15. Criminal law. -In criminal law, possession is sometimes distinguished from custody. Thus, if the owner of a chattel gives it to his servant to keep for him for a specific purpose, or until he requires it again, the chattel is in the custody of the servant and in the possession of the master; if, however, the servant receives anything for his master from a third person (not being a fellow-servant), e. g. a tradesman, he has the possession, and not merely the custody of it until he places it in his master's possession by putting it into a place or thing belonging to his master, or by some similar act. The importance of the he is ordinarily in constructive possession distinction is with reference to the differof the goods in it, or if he is in legal posence between larceny and embezzlement session of a portion of an estate or farm, (q. v.) Steph. Cr. Dig. 195, 376. See Cushe is in constructive possession of the TODY. whole of it. The doctrine of constructive 16. Possession-Seisin.-Possession possession does not apply to a wrongdoer is sometimes used in the old books in the or person without title. Ex parte Fletcher, 5 Ch. D. 809; Bristow v. Cormican, 3 App. Cas. 661; Coverdale v. Charlton, 4 Q. B. D. 104. See, also, Kinsman v. Rouse, 17 Ch. D. 104. 13. Joint, or concurrent.-Joint or concurrent possession, is where two or more persons have possession of the same *2 Sm. Lead. Cas. 681 et seq. Formerly the term adverse possession was used to signify the possession of a person who had ousted the seisin of the true owner, e. g. by disseisin, abatement, &c., as opposed to non-adverse possession, which existed when a person was in the actual enjoytechnical sense of seisin or feudal possession of land. "It is to be knowne that there is a jus proprietatis, a right of ownership; jus possessionis, a right of seisin or possession, and jus proprietatis et possessionis, a right both of property and possession; and this is antiently called jus duplicatum, or droit droit. For example, if a ment of land without having technically disseised the owner, so that during that time the period of limitation under the Stat. 21 Jac. I. c. 16, did not run. This doctrine was abolished by Stat. 3 and 4 Will. IV. c. 27; 2 Bl. Com. 266 п.