Definition
Latin: "That if it happen." A formal conditional clause used in medieval and early modern conveyancing to introduce a condition subsequent in a deed. When inserted into a deed, the phrase *quod si contingat* signaled that the grant or reservation was subject to a triggering event — that is, something that might or might not come to pass. The clause functioned as a technical marker of conditionality, distinct from an absolute grant, and its presence (or absence) could determine whether an interest was conditional or vested.
The phrase belongs to the broader vocabulary of Latin conveyancing formulas that carried precise legal weight in common law deed drafting prior to the simplification of conveyancing language in the nineteenth century.
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Common Confusion
*Quod si contingat* is occasionally confused with other Latin conditional formulas in deeds, particularly *si contingat* (a shortened variant) and *proviso* clauses. The distinction mattered: courts sometimes drew fine lines between language that created a true condition (with the consequence of forfeiture upon breach) and language that merely expressed a covenant or qualification. *Quod si contingat* was understood by Littleton and the common law tradition as capable of creating a condition, but its effect depended heavily on the surrounding language of the instrument.
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Why It Matters in Research
Researchers encounter this phrase almost exclusively in pre-nineteenth-century deed instruments, treatises on real property, and court opinions construing historical conveyances. Several navigational points are worth noting:
**Temporal boundary.** The phrase is a relic of formal Latin conveyancing. After the plain-language reforms of the nineteenth century — and particularly after American states enacted their own conveyancing statutes — Latin conditional formulas fell out of standard drafting practice. A researcher seeing this phrase in a primary source should treat it as a strong signal that the document dates to the colonial or early republic period, or to an English precedent book.
**Littleton's authority.** All three historical dictionaries in the Law Mind corpus trace this phrase directly to Littleton's *Tenures*, § 330 — the foundational English treatise on real property that Coke later annotated in *Coke on Littleton*. Any deep research into the operative meaning of this clause should begin with those sources, which remain the primary interpretive authority. The dictionaries summarize but do not fully reproduce Littleton's analysis.
**Condition vs. covenant trap.** Courts in the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries frequently litigated whether language in a deed created a condition (triggering forfeiture) or merely a covenant (triggering damages). The presence of *quod si contingat* was one factor courts examined. A researcher working with cases that cite or discuss this phrase should look carefully at how the court characterized the operative language — the phrase alone was not always dispositive.
**Corpus connections.** This term connects directly to the Law Mind materials on conditions in deeds, conditional estates, and the law of conditions subsequent. Researchers tracing a historical title dispute or construing an old deed should cross-reference entries on CONDITION, CONDITION SUBSEQUENT, and DEFEASANCE to understand the doctrinal stakes of the phrase's inclusion.
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Historical Dictionary Support
Black's (1st and 2nd editions) and Burrill's Law Dictionary are in full agreement on the core definition: the phrase means "that if it happen" and operated as a condition-creating formula in deeds, citing Littleton § 330. The entries are nearly identical across all three sources, which suggests the dictionaries were drawing from a common stream of authority rather than independent analysis.
Burrill's entry labels the phrase "L. Lat." (Law Latin), a useful reminder that this was a term of art within the specialized legal Latin of English conveyancing — not classical Latin. This distinction occasionally matters when researchers consult Latin reference works that may not recognize the legal technical usage.
What the historical dictionaries do not address: none of the three sources explains how courts actually applied the phrase in contested cases, what consequences flowed from its use, or how it interacted with other conveyancing formulas in the same instrument. The entries are definitional snapshots, not doctrinal analyses. For the latter, Coke's commentary on Littleton and the nineteenth-century American real property treatises (such as Washburn's *Real Property*) are the appropriate next step.
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Jurisdictional Note
The phrase originated in English law and was carried into American colonial practice through English precedent books and deed forms. Its legal effect was governed by common law principles of conveyancing that were broadly uniform across common law jurisdictions, though individual American states eventually modified the law of conditions in deeds by statute. Researchers working with deeds from specific American colonies or early states should check whether local recording acts or property statutes altered the common law treatment of conditional language.
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