QUICQUID - The Law Mind Legal Dictionary

QUICQUIDAuthored

The Law Mind • 686 words

Definition

A Latin pronoun meaning "whatever" or "whatsoever." In legal usage, *quicquid* appears primarily as a component of longer Latin maxims and phrases embedded in common law texts, pleadings, and judicial opinions. It functions grammatically as an indefinite relative pronoun, introducing a clause that encompasses all things, acts, or circumstances within a stated category without limitation. The term has no independent legal definition of its own; its significance is entirely contextual, derived from the maxims in which it appears.

The most frequently encountered legal maxim containing *quicquid* is *quicquid plantatur solo, solo cedit* — whatever is affixed to the soil belongs to the soil — a foundational principle of property law governing fixtures and the relationship between land and objects attached to it. A second common form is *quicquid ex culpa contingit damnum vel periculum, ei imputari debet cujus culpa id contingit*, expressing that loss or danger arising from fault is chargeable to the one whose fault caused it. These maxims, not the pronoun itself, are the operative legal instruments.

Why It Matters in Research

Researchers encountering *quicquid* in historical legal materials should treat it as a signal to identify the full maxim, not as a standalone term. Digests and treatises from the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries — Coke, Bracton's translators, and the institutional writers — employ Latin maxims freely, often abbreviated or paraphrased, and *quicquid* in isolation is an incomplete fragment. Searching a corpus for *quicquid* without the surrounding phrase will surface an unwieldy range of maxims across property, tort, contract, and procedural law.

The most research-consequential maxim is *quicquid plantatur solo*. Its application in disputes over fixtures, tenant improvements, trade fixtures, and the boundary between real and personal property makes it a durable presence in property law well into the modern period, and the underlying doctrine appears frequently in sources that do not use the Latin phrase at all. Researchers working in nineteenth-century American case law should expect the principle to appear in English rather than Latin as courts moved away from maxim-citation style.

Corpus researchers should also note that historical legal dictionaries index maxims containing *quicquid* inconsistently — some under *quicquid*, others under the operative noun in the phrase (e.g., *solo*, *culpa*). Rapalje & Lawrence, for instance, does not independently define *quicquid* but routes the reader to *quisquis*, the parent entry covering indefinite relative pronouns in Latin legal usage. This cross-referencing practice was common but not universal, meaning a single-entry search may miss relevant material.

Historical Dictionary Support

Rapalje & Lawrence treat *quicquid* as a variant form of *quisquis* (whatever person, whosoever) and provide no independent substantive definition, directing users to the parent entry. This reflects standard Latin grammatical practice: *quisquis* and *quicquid* are forms of the same indefinite relative pronoun, differing only in that *quicquid* is the neuter form, used when the antecedent refers to things rather than persons. Historical legal dictionaries generally do not isolate *quicquid* as a term of art for this reason — it is grammatical infrastructure, not a legal concept.

Earlier glossaries and brocard collections (Noy's *Grounds and Maximes*, Wingate's *Maximes of Reason*, and Rolle's abridgment) embed *quicquid* maxims within substantive subject entries. The fixture maxim, in particular, appears under real property headings rather than under Latin index terms. Researchers consulting those sources should search by subject, not by Latin keyword.

No meaningful divergence among historical sources on the meaning of *quicquid* itself exists — it is a Latin word with a fixed grammatical meaning. The interpretive variation lies entirely in how specific maxims using *quicquid* have been applied, limited, or qualified by courts over time.

Jurisdictional Note

The maxims built around *quicquid* are common law in origin and appear in both English and American legal history. Their direct citation is now rare in most American jurisdictions, but the underlying doctrines — particularly *quicquid plantatur solo* as the basis of fixture law — remain operative. Civil law jurisdictions address analogous concepts through different frameworks and would not use these Latin formulations.

QUICQUIDmain

Rapalje & Lawrence • 1883

(1054) Qui periculum amat in eo peribit: He who loves danger will perish by it. Qui potest et debet vetare, jubet (Gilb. 35): He who is able and ought to forbid, commands. Qui primum peccat ille facit rixam (Godb.): He who sins first, makes the strife. Qui prior est tempore potior est jure (Co. Litt. 14a): He who is first in point of time is preferred in law. (See Brace v. Duchess of Marlborough, 2 P. Wms. 49, 1, and Marsh v. Lee, 1 White & T. Lead. Cas. 659.) A mortgagee may recover in ejectment without giving notice to quit against a tenant who claims under a lease from the mortgagor, granted after the mortgage without the privity of the mortgagee. The rule stated in this maxim applies as between finders of "treasure trove," derelicts, and such like. (See, also, Keech v. Hall, 1 Sm. Lead. Cas. 574.) Where several persons have interests in one property, and equal equities in every point except time, as in the case of a third mortgagee who had no notice of a second mortgage when making his advance, here both mortgagees have equal equities, but the second mortgagee being first in point of time, has the prior right in this instance, however, the third mortgagee could avail himself of the advantages of tacking. Qui pro me aliquid facit, mihi fecisse videtur (2 Inst. 501): He who does anything for me, appears to do it to me. Qui providet sibi providet hæredibus: He who provides for himself, provides for his heirs. Qui rationem in omnibus quærunt, rationem subvertunt (2 Co. 75): They who seek a reason for everything, subvert reason. Qui semel actionem renunciaverit amplius repetere non potest (8 Co. 59): He who renounces an action once, cannot any more repeat it. Qui semel est malus, semper præsumitur esse malus in eodem genere (Cro. Car. 317): He who is once criminal, is presumed to be always criminal in the same way. Qui sentit commodum sentire debet et onus (1 Co. 99): He who receives the advantage ought also to suffer the burden. Equity always acted on this principle when enforcing contribution between co-sureties. Dering v. Earl of Winchelsea, 1 White & T. Lead. Cas. 106, and Waugh v. Carver, 1 Sm. Lead. Cas. 908. Qui sentit onus, sentire debet et commodum (1 Co. 99a): He who bears the burden of a thing, ought also to experience the advantage arising from it. Qui tacet, consentire videtur (Jenk. Cent. 32): He who is silent, appears to consent. Qui tacet consentire videtur, ubi tractatur de ejus commodo (9 Mod. 38): He who is silent is considered as assenting, when his advantage is debated,