A con- tract mutually entered into by a man and a woman that they will marry each other. Every marriage is necessarily preceded by an express or implied contract of this de- scription, as a wedding cannot be agreed upon and celebrated at one and the same instant; Addison, Contr. 1196. When a man and a woman agree to mar- ry and subsequently either one refuses, the other may bring suit for damages, such suits being called breach of promise suits. It is no defence to an action for breach of promise that the defendant was married if the plaintiff did not have knowledge of such fact; 60 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 222; 133 N.Y. 623. If a man refuse to marry a woman she need not make a demand before bring- ing action; 77 Wisc. 663. Before the Ref- ormation no action for breach of promise could be maintained, for marriage was a matter of spiritual jurisdiction. It was not till the middle of the seventeenth cent- ury that marriage was recognized by our law as a temporal benefit, and a breach of promise as cognizable by the temporal courts; 20 Q. B. D. 494, 504, 505. A promise of marriage is not to be lik- ened to an actual marriage. The latter, as has been seen in the article on marriage, is not a contract, but a legal relation; while the former is an executory contract in the strict sense of the term, and gov- erned in general by the ordinary law of contracts, though it has certain peculiar- ities of its own. As in other contracts, the parties must be sui jurix. If, therefore, the man or the woman be an infant, or labor under any other legal disability, he or she will not be bound by a promise of marriage; but if one of the parties be an infant and the other be an adult, the prom- ise will be binding upon the latter; Stra. 937; 5 Cow. 475; 7 id. 22; 5 Sneed 659; 1 D. Chipm. 252; 42 Ill. App. 511. A promise made during infancy may be ratified after the infant attains majority. A late English statute requires a new and distinct con- tract, after majority, in order to bind the infant on his promise to marry after he comes of age; but a new contract may be inferred from continued acceptance of the engagement; L. R. 5 C. P. 410; and see 4 C. P. Div. 485. Neither does it follow, as we shall see presently, that a promise of marriage is not binding because the parties to the promise cannot form a valid mar- riage; they may be competent to contract, though not competent to marry. There must be a legal and valid consider- ation; but as there are always mutual prom- ises, they are a sufficient consideration for each other. There must be a meeting of the minds of the parties, i. e. a request or proposition on the one side, and an as- sent on the other. If the communications between the parties are verbal, the only questions which usually arise relate to evidence and proof. The very words or time or manner of the promise need not be proved, but it may be inferred from the conduct of the parties, and from the cir- cumstances which usually attend an en- gagement to marry: as, visiting, the un- derstanding of friends and relations, prep- arations for marriage, and the reception of the man by the woman's family as a suitor: 3 Salk. 16; 15 Mass. 1; 2 D. & C. 282; Leake, Contr. 210; 18 Pa. 831; 1 Ohio St. 26; 2 C. & P. 553; 6 Cow. 254; 26 Conn. 398; 4 Zabr. 291; 65 Vt. 273. But as to the evidence of a contract to marry, more direct proof is now commonly required than formerly, since modern statutes per- mit parties themselves to take the stand; Schoul. Husb. & W. § 43. Therefore a promise cannot be inferred from devoted attention, frequent visits, and apparently exclusive attention; 53 N. Y. 267; nor from mere presents or letters not to the point; see 2 Brewst. 487; [1891] 2 Q. B. 534; nor from the plaintiff's wedding preparations, unknown to the defendant; 48 Ind. 562; 68 Ill. 41; nor from the woman's unexplained possession of an engagement ring; 2 Brewst. 487. See, generally, 53 N. Y. 267. A later New York case holds that under the law allowing parties to an action to testify, a promise of marriage cannot be inferred from the mere proof of circum- stances such as usually attend an engage- ment to marry. In the absence of fraud, there must be proof of an actual contract; a meeting of minds of the two parties. Courtship alone or mere intention to marry is not enough. Thorough acquaintance with character, habits, and disposition is essential in order to enter into such a con- tract intelligently, and an opportunity must be allowed to form the acquaintance which is required, without raising the in- ference of a contract; 151 N. Y. 598. Mere courtship is not an agreement to marry; 14 Am. R. 111; 63 Am. Dec. 529; 63 IllI. 41. When the parties are at a distance from each other, and the offer is made by letter, it will be presumed to continue for a rea- sonable time for the consideration of the party addressed; and if accepted within a reasonable time, and before it is expressly fevoked, the contract is then complete; 1 Pars. Contr. 84. No particular