Definition
Latin: "I have caused to know." A formal return made by a sheriff to a writ of scire facias, certifying to the court that the sheriff has caused notice to be given to the party or parties against whom the writ was issued. The term names the return itself—the sheriff's official written certification—rather than any independent writ or proceeding. The phrase derives from the emphatic words of the old Latin return, in which the sheriff affirmed personal performance of the notice obligation.
Common Confusion
SCIRE FECI and SCIRE FACIAS are distinct but inseparable. Scire facias is the writ commanding the sheriff to give notice; scire feci is the sheriff's return confirming that he has done so. Researchers encountering either term in historical records need the other: the writ and the return are two sides of the same procedural transaction. Confusing the two collapses the distinction between the court's command and the officer's compliance.
Why It Matters in Research
Scire feci appears almost exclusively in procedural records from English common law practice and early American courts following that practice. Researchers are most likely to encounter it in:
Court files and plea rolls, where the sheriff's return was endorsed on the back of the writ itself. The physical document bearing this return is the primary source; the term rarely appears in reported opinions except incidentally.
Records of scire facias proceedings generally, which were used to revive dormant judgments, enforce recognizances, repeal letters patent, and pursue executors for a testator's debts. Understanding scire feci requires understanding the scire facias writ that generated it; the return has no meaning in isolation.
Historical American practice. As American courts progressively replaced common law writs with statutory or rules-based procedures through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, scire facias—and therefore scire feci—fell out of active use. Researchers reading pre-Civil War American court records should expect to encounter it; researchers in modern procedural contexts almost certainly will not, except in historical discussion.
Terminology drift between sources. Burrill preserves the Latin gloss ("I have caused to know") that explains the grammatical construction, while Black's focuses on the functional definition. Neither source addresses how scire feci interacted with alternative returns—particularly the return of nihil (nothing done, party not found)—which would have triggered different procedural consequences. Researchers tracing what happened after a scire facias issued must look beyond the return itself to understand the downstream procedural effect.
Historical Dictionary Support
The four source dictionaries are in close agreement on all substantive points, which is itself informative: scire feci is a narrow, well-settled procedural term with a single established meaning. Black's (both editions) and Rapalje & Lawrence agree on the core definition without variation. Burrill adds the most useful gloss, supplying the literal Latin translation ("I have caused to know") and identifying the phrase as derived from the emphatic words of the old Latin return—a detail that helps researchers recognize the term when they encounter it in handwritten or abbreviated form in historical records.
The Rapalje & Lawrence entry is notable for running directly into the adjacent entry for SCIRE FIERI INQUIRY without breaking, which reflects how closely these terms cluster in the procedural landscape of enforcement against executors and estate assets. Researchers working with post-judgment enforcement records against decedents' estates should be aware that scire facias, scire feci, and scire fieri inquiry may all appear in the same documentary sequence.
All sources cite 2 Archbold's Practice of the Court of King's Bench (Arch. Pr. K.B.) as authority, confirming that the definition tracks standard English common law practice as received in American courts.
Jurisdictional Note
Scire feci belongs to English common law procedure and was carried into American practice in jurisdictions that adopted common law forms. Its use declined unevenly across American states as legislatures and courts abolished or replaced common law writs. Researchers should calibrate expectations to jurisdiction and time period; the term is effectively obsolete in modern American practice but live in historical records of any common law jurisdiction.