REA

6 definitions found across Law Mind sources

REAAuthored
The Law Mind • 991 words
Definition
Rea is a Latin adjective meaning "guilty" or "culpable," used in legal contexts almost exclusively as a component of compound terms rather than as a standalone word. Its primary modern legal appearance is in the phrase mens rea (guilty mind), the mental-state element required for criminal liability, and its counterpart actus reus (guilty act), the conduct element. Together, these two compounds form the foundational structure of criminal responsibility in common law systems. As a standalone term, rea rarely appears in contemporary legal writing. Researchers encountering it in older sources will find it functioning as an adjective modifying a noun — most commonly in the phrase persona rea (guilty person) — or embedded in Latin maxims addressing culpability and wrongdoing. ---
Common Language
Modern common usage (Wiktionary): Abbreviation for "reactive arthritis," a medical condition. Historical common usage: Not independently attested in Webster's 1913 as a legal or common English term. The word is Latin, not anglicized. The gap here is directional: common modern usage of "rea" as an abbreviation is entirely medical and has no overlap with legal meaning. Researchers encountering "rea" in a legal context should not import medical-abbreviation meanings. Conversely, legal database searches for "rea" as a standalone term will often return noise, including medical literature and proper names, rather than legal doctrine. ---
Common Confusion
Rea is most frequently confused or conflated with the full compound terms mens rea and actus reus, to which it belongs. Some researchers mistakenly treat rea as a synonym for mens rea itself. It is not: rea is the adjectival component describing guilt or culpability, while mens rea means specifically "guilty mind" — the mental dimension of that culpability. Actus reus means "guilty act" — the physical dimension. The distinction matters when reading historical sources that abbreviate or reconstruct these phrases. Additionally, do not confuse rea with res (thing, matter), a superficially similar Latin term with an entirely different legal vocabulary — res judicata, res ipsa loquitur, and so forth. The two words are unrelated in meaning and usage. ---
Why It Matters in Research
Researchers working in the Law Mind corpus are unlikely to encounter rea as a freestanding headword in most modern sources. Its research value is primarily as a building block for understanding mens rea doctrine and the broader criminal law framework. Key navigational points: First, when searching historical sources, rea appears embedded in maxims and doctrinal Latin that was standard in treatises through the nineteenth century. Bouvier and Burrill use Latin constructions freely; researchers should be prepared to parse compound Latin phrases rather than find English glosses. Second, the historical dictionaries in the Law Mind corpus do not contain a dedicated entry for rea as a standalone term — the source material provided confirms this. Bouvier's relevant surrounding entries address maxims of interpretation; Burrill's surrounding context addresses qualified property in animals through ratione-based grounds (ratione impotentiae, ratione loci, ratione privilegii). Neither treats rea independently. This tells the researcher something important: pre-twentieth-century legal dictionaries folded rea's meaning into the compound terms where it operated, rather than treating it as a discrete concept. Third, the evolution of mens rea doctrine is the area where this term generates the most research complexity. The mental-state vocabulary — intent, knowledge, recklessness, negligence, and their historical equivalents — has shifted substantially across common law development. A researcher reading nineteenth-century sources on criminal liability will encounter rea in constructions that do not map cleanly onto modern Model Penal Code categories. Fourth, jurisdictional variation in mens rea standards is substantial, and rea's meaning as a culpability marker tracks those variations. What counts as a "guilty mind" differs across jurisdictions, offense types, and historical periods. ---
Historical Dictionary Support
Neither Bouvier's Law Dictionary nor Burrill's Law Dictionary contains a dedicated entry for rea as a standalone term, which is consistent with how Latin adjectives functioned in historical legal writing — they were defined through the compounds they inhabited rather than extracted for independent treatment. Burrill's entries on ratione impotentiae, ratione loci, and ratione privilegii — all built on the ablative ratione (by reason of) — illustrate how historical dictionaries handled Latin components: by entering the full phrase, not the constituent parts. The same logic governed rea. Researchers seeking historical treatment of the concept will find it under mens rea, not under rea alone. Bouvier's surrounding content consists of interpretive maxims in Latin, further confirming that the operative unit of analysis in historical legal Latin was the phrase or maxim, not the individual word. Neither dictionary covers the twentieth-century development of tiered mental-state frameworks — which is where the most practically significant doctrinal elaboration of rea-as-culpability has occurred. ---
Jurisdictional Note
The relevance and precise content of mens rea — and by extension the culpability concept rea represents — varies meaningfully between common law jurisdictions and between jurisdictions that have adopted the Model Penal Code framework and those that have not. Strict liability offenses, which dispense with any rea requirement entirely, exist across virtually all jurisdictions but vary in scope and application. ---
Encyclopedia Cross-Reference
Criminal Law — Elements of a Crime (Actus Reus and Mens Rea) (The Law Mind Criminal Law Encyclopedia) Criminal Law — Mens Rea (Intent, Knowledge, Recklessness, Negligence) (The Law Mind Criminal Law Encyclopedia) ---
Related Terms
Mens rea — the guilty mind; primary compound term Actus reus — the guilty act; paired element Persona rea — guilty person; historical Latin construction Strict liability — offenses requiring no mens rea Culpability — modern English equivalent concept Intent — specific mental-state category under mens rea analysis Knowledge — mental-state category Recklessness — mental-state category Negligence — mental-state category Model Penal Code — codified framework structuring modern mens rea analysis Scienter — related concept in civil and criminal contexts
REAmain
Bouvier's Law Dictionary • 1928
Non ex opinionibus singulorum, sed ex communi usu, nomina exaudiri debent. Names of things ought to be understood according to common usage, not according to the opinions of individuals. Dig. 33. 10. 7. 2. Non exemplis sed legibus judicandum est. Not by the facts of the case, but by the law must judg- ment be made. Dig. 7. 45. 18. (called by Albericus Gentilis lez aurea). Non facias malum ut inde veniat bonum. You are not to do evil that good may come of it. 11 Co. 74 a. Non impedit clausula derogatoria, quo minus ab eadem potestate res dissolvantur a qua constitu- untur. A derogatory clause does not prevent things from being dissolved by the same power by which they were originally made. Bacon, Max. Reg. 19; Broom, Max. 27; 5 Watts 155. Non in legendo sed in intelligendo leges consistunt. The laws consist, not in being read, but in being understood. 8 Co. 167. Non jus ex regula, sed regula ex jure. The law does not arise from the rule (or maxim), but the rule from the law. Fleta vi. 14; Trayner, Max. 884. Non jus, sed seisina facit stipitem. Not right, but seisin, makes a stock (from which the inheri- tance must descend). Fleta, 1. 6, cc. 14, 2, §2; Noy, Max., 9th ed. 72, n. (b); Broom, Max. 525; 2 Sharsw. Bla. Com. 209; 1 Steph. Com. 365, 368, 394; 4 Kent 388: 4 Scott N. R. 468. Non licet quod dispendio licet. That which is permitted only at a loss is not permitted to be done. Co. Litt. 197. Non nasci, et natum mori, paria sunt. Not to be born, and to be dead-born, are the same. Non obligat lex nisi promulgata. A law is not obligatory unless it be promulgated. Non observata forma, infertur adnullatio actus. When the form is not observed, it is inferred that the act is annulled. 12 Co. 7. Non officit conatus nisi sequatur effectus. An attempt does not harm unless a consequence follow. 11 Co. 98. Non omne damnum inducit injuriam. Not every loss produces an injury (i. e, gives a right of action). See 3 Bla. Com. 219; 1 Sm. L. C. 131; 2 Bouv. Inst. n. 2211. Non onme quod licet honestum est. It is not everything which is permitted that is honorable. Dig. 50. 17. 144; 4 Johns. Ch. 121. Non omnium quæ a majoribus nostris constituta sunt ratio reddi potest. A reason on cannot always be given for the institutions of our ancestors. 4 Co. 78; Broom, Max. 157; Branch, Princ. Non possessori incumbit necessitas probandi pos- sessiones ad se pertinere. It is not incumbent on the possessor of property to prove his right to his possessions. Code, 4. 19. 2; Broom, Max. 714. Non potest adduci exceptio ejusdem rei cujfls pe titur dissolutio. A plea of the same matter, the determination of which is sought by the action. cannot be brought forward. Bacon, Max. Reg. 2. (When an action is brought to annul a proceeding, the defendant cannot plead such proceeding in bar.) Broom, Max. 166; Wing. Max. 647; 3 P. Wms. 317. Non potest probari quod probatum non relevat. That cannot be proved which proved is irrelevant. See 1 Exch. 91, 102. Non potest quis sine brevi agere. No one can sue without a writ. Fleta, 1. 2, c. 18, § 4. Non potest rex gratiam facere cum injuria et damno aliorum. The king cannot confer a favor which occasions injury and loss to others. 3 Inst. 286; Broom, Max. 63; Vaugh. 338; 2 E. & Β. 874. Non potest rex subditum renitentem onerare im- positionibus. The king cannot load a subject with imposition against his consent. 2 Inst. 61. Non potest videri desisse habere, qui nunquam habuit. He cannot be considered as having ceased to have a thing, who never had it. Dig. 50. 17. 208. Non præstat impedimentum quod de jure non sortitur effectum. A thing which has no effect in law is not an impediment. Jenk. Cent. 162; Wing. Max. 727. Non quod dictum est, sed quod factum est, in- spicitur. Not what is said, but what is done, is to be regarded. Co. Litt. 36; 6 Bing. 310; 1 Metc. 858; 11 Cush. 536. Non refert an quis assensum suum præfert verbis, an rebus ipsis et factis. It is immaterial whether a man gives his assent by words or by acts and deeds. 10 Co. 82. Non refert quid ex æquipollentibus fat. It mat- ters not which of two equivalents happens. & Co. 129. Non refert quid notum sit judici, si notum non rit in forma judicii. It matters not what is known to the judge, if it is not known to him judicially. 8 Bulstr. 115. See JUDICIAL NOTICE. Non refert verbis an factis fit revocatio. It mat ters not whether a revocation be by words or by acts. Cro. Car. 49; Branch, Princ. Non remota causa sed prozima spectatur. See
REAmain
Burrill's Law Dictionary • 1870
(381) Ratione impotentiæ; on account of inability. A ground of qualified property in some animals feræ naturæ, as in the young ones, while they are unable to fly or run. 2 Bl. Com. 394. Hale's Anal. sect. xxvi. Ratione loci; by reason of place. A ground of ownership in rabbits and hares. Hale's Anal. sect. xxvi. Ratione privilegii; by reason of privilege. A ground of ownership in birds or beasts of warren. Id. ibid. Ratione soli; on account of the soil; with reference to the soil. Said to be the ground of ownership in bees. 2 Bl. Com. 393. Ratione tenure; by reason of tenure; as a consequence of tenure. 3 Bl. Com. 230. 1 Μ. & S. 435. A phrase in old pleading. Not the same as "by reason of being owner and proprietor." Le Blanc, J. 1 M. & S. 441. Ratione tenuræ implies ex vi termini, something originally annexed to the holding. Id. ibid. RAUNSOM, Raunsome. L. Fr. In old English law. Ransom; a fine; a severe kind of fine. Sur peyne de raunsome; on pain of ransom. Britt. c. 11. Per raunsome simple ou graund, solonc le fait; by an ordinary or a great ransom, according to the fact. Id. ibid. Puny par prison et greve raunsom. Id. c. 48. (382) The threefold division of actions into real,) troduced from the civil law. Best on Evid. personal and mixed, is obviously taken 221, § 178. from the civil law. Inst. 4. 6. 1, 20.
ReAnoun
Wiktionary (English) • 2026
Wiktionary contributorsCC BY-SA 4.0 • via Kaikki
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Abbreviation of reactive arthritis.
reanoun
Wiktionary (English) • 2026
Wiktionary contributorsCC BY-SA 4.0 • via Kaikki
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Alternative form of rei.
Reaname
Wiktionary (English) • 2026
Wiktionary contributorsCC BY-SA 4.0 • via Kaikki
Extracted and formatted for display by Law Mind. Source link opens the current Wiktionary page and its contributor history; it is not a frozen copy of this extract.
A female given name. | A surname. | A minor city in Andrew County, Missouri, United States. | A river flowing through the city of Birmingham, West Midlands, England, which flows into the River Tame; in full, River Rea. | A river in Shropshire and co/Worcestershire, England, which flows into the River Teme; in full, River Rea. | A river in Fiordland, Southland region, New Zealand, which flows into Bradshaw Sound; in full, Rea River.

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