should note the document type before assuming the legal meaning applies.
Historical Dictionary Support
Anderson's Dictionary of Law is the sole dictionary source available here, and its treatment is characteristically compressed but useful. Anderson correctly identifies the dual formulation — *stet* and *stet processus* — and correctly notes that the plaintiff's agreement required leave of court, which distinguishes it from a unilateral discontinuance. His note about protecting against an insolvent defendant reflects the procedural stakes of the 19th-century civil practice context that gave the term most of its American common-law significance.
What Anderson does not address, and what no 19th-century legal dictionary could have anticipated, is the term's migration into modern criminal docket practice as a standalone dispositional category. That development is largely jurisdictional and statutory, not rooted in common-law civil procedure, and represents a semantic extension of the original Latin instruction into a new procedural context.
No significant divergence exists among historical dictionaries on the core meaning. The term was never contested; it was simply narrow, technical, and infrequently glossed at length.
Jurisdictional Note
The stet as a formal criminal docket disposition is principally a Maryland practice. Other states use functionally analogous deferred-prosecution or inactive-docket mechanisms under different names. Researchers should not assume that a *stet* found in Maryland criminal records has a direct equivalent in records from other jurisdictions, and should verify local procedural rules before drawing comparisons.