Definition
A Latin adjective used in medieval and early modern common law practice meaning "special" or "particular," as distinguished from *generalis* (general). The term appears most often in compound phrases drawn from Latin pleading, where it modifies nouns to describe procedural devices that were specific in scope, limited in application, or tailored to particular facts — as opposed to those of a broader, categorical character.
The term is not a standalone doctrine but a qualifying descriptor that takes legal meaning from the phrase it anchors. Its most commonly encountered use is in *exceptio specialis*, a special exception or plea — a defense that challenges a particular element of the opposing party's position rather than denying the claim in its entirety.
Common Confusion
SPECIALIS should not be confused with *generalis*, its direct Latin antonym. The distinction between the two was procedurally significant in old practice: a general exception or plea operated broadly against the whole of an opponent's position, while a special exception targeted a specific defect, fact, or circumstance. Researchers encountering either term in historical records should identify which modifier is present before inferring the nature of the procedural act being described. The maxim *generalia specialibus non derogant* — general things do not derogate from special things — reflects the same conceptual axis and appears in both statutory and common law contexts, though it is a separate research target.
Why It Matters in Research
This term will almost never appear in modern legal materials. It belongs to the vocabulary of Latin-inflected common law pleading that prevailed in English courts through the early modern period and was carried into early American practice. Researchers working in:
— **Medieval and early modern English court records** (Year Books, Fleta, Bracton, Britton)
— **Colonial and early American pleading records**
— **Treatises on common law procedure** predating the Field Code reforms of the mid-nineteenth century
will encounter *specialis* and its compounds without translation. The term is a navigational marker: when you see it, you are in the world of formal Latin pleading, where procedural distinctions between "special" and "general" carried real tactical and legal consequences.
The critical research trap is treating *specialis* as a defined doctrine rather than a modifier. Its meaning is always relational — it describes how a given plea, exception, warrant, or power differs from its general counterpart. Always read the full compound phrase before drawing conclusions about the procedural context.
Researchers should also be alert to the term appearing in discussions of *mandatum speciale* (special mandate or power of attorney), *jurata specialis* (special jury), and similar compounds across different areas of old practice. The modifier travels widely across procedural and substantive contexts.
Historical Dictionary Support
Burrill is the primary historical dictionary source available for this term, and his entry is intentionally spare: a Latin-to-English gloss ("special") with a single illustrative compound (*exceptio specialis*) and a pinpoint citation to Fleta. This minimalism is characteristic of how historical dictionaries treat Latin modifiers — they are defined by translation rather than by doctrine.
Burrill's citation to Fleta (lib. 2, c. 60, § 36) situates the term firmly in thirteenth-century English legal literature. Fleta is a Latin treatise on English common law compiled circa 1290, drawing heavily on Bracton. Its discussion of exceptions and pleas in Book II is a primary source for understanding how *specialis* functioned as a procedural category in the earliest common law.
What the historical dictionary record does not supply: any account of how the special/general distinction played out across different types of proceedings, how the terminology migrated into English-language pleading manuals, or how it was eventually displaced by the procedural vocabulary of modern code pleading. Researchers seeking that developmental arc must go beyond dictionary sources to the pleading treatises themselves — Glanvill, Bracton, Fleta, and later Blackstone's Commentaries and Chitty on Pleading.
Encyclopedia Cross-Reference
Law Mind Encyclopedia — Special Pleading
Law Mind Encyclopedia — Exceptions (Procedure)
Law Mind Encyclopedia — Latin Maxims and Phrases in Common Law