RECEIVER OF STOLEN GOODS - The Law Mind Legal Dictionary

RECEIVER OF STOLEN GOODSAuthored

The Law Mind • 1051 words

Definition

One who takes possession of property knowing it to have been stolen, with the intent to deprive the rightful owner of it. The receiver does not commit the theft itself but becomes criminally liable after the fact by accepting the stolen goods into their custody or control.

At common law, receiving stolen goods was treated as a form of accessory liability — the receiver was an accessory after the fact to the theft. Modern statutes in most U.S. jurisdictions have elevated the offense to a standalone crime, often called "receiving stolen property" or "possession of stolen property," punishable independently of the underlying theft and, in many states, at the same level as the principal thief.

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Common Confusion

RECEIVER OF STOLEN GOODS vs. ACCESSORY AFTER THE FACT: Historically, a receiver was classified as an accessory after the fact to the theft. Modern statutory treatment has largely severed that connection. Today, receiving stolen property typically stands as an independent offense. A researcher encountering a receiver treated as an accessory in historical sources is not reading bad law — they are reading older law. The distinction matters when tracking punishment levels and procedural requirements across time.

RECEIVER OF STOLEN GOODS vs. THIEF: The receiver commits a separate act from the theft. The original thief and the receiver can be prosecuted independently. A person cannot receive stolen property from themselves — the act requires that someone else committed the predicate theft.

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Core Elements

Three elements must concur to establish liability as a receiver of stolen goods:

1. THE GOODS WERE STOLEN. The property received must actually have been stolen. If the underlying theft is incomplete, negated, or legally excused, the receiving offense may fail. This creates a dependency on the validity of the predicate theft — a point with procedural and evidentiary consequences.

2. THE DEFENDANT RECEIVED THE GOODS. Receipt requires some exercise of dominion or control over the property. Mere proximity is not enough. Constructive receipt — where goods are placed under the defendant's effective control without physical handling — satisfies this element in most jurisdictions.

3. THE DEFENDANT KNEW THE GOODS WERE STOLEN. Knowledge is the mens rea of the offense and historically its most contested element. Actual knowledge is required; mere suspicion is insufficient at strict common law, though many modern statutes have introduced a "reason to know" or "should have known" standard. Wilful blindness — deliberately avoiding knowledge — is treated as constructive knowledge in most modern courts.

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Why It Matters in Research

This term underwent significant structural transformation between its common-law origins and modern statutory form. In pre-statutory sources, including Bouvier, the receiver appears almost always in the shadow of the principal thief — liability derived from the theft rather than standing independently. Researchers working in 19th-century case law or treatise material should expect to find the offense analyzed under accessory doctrine, with procedural rules (such as the requirement that the principal be convicted before the accessory could be tried) potentially applying.

Modern statutory offenses labeled "receiving stolen property" or "possession of stolen property" often abandon the accessory framework entirely, and some statutes have extended coverage to property obtained by fraud, robbery, or embezzlement — not just theft in the strict larceny sense. When searching historical sources for this term, the predicate offense matters: a source discussing receipt of goods stolen by larceny may not map cleanly onto a modern statute covering receipt of any "unlawfully obtained" property.

The knowledge element is the live research issue in most modern disputes. Historical sources tend to treat knowledge as requiring proof of actual awareness; the shift toward constructive knowledge and willful blindness standards is largely a 20th-century development. Researchers tracing this evolution should note that Bouvier's formulation — "knowing them to have been stolen" — represents the strict common-law standard, which has been substantially modified in most jurisdictions.

One trap in older sources: the juvenile thief problem. Bouvier notes a case involving a boy who stole from his master. At common law, questions arose about whether a receiver could be convicted when the original thief lacked criminal capacity (as with a child below the age of criminal responsibility). This edge case — whether the predicate "theft" must be criminally attributable to the thief — created doctrinal instability. Modern statutes have largely resolved this by focusing on whether the property was in fact taken unlawfully, independent of the thief's individual culpability.

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Historical Dictionary Support

Bouvier's treatment is concise but structurally accurate for its era. The three-element framework Bouvier sets out — stolen goods, receipt, knowledge — remains the foundation of the modern offense, and there is substantial agreement between Bouvier and contemporary doctrine on the basic structure.

Where Bouvier reflects period limitations: the accessory-after-the-fact framing is present by implication in his statutory note ("may be punished as the principal"), which signals that without the statute, the receiver would occupy a lesser or derivative position. The fact that Bouvier found it necessary to note statutory authorization for punishing the receiver as a principal tells researchers that the common-law baseline was different — and that early American courts would have operated under that baseline before comprehensive criminal codes arrived.

Bouvier does not address constructive receipt, willful blindness, or the extension of the offense beyond goods taken by larceny. These are post-Bouvier developments that historical dictionary sources will not illuminate, and researchers must turn to statutory history and case law for that evolution.

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Jurisdictional Note

Most U.S. jurisdictions have codified this offense as "receiving stolen property" or "possession of stolen property," and punishment typically scales with the value of the goods received, mirroring the tiered structure of theft statutes. Some states have folded receiving into broader "theft" or "stolen property" offenses that consolidate multiple forms of post-theft liability. English law developed the offense through a distinct statutory line beginning with the Theft Act 1968, and researchers working with English sources should not assume terminological equivalence with American doctrine.

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Encyclopedia Cross-Reference

Receiving Stolen Property — The Law Mind Criminal Law Encyclopedia (criminal_69)

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RECEIVER OF STOLEN GOODSsubentry

Bouvier's Law Dictionary • 1928

In Criminal Law. By statutory provi- sion, the receiver of stolen goods, knowing them to have been stolen, may be punished as the principal, in perhaps all the United States. To make this offence complete, the goods received must have been stolen, they must have been received by the defendant, and the receiver must know that they had been stolen. A boy stole a chattel from his master, and after it had been taken from him in his master's presence, it was, with the master's consent, restored to him again, in order that he might sell it to the defend- ant, to whom he had been in the habit of selling similar stolen articles. He accord- ingly sold it to the defendant, who, being indicted for feloniously receiving it of an evil-disposed person, knowing it to be stolen, was convicted, and, notwithstand- ing objection made, sentenced; Car. & M. 217. But this case has since been held not to be law, and a defendant not to be liable to conviction under such circumstances, inasmuch as at the time of the receipt the goods were not stolen goods; Dearsl. 468. The goods stolen must have been received by the defendant. Prima facie, if stolen goods are found in a man's house, he, not being the thief, is a receiver; 1 Den. Cr. Cas. 601. And though there is proof of a criminal intent to receive, and a knowledge that the goods were stolen, if the exclusive possession still remains in the thief, a con- viction for receiving cannot be sustained; 2 id. 37. So a principal in the first degree, particeps criminis, cannot at the same time be treated as a receiver; 2 id. 439. Where a prisoner is charged in two counts with stealing and receiving, the jury may re- turn a verdict of guilty on the latter count, if warranted by the evidence, although the evidence is also consistent with the pris- oner having been a principal in the second degree in the stealing; Bell, Cr. Cas. 20. See 48 Ohio St. 220. But a person having a joint possession with the thief may be convicted as a receiver; Dearsl. 494. The actual manual possession or touch of the goods by the defendant, however, is not necessary to the completion of the offence of receiving; it is sufficient if they are in the actual possession of a person over whom the defendant has a control, so that they would be forthcoming if he ordered it; id. 494. Husband and wife were indicted jointly for receiving. The jury found both guilty, and found, also, that the wife re- ceived the goods without the control or knowledge of the husband, and apart from him, and that "he afterwards adopted his wife's receipt." It was held that this find- ing did not warrant the conviction of the husband; Dearsl. & B. 329. The offence of receiving stolen property involves a criminal intent as a material element, such as an intent to aid the thief, of obtaining a reward for restoring it to the owner, or in some way to derive profit from the act; 27 Tex. App. 193. See 58 Ark. 513. It is almost always difficult to prove guilty knowledge; and that must, in gen- eral, be collected from circumstances. If such circumstances are proved which to a person of common understanding and pru- dence, and situated as the prisoner was, must have satisfied him that they were stolen. this is sufficient. For example, the receipt of watches, jewelry, large quantities of money, bundles of clothes of various kinds, or personal property of any sort, to a considerable value, from boys or persons destitute of property and without any law- ful means of acquiring them, and specially if bought at untimely hours, the mind can arrive at no other conclusion than that they were stolen. This is further cou- firmed if they have been bought at an un- der-value, concealed, the marks defaced, and falsehood resorted to in accounting for the possession of them; Alison, Cr. Law 330; 2 Russ. Cr. 253; 1 Fost. & F. 51; Whart. Cr. L. 983, 986. See 135 Ill. 243. Evidence that other stolen goods were found in defendant's possession is admis- sible to show guilty knowledge; 38 S. C. 330. In order to sustain a prosecution for re- ceiving stolen property, it is necessary to prove that defendant knew it was stolen, but such knowledge need not be personal or actual; 50 Mo. App. 186. At common law, receiving stolen goods, knowing them to have been stolen, is a misdemeanor; 2 Russ. Cr. 253. But in Massachusetts it has been held to partake so far of the nature of felony that if a con- stable has reasonable grounds to suspect one of the crime of receiving or aiding in the concealment of stolen goods, knowing them to be stolen, he may without warrant arrest the supposed offender; 5 Cush. 281. See [1892] 2. B. 597; RECENT POSSESSION, etc.

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