Definition
A phrase of limitation appearing in deeds and wills that designates a named grantee or devisee — identified by the initial "B" — as the holder of a remainder interest in real property. The full expression is typically "remainder to B," or "remainder to B and C," meaning that after a prior estate (usually a life estate or estate for years) terminates, the property passes to or vests in B as remainderman.
The phrase is not a term of art in itself but rather an illustrative formula used in property law treatises, pleading examples, and conveyancing manuals to represent the simplest case of remainder creation. "A to A for life, remainder to B" is the paradigm grant: A holds a possessory life estate; B holds a future interest — the remainder — that becomes possessory upon A's death. "B" functions as a placeholder for any grantee capable of taking a remainder.
Whether the remainder is vested or contingent depends on what follows "remainder to B":
1. Vested remainder: B is ascertained and no condition precedent (other than the natural termination of the prior estate) stands between B and possession. Example: "to A for life, remainder to B" where B is a living, identified person.
2. Contingent remainder: B is unascertained, or B's interest is subject to a condition precedent. Example: "to A for life, remainder to B if B survives A."
The addition of "and C" (as in the Rapalje & Lawrence entry "Remainder to B and C") introduces a joint remainder, raising questions of survivorship, joint tenancy versus tenancy in common, and class gifts.
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Common Confusion
"Remainder to B" is sometimes confused with a reversion or an executory interest. A reversion arises by operation of law when the grantor fails to dispose of the entire future interest; it runs back to the grantor, not forward to a third party. An executory interest, by contrast, cuts short a prior estate rather than waiting for it to expire naturally. The remainder to B in the classic formulation does neither — it follows naturally on the expiration of the prior estate and is held by a third party, not the grantor. Researchers encountering ambiguous language in older instruments should confirm which future interest is actually created before applying remainder doctrine.
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Core Elements
For a remainder to B to be valid at common law, four traditional requirements must be satisfied:
1. A prior supporting estate: A remainder cannot exist in a vacuum. There must be a prior freehold estate (typically a life estate) created in the same instrument.
2. Created in the same instrument: The remainder must be created simultaneously with the supporting estate, not by a later conveyance.
3. Takes effect immediately on expiration of the prior estate: The remainder must become possessory the moment the prior estate ends — it cannot "spring up" after a gap or cut short the prior estate.
4. Grantee capable of taking: B must be an identified or identifiable person (or class) capable of receiving a freehold at common law.
Modern property law has relaxed some of these requirements, particularly through the rise of equitable remainders, the Statute of Uses, and the Rule Against Perpetuities reforms.
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Why It Matters in Research
Researchers will encounter "remainder to B" primarily in three contexts: treatise illustrations, reported cases involving will construction, and conveyancing forms.
In will construction cases, the phrase signals a dispute about whether the remainder is vested or contingent — a distinction with enormous practical consequences for creditors, heirs, and tax treatment. Rapalje & Lawrence cross-references "Remainder, Vested (may be sold under execution)" at 2 Halst. (N.J.) 180, underscoring that a vested remainder was treated as alienable and reachable by creditors, while a contingent remainder historically was not.
Researchers using older American and English sources should watch for the common law rule of destructibility of contingent remainders, which was never universally adopted and has been abolished in most U.S. jurisdictions by statute. An older source confirming that a contingent remainder was destroyed may no longer state good law.
The phrase "remainder to B and C" in wills, noted in the Rapalje & Lawrence entry at 2 Eden 115, frequently generated litigation over whether a joint tenancy or tenancy in common was created and whether survivorship applied. The canon that words of "and" or "or" could shift the meaning depending on testamentary context is a recurrent trap in historical sources.
The Rule Against Perpetuities is the other major trap. Any remainder to an unborn or unascertained B may have been void at common law if it could not vest within a life in being plus 21 years. Modern wait-and-see statutes and the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities have changed this analysis in most jurisdictions, but historical instruments must still be read under the law in force at execution.
Finally, researchers should not confuse the dictionary entry's use of "B" as a placeholder with any legal significance attached to the letter itself. The "B" in the related encyclopedia entry immigration_7 — B-1/B-2 Visitor Visas — is entirely unrelated and refers to a visa classification code, not a remainder grantee.
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Historical Dictionary Support
Rapalje & Lawrence treat "Remainder to B and C" as a will-construction entry pointing to 2 Eden 115, a reference to Eden's Chancery Reports (English). This reflects the historical practice of using reported cases as definitional anchors for phrases of limitation rather than providing freestanding definitions. The companion entries — "Remainderman," "Remainders of My Different Bequests," "Remaining Goods and Chattels," "Remaining Part," and "Remains, What" — form a cluster addressing the recurring interpretive problem in probate and conveyancing: what passes under residuary or remainder language, and to whom.
What Rapalje & Lawrence do not address directly is the vested/contingent distinction at the definitional level; that treatment is left to the separate "Remainder, Vested" entry. Researchers relying solely on the "Remainder to B" entry will miss the doctrinal significance of conditions precedent. Earlier English dictionaries such as Tomlin's Law Dictionary and Jacob's Law Dictionary gave fuller treatment to the classic categories of remainder doctrine, and Blackstone's Commentaries (Book II, Chapter 11) remains the most accessible historical synthesis of the four requirements and their consequences.
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Jurisdictional Note
The destructibility of contingent remainders rule was never adopted in equity and has been abolished by statute in most U.S. states. The Rule Against Perpetuities as applied to remainders varies significantly: some states retain the common law rule, others have enacted wait-and-see or cy pres reforms, and a handful have abolished the rule for certain trusts entirely. Researchers analyzing instruments from specific jurisdictions should confirm the applicable perpetuities regime at the time of execution.
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Encyclopedia Cross-Reference
property_6: Future Interests — Remainder (Vested, Contingent, Subject to Open), The Law Mind Property Law Encyclopedia
estates_110: Classification of Future Interests — Remainders, Reversions, Executory Interests, and Powers of Termination, The Law Mind Trusts, Estates & Probate Encyclopedia
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