At the time of the conquest of California, July 7, 1846, there was a Mexican pueblo at the site of the present city of San Francisco.1 Ownership of the lands in the pueblos could not in strictness be affirmed. It amounted to little more than a restricted and qualified right to alienate portions to its inhabitants for building or cultivation, and to use the remainder for commons, for pasture lands, or as a source of revenue, or for other public purposes. This right of disposition and use was, in all particulars, subject to the control of the government of the country. The right appears to have been common to the cities and towns of Spain from an early period in her history, and was recognized in the laws governing her colonies on this continent.2 Upon the conquest, the United States succeeded to the rights and authority of the Mexican government, subject only to their obligations under the treaty of Guadaloupe Hidalgo. Before the estate of the pueblo could become absolute and indefeasible, some action was required on the part of the United States. This action was taken by act of July 1, 1864. Down to that time, the city of San Francisco held under its original imperfect Mexican title only. Afterward, it was possessed of the fee "for the uses, and purposes specified" in the Van Ness ordinance. The State statute of limitations began to run, as to this title, July 1, 1864.3 The pueblo Indians in New Mexico held their lands by a right superior to that of the United States. Their title dates back to grants made by Spain before the Mexican revolution, fully recognized by the Mexican government, and protected by it in the treaty of Guadaloupe Hidalgo, by which the country and the allegiance of its inhabitants were transferred to the United States. "For centuries the pueblo Indians have lived in villages, with municipal government. They adopted the Spanish language, and the Christian religion as taught them by Spanish Catholic missionaries. They are a peaceable, industrious, intelligent, honest, and virtuous people. They are Indians only in feature, and in a few habits." 4 To afflict with pain or loss, with a view to amendment; to impose a penalty for the commission of a crime. Punishable. Liable to punishment.5 May be punished, or liable to be punished.6 Not, must be punished, but liable to be punished." Punishment. Punishments are evils or inconveniences consequent upon crimes and misdemeanors, and inflicted by human laws, in consequence of disobedience or misbehavior in those to regulate whose conduct such laws are made.8 In ex post facto laws, "punishment" is synonymous with chastisement, correction, loss, or suffering to the party supposed to be punished, and not in the legal sense which signifies a penalty inflicted for the commission of crime. Wharton's definition, "the penalty for transgressing the law," is, perhaps, as comprehensive and accurate as can be given.9 The end of punishment is not atonement or expiation, but precaution against future offenses.10 The power is exercised through the means which the laws provide.11 A statute which describes an act as punishable and imposes a fine creates an offense. 12 Re Denny's Estate, 8 Irish Eq. 447 (1874), Christian, Ld. J. 2 O'Brien v. Brice, 21 W. Va. 707 (1883), Snyder, J. * Caston v. Brock, 14 S. C. 107 (1880), Williard, C. J.; Albright v. Payne, 43 Ohio St. 14-15 (1885), cases; 65 Pa. 311; 38 Wis. 434. F. puniss-, punir: L. punire, to impose a penalty upon. Commonwealth v. Pemberton, 118 Mass. 42 (1875). • United States v. Watkinds, 7 Saw. 94 (1881). State v. Neuner, 49 Conn. 233 (1881); 58 Ga. 200. 8 [4 Bl. Com. 7. • Exp. Garland, 4 Wall. 393 (1866), Chase, C. J. See also Matter of Bayard, 25 Hun, 546 (1881). 10 [4 Bl. Com. 11, 252. 11 Exp. Milligan, 4 Wall. 119 (1866). 12 Re Jackson, 14 Blatch. 245 (1877).