A contract for pay- ment of ransom of a captured vessel, with stipulations of safe conduct if she pursue a certain course and arrive at a certain time. If found out of time or course, the safe conduct is void; Wheaton, Int. Law 107. The payment cannot be enforced in England, during the war, by an action on the contract, but can in this country; 1 Kent 104, 105; 4 Wash. C. C. 141; 2 Gall. 325. By the general maritime law ransoms are allowed and the master of a ship may bind the whole cargo as well as the ship, by his contract for ransom; 3C. Rob. 240. They were formerly prohibited in England, but now the queen in council may make rules for prohibiting or allowing them, under the act of 1864. Ransoms have never been prohibited by the United States; 15 Johns. 6; nor by the other nations, except England; 1 Kent 112. A belligerent may deliver up neutral property on ransoms as well as enemy's property; per Story, J., in 2 Gall. 337, where the subject of ransom is discussed. A ransom strictly speaking is not a re- purchase of the captured property, it is rather a repurchase of the actual right of the captors at the time, be it what it may, or, more properly, it is a relinquishment of all the interest or benefit which the captors might acquire or consummate in the prop- erty by the regular adjudications of a prize tribunal. There seems to be no legal difference between the case of a ransom of the property of an enemy and of a neutral, for if the property be neutral and yet there be probable cause of capture, or if the de- linquency be such that the penalty of con- fiscation might be justly applied, there can be no intrinsic difficulty in supporting a contract by which the captors agree to waive their rights in consideration of a sum of money voluntarily paid or agreed to be paid by the captured; 3 Phil. Int. L. 645. In the absence of stipulation, if the ran- somel vessel be lost, the contract is still binding; but usually there is a clause ex- cepting loss on the high seas, but not by stranding; 2 Halleck, Int. L., Baker's ed. 331. RAPE (Lat. rapere. to snatch, to seize with violence). In Criminal Law. The carnal knowledge of a woman by a man forcibly and unlawfully against her will. Russ. Cr. L. 904. The statute of Westminster 2, c. 34, de- fines the crime to be where "a man do ravish a woman, married, maid, or other, where she did not consent neither before nor after." And this statute definition has been adopted in several very recent cases. Addenda to 1 Den. Cr. Cas.; 1 Bell, Cr. Cas. 63, 71. Much difficulty has arisen in defining the meaning of carnal knowledge, and different opinions have been entertained.-some judges having supposed that penetration alone is sufficient, while others deemed emission an essential ingredient in the crime; Hawk. Pl. Cr. b. 1, c. 41, s. 3; 12 Co. 37; 1 Hale, Pl. Cr. 638; 2 Chitty, Cr. Law 810. Penetration is the act of inserting the penis into the female organs of gener- ation. 9 C. & P. 118. See 5 C. & P. 321; 9 id. 31. It was once held that in order to commit the crime of rape it is requisite that the penetration should be such as to rupture the hymen; 5 C. & P. 321. But this case has since been expressly over- ruled; 2 Mood. Cr. Cas. 90; 9 C. & P. 752; Whart. Cr. L. 554. In the United States in modern times the better opinion seems to be that both penetration and emission are not necessary; 1 East, Pl. Cr. 439: Add. Pa. 143; 3 Greenl. Ev. § 410; 2 Bish. N. Cr. Law § 1131; 111 Ind. 279; 14 Neb. 205; 1 Houst. Cr. Cas. 363; 25 Fla. 702; contra, 14 Ohio 222; but later cases in that state intimated that if the question were new, the decision would be the other way; 22 Ohio St. 102, 541. See 65 N. С. 466. Slight penetration has been held to be sufficient; 76 Ga. 623. By statute in England carnal knowledge is completely proved by proof of penetration; 9 Geo. IV. c. 31, § 18. Statutes to the same effect have been passed in some of the United States; but these statutes have been thought to be merely declaratory of the common law: 3 Greenl. Ev. § 210. See, on this subject, 1 Hale, Pl. Cr. 628; 1 East, Pl. Cr. 437; 1 Chitty, Med. Jur. 886; 1 Russ. Cr. Law 860. It is to be remarked, also, that very slight evidence may be sufficient to induce a jury to believe there was emission; Add. Pa. 143; 2 Const. 351; 1 Beck, Med. Jur. 140; 4 Chitty, Bla. Com. 213, note 8. See [1891] 2 Q. B. 149. In Scotland, emission is not requisite: 1 Swint. 93. See EMISSION, By the term man in this definition is meant a male of the human species, of the age of fourteen years and upwards; foran infant under fourteen years is supposed by law incapable of committing this offence: Whart. Cr. L. 551; 1 Hale. Pl. Cr. 631; 8 C. & P. 738; Tayl. Ev. 127; 29 Fla. 565. But this presumption has been held by some authorities not to be conclusive, but capable of removal by proof: 5 Lea 352. But not only can an infant under fourteen years, if of sufficient mischievous discre- tion, but even a woman may be guilty as principal in