(367) bilities pertaining to it.] Broom's Max. [356.] Qui bene interrogat, bene docet. He who questions well, teaches well. 3 Bulstr. 227. Information or express averment may be effectually conveyed in the way of interrogation. Id. ibid. sively (ceu per adulterium) employed to express the ideas of victory and martial subjugation, (now inseparable from it) is clearly shown by Spelman, who traces it to the peculiar circumstances under which the great Norman Conquest of England was accomplished. William the First was called "the Conqueror," (Lat. conquestor,) Qui bene distinguit, bene docet. He who because he succeeded to the throne of distinguishes well, teaches well. 2 Inst. England not by hereditary right, but on 470. In both these maxims, docet is transthe bequest of Edward the Confessor; lated in Branch's Principia, "learns." that is, (according to the old French Qui concedit aliquid, concedit omne id sine idiom,) by quest and conquest, commonly quo concessio est irrita. He who grants called purchase. But as the enforcement of his right, thus acquired, was accomplished by means of the signal victory obtained over Harold and the Saxons, the ideas of victory and subjugation became so strongly attached to his peculiar title of Conquestor, as gradually to obscure, and finally to supplant its original and proper meaning. Lat. Who; he who. The initial word of numerous maxims. See infra. Qui adimit medium, dirimit finem. He who takes away the mean, destroys the end. Co. Litt. 161 a. He that deprives a man of the mean by which he ought to to come to a thing, deprives him of the thing itself. Id. ibid. Litt. sect. 237. See Qui destruit, &c. Qui aliquid statuerit, parte inaudita altera, æquum licet dixerit, haud æquum fecerit. He who determines any matter without hearing both sides, though he may have decided right, has not done justice. 6 Co. 52 a, Boswell's case. A quotation from Seneca. Traged. fo. 55, Medea, 195. 4 Bl. Com. 283. any thing, grants every thing without which the grant is fruitless. Jenk. Cent. 32, case 63. Qui contemnit præceptum, contemnit præcipientem. He who contemns [contemptuously treats] a command, contemns the party who gives it. 12 Co. 97, Countess of Shrewsbury's case. Qui cum alio contrahit, vel est, vel esse debet non ignarus conditionis ejus. He who contracts with another either is, or ought to be, not ignorant of his condition. Dig. 50. 17. 19. Story's Confl. Laws, § 76. Qui destruit medium, destruit finem. He who destroys the mean, destroys the end. 10 Co. 51 b, Lampet's case. Co. Litt. 161 a. Shep. Touch. 342. Qui ex damnato coitu nascuntur inter liberos non computantur. They who are born of a condemned [or illicit] connection, are not counted among children. Bract. fol. 5. Co. Litt. 8 a. 2 Bl. Com. 247. Bastards are held to be nullius filii, the children of nobody. Id. ibid. Broom's Max. 221, [390.] Qui facit per alium, facit per se. He who acts through another, acts of himself. 1 Bl. Com. 429, 474. Otherwise expressed, Qui per alium facit, per seipsum facere videtur. He who acts by another is considered as acting of himself. Co. Litt. 258 а. Не who does an act through the medium of another party, is in law considered as doing it himself. Broom's Max. 373, [643.] An agent is merely the medium through which the principal himself acts. The fundamental principle of the law of agency, and a maxim of almost universal application. Story on Agency, §§ 440, 442. 7 Man. & Gr. 32, 33. See 1 Selden's R. 48, 53. Qui habet jurisdictionem absolvendi, habet jurisdictionem ligandi. He who has jurisdiction to loosen, has jurisdiction to bind. 12 Co. 60. Applied to writs of prohibition and consultation, as resting on a similar Qui alterius jure utitur, codem jure uti debet. He who uses the right of another, ought to use the same right, [that is, ought to use it subject to the rights and lia- foundation. Id. ibid. (368) authority,] is not supposed to have acted from a wrong or improper motive, because it was his bounden duty to obey. 10 Co. 76 a, b. Broom's Max. 48, [69.] Qui non habet, ille non dat. He who has not, gives not. He who has nothing to give, gives nothing. A person cannot convey a right that is not in him. If a man grant that which is not his, the grant is void. Shep. Touch. (by Preston,) 243. Watkinson Conv. (by Preston,) 191. See Nemo dare potest, &c. Qui hæret in litera, hæret in cortice. He judge, [or one lawfully exercising judicial who sticks, [stops] in the letter, stops in the rind, [or outer covering.] Co. Litt. 54 b. 5 Co. 4 b, Lord Mountjoy's case. 11 Co. 34 b, Powlter's case. 2 Eden, 55. Grose, J. 12 East, 372. He who stops in the mere letter of an instrument, (goes no farther than the mere words of it,) stops in its outer covering, and does not reach its essential meaning. Words are the mere cortex, rind, or bark of an instrument or statute, and are not to be paused upon or dwelt upon, to the neglect of the heart, pith or inner substance.* He who considers merely the letter of an instrument, goes but skin-deep into its meaning. Broom's Max. [534.] Where the intention is clear, too minute a stress should not be laid on the strict and precise signification of words. 2 Bl. Com. 379. Broom's Max. ub. sup. See Cortex, Bark. This is one of the most familiar maxims of the law, but its literal meaning is scarcely expressed by the common translation, "He who sticks to the letter, sticks to the bark," which besides being rude, is grammatically inaccurate, and does not express the full force of hæret, which does not imply adhesion to a thing, but rest or pause upon or in it; hesitancy; a going no farther. The English word "stick" had precisely this meaning, and is often used in the old books to denote hesitancy on the part of a judge. See Hærere. Qui non habet in crumena, luat in corpore. He who has not [the means of satisfaction] in his purse, must pay in his body. If a man cannot pay his fine, he must go to prison. 4 Bl. Com. 380. Otherwise expressed, qui non habet in ære, luat in corpore. 2 Inst. 173. Si in ære non habeat, in pelle luat. 1 Kent's Com. 423. Qui non obstat quod obstare potest, facere videtur. He who does not prevent [a thing] which he can prevent, is considered to do [as doing] it. 2 Inst. 146. Qui non improbat, approbat. He who does not condemn, approves. 3 Inst. 27. Qui non prohibet quod prohibere potest, assentire videtur. He who does not forbid [an act] which he can forbid, is supposed to assent [to it.] 2 Inst. 305. Otherwise expressed, Qui non prohibet cum prohibere possit, jubet. He who does not forbid [a thing being done] when he can forbid it, commands [it.] 1 Bl. Com. 430. NegliLord Bacon, citing this maxim, pushes the figure still farther. "This is not wor-gence is a kind of implied consent. Id. ibid. See Grotius de Jur. Bell. lib. 2, с. 21, § 2, n. 2. thy the name of cortex; it is but muscus corticis, the moss of the bark." Argument in Case of the Postnati of Scotland; Works, Qui obstruit aditum, destruit commodum. iv. 333. Qui in jus dominiumve alterius succedit, jure ejus uti debet. He who succeeds to the right or property of another, ought to use his right [ought to exercise it as the He who obstructs a way, passage or entrance, destroys a benefit or convenience. Co. Litt. 161 a. He who prevents another from entering upon land, destroys the benefit which he has from it. Id. ibid. assignor himself would have exercised it.] Qui "omne" dicit, nihil excludit [excipit.] Dig. 50. 17. 177, pr. The assignee of property takes it subject to all the liabilities, and clothed with all the rights which attached to it in the hands of the assignor. Broom's Max. [356.] Qui jure suo utitur, nemini facit injuriam. He who uses his own right, harms no Branch's Pr. Another form of the civil law maxim Non videtur vim facere, &c. (q. v.) one. Qui jussu judicis aliquod fecerit, non videtur dolo malo fecisse, quia parere necesse est. He who does any thing by command of a He who says "all" excludes or excepts nothing. 11 Co. 59 b, Foster's case. Shep. Touch. (by Preston,) 90. Qui peccat ebrius, luat sobrius. He who sins when drunk, shall be punished when sober. Cary's R. 133. Broom's Maz. [14.] Qui potest et debet vetare, jubet. He who ean and ought to forbid a thing [if he do not forbid it,] directs it. 2 Kent's Com. 483, note. Qui primum peccat, ille facit rixam. He who first sins makes the strife. He who (369) does the first wrongful act is chargeable as the cause of the quarrel. Branch's Max. Qui prior est tempore, potior est jure. He Story on Agency, § 389. And, in equity, the rule has an extensive application. 1 Story's Eq. Jur. § 469. who is before in time is the better in right. Qui sentit onus, sentire debet et commodum. Priority in time gives preference in law. Co. Litt. 14 a. 4 Co. 90 a, Drury's case. 3 East, 93. A maxim of very extensive application, both at law and in equity. Broom's Max. 329-335, [260.] 1 Story's Eq. Jur. § 64 d. Story on Bailm. § 312. 24 Mississippi R. 208. He who bears the burden of a thing, ought also to experience the advantage arising from it. 1 Co. 99 a, Shelley's case. As a principal is bound by the acts of his authorized agent, so he may take advantage of them. Broom's Max. 317, [559.] This is the converse of the preceding maxim. QUI statuit aliquid, parte inaudita altera, Æquum licet statuerit, haud æquus fuit. He who determines any thing, without Qui rationem in omnibus quærunt, rationem subvertunt. They who seek a reason in [for] every thing, subvert reason. 2 Co. 75 a, Lord Cromwell's case. A sentence hearing both parties, though he may have quoted from Theophrastus, in Met. There determined justly, has not himself been are some things for which no reason can just. A quotation from Seneca, which has be given, and for which no reason should been adopted as a maxim of the common be sought or required. Broom's Max. 66, law. 4 Bl. Com. 283. See Qui aliquid sta- [117.] Quí semel actionem renunciaverit, amplius repetere non potest. He who has once relinquished his action, cannot bring it again. 8 Co. 59 a, Beecher's case. A rule descriptive of the effect of a retraxit and nolle prosequi. Qui semel est malus, semper præsumitur esse malus in codem genere. He who is once criminal, is presumed to be always criminal in the same kind, or way. Cro. Car. 317. Best on Evid. 345. He who has once committed an offence, is supposed always to have an inclination to repeat it. Qui sentit commodum, sentire debet et onus. He who experiences the benefit, ought also to feel [or bear] the burden. He who enjoys the benefit or advantage of a thing, ought also to be subject to the burden or disadvantage connected with it. 2 Inst. 489. A maxim expressed in a hexameter line, and one of the most extensive application in the law. He who enjoys the benefit arising from a title to land, must bear the burden of the incumbrances attached to it, and of the covenants that run with the land. Broom's Max. 313, [552.] Bacon's Use of the Law, 31. Shep. Touch. 178. All who are to receive benefit from the construction of a thing, must be contributory to its construction. 5 Co. 100 a, Rooke's case. So, in partnership, the agreement to share in the profits of the concern carries with it a corresponding liability for the debts or losses. Broom's Max. 315, [554.] So, a principal will not be allowed tuerit, &c. Qui tacet, consentire videtur. He who is silent, is supposed to consent; the silence of a party implies his consent. Jenk. Cent. 32, case 64. Id. 68, case 30. Id. 226, case 87. The principle of the doctrine of implied waiver, of the validity of proceedings by default, &c. and of the doctrine of equitable estoppel in equity. Thus, if a person having the legal title to property, stands by and acquiesces in the sale of it by another person claiming or having color of title, he will be estopped afterwards in asserting his title against the purchaser. 2 Kent's Com. 483, note. So, where the owner of land stands by and suffers another who supposes he has an absolute title to the estate, to expend money in improvements and erections on the land, without giving any notice of his own claim, he will not be permitted to avail himself of such improvements, without paying a full compensation therefor. 1 Story's Eq. Jur. §§ 388, 389. Sec 1 Story's R. 493. As to the application of the rule in the law of evidence, see 1 Greenl. Evid. § 199. This maxim is immediately derived from the canon law, and is otherwise expressed with still more brevity, Qui tacet consentit; he who is silent, consents. Bonifacius de Reg. Juris in Sexto, reg. 43. 1 Mackeld. Civ. Law, 162, Kaufmann's note. The civilians have generally supposed it to be of too sweeping a nature, and have accordingly qualified it by the maxim laid down in the Digests, Qui tacet non utique fatetur, to avail himself of the benefits of a transsed tamen verum est eum non negare. He action by his agent, without at the same who is silent does not thereby confess, but time subjecting himself to its burthens. yet it is true that he does not deny. Diy. VOL. IL. (370) No. i. sect. 4. 50. 17. 142. But, according to Dr. Kaufhis right. 3 Bl. Com. 195. Id. Appendix, mann, these two rules apply to matters that are wholly distinct; consensus belongQUIA EMPTORES. Lat. (Because ing to the doctrine of contracts alone, while confessio relates merely to proceedings. (371) novitati non subjicitur. Whatever is subjected to the authority of a judge is not subjected to novelty. Whatever is left to the discretion of a judge, as in cases without precedent, is not for that reason left to the caprice of novelty or innovation. 4 Inst. 66. the grantee shall hold the land, undisturbed by himself or others. 2 Hilliard's Real Prop. 374. 4 Kent's Com. 471. (372) c. 8. Quod quieti sint imperpetuum de This maxim is obviously derived from omnibus purpresturis, &c.; that they be those of the civil law. Unicuique licet conforever quit of all purprestures, &c. Cart. temnere hæc quæ pro se introducta sunt. de For. 9 Hen. III. c. 4. Recedet inde reus Dig. 4. 4. 41. Omnes licentiam habent his quietus imperpetuum; the defendant shall quæ pro se introducta sunt, renunciare. go quit thereof forever. Fleta, lib. 2, c. 63, § 12.