Definition
A Latin maxim of statutory and documentary construction meaning, roughly, "as often as in the words" or "whenever the words [are ambiguous or nondescript]." The phrase signals the interpretive principle that when the words of an instrument are general, doubtful, or insufficient on their face, resort may be had to surrounding circumstances, intent, or related provisions to supply meaning — and that this process repeats as often as the text presents such gaps. In practice, the maxim operates as a warrant for contextual or purposive interpretation: wherever the words alone do not resolve the question, the interpreter turns to context.
The maxim is closely associated with the broader canon that ambiguous language in a legal instrument should be read in light of the purpose the instrument was meant to serve, and that a purely literal reading should yield whenever literalism would produce absurdity or defeat the evident intent of the drafters.
Why It Matters in Research
This is a rarely encountered maxim, and Law Mind corpus researchers should approach it with two cautions. First, the surviving historical dictionary entries for this term are fragmentary. Black's 2nd Edition reproduces surrounding material that appears to concern an adjacent entry, and Anderson's Dictionary of Law offers only a cross-reference to AMBI- (likely AMBIGUITY or AMBIGUOUS), which itself suggests that the compilers treated this maxim as a sub-point within the larger doctrine of ambiguity rather than a freestanding concept. Researchers should not rely on these two sources as complete statements of the maxim's scope.
Second, the maxim belongs to a family of Latin construction canons — including expressio unius, noscitur a sociis, and ejusdem generis — that appear frequently in older common law cases and equity opinions but are often cited without attribution to any specific maxim by name. A researcher tracing interpretive methodology in historical opinions may encounter the underlying principle in practice long before finding the phrase quoties in verbis stated explicitly.
For research in pre-twentieth-century materials, this maxim is most likely to surface in treatises on statutory construction (such as Dwarris on Statutes or Sedgwick on Construction of Statutory and Constitutional Law) rather than in judicial opinions, where the principle was typically applied without labeling. Researchers working in equity or on deed and will construction will find the maxim's logic embedded in doctrine even where the Latin phrase is absent.
Historical Dictionary Support
The available historical dictionary sources are of limited direct value for this term. Black's 2nd Edition reproduces text that does not correspond to a substantive treatment of quoties in verbis — the visible passage discusses "Quorum pretextu" and a separate principle concerning sentences and confirmation of prior matter, suggesting either a printing adjacency issue or that the entry was minimal and the surrounding context has been captured instead. This is a known limitation of compressed Latin maxim entries in early editions of Black's, where brief phrases received only a line or two of treatment.
Anderson's cross-reference to AMBI- confirms that the term was understood within the framework of ambiguity doctrine, and that Anderson did not treat it as independently significant enough for a standalone substantive entry. This is itself useful data: it tells the researcher that by the late nineteenth century, quoties in verbis was regarded as a subordinate expression of the ambiguity canon rather than an independent rule of construction.
Neither source quotes the maxim fully or traces its development. Researchers needing authoritative treatment should consult primary civil law and common law treatises on construction directly.
Jurisdictional Note
As a Latin maxim of general construction, quoties in verbis was not jurisdiction-specific and appears across common law systems. Its practical application, however, has been absorbed into modern statutory interpretation doctrine differently across jurisdictions — American textualists largely resist the contextual license the maxim implies, while English and Commonwealth courts have historically been more receptive to purposive readings the maxim supports.