PRIVACY

5 definitions found across Law Mind sources

PRIVACYAuthored
The Law Mind • 1216 words
Definition
Privacy, in law, refers to an individual's legally recognized interest in controlling access to their person, information, communications, and activities — and in being free from unwarranted intrusion, surveillance, disclosure, or appropriation by others. The concept operates across multiple legal domains and does not resolve into a single unified doctrine. 1. Constitutional privacy: A judicially implied right, derived principally from the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause, protecting certain intimate decisions and personal autonomy from government interference. This includes reproductive choice, family structure, and sexual conduct in the home, among other recognized zones of liberty. 2. Tort privacy: Four distinct common-law causes of action, systematized by the Restatement (Second) of Torts, that protect individuals from specific categories of private-party intrusion: (a) intrusion upon seclusion, (b) public disclosure of private facts, (c) false light, and (d) appropriation of name or likeness. 3. Informational privacy: The legally protected interest in controlling the collection, use, and disclosure of personal data. Increasingly governed by statute at both federal and state levels (e.g., HIPAA for health data, state consumer privacy acts). Distinct from constitutional and tort privacy, though overlapping. 4. Evidentiary and procedural privacy: Protections against compelled disclosure, such as testimonial privileges, Fourth Amendment search and seizure doctrine, and analogous state protections. Operationally distinct but rooted in the same underlying value. ---
Common Language
Modern common usage (Wiktionary): The state of being secluded from the presence, sight, or knowledge of others; freedom from unwanted disturbance of one's private life; freedom from damaging publicity, surveillance, and disclosure of personal information. Historical common usage (Webster's 1913): The state of being in retirement from the company or observation of others; seclusion; concealment of what is said or done; a private matter; a secret. In ordinary English, privacy is essentially experiential — being left alone, unobserved, undisturbed. In law, privacy is a structured bundle of interests with different doctrinal homes, enforcement mechanisms, and limits. Feeling that one's privacy has been violated does not, without more, state a legal claim. The gap between common expectation and legal protection is significant, and the common meaning tends to vastly overstate the scope of enforceable privacy rights. ---
Common Confusion
Privacy is sometimes used interchangeably with secrecy or confidentiality, but these are distinct. Secrecy concerns the concealment of information; confidentiality typically involves a relational duty (attorney-client, physician-patient) not to disclose. Privacy, by contrast, is an affirmative interest in controlling access regardless of whether a relationship exists. Similarly, constitutional privacy (substantive due process) and Fourth Amendment privacy (freedom from unreasonable searches) are frequently conflated but rest on different doctrinal foundations and apply in different contexts. ---
Recognized Forms
/SUBTYPES The tort law of privacy, following the Prosser taxonomy adopted by the Restatement (Second) of Torts, recognizes four invasion-of-privacy torts: 1. Intrusion upon seclusion — intentional intrusion, physically or otherwise, into the plaintiff's solitude or private affairs, in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable person. 2. Public disclosure of private facts — widespread publication of private information that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person and is not of legitimate public concern. 3. False light — publicity placing the plaintiff in a false light before the public in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable person. 4. Appropriation of name or likeness — unauthorized use of a person's name, image, or identity for the defendant's advantage, particularly commercial benefit. Constitutional privacy does not map neatly onto named subtypes but is understood to encompass at minimum: decisional autonomy in intimate matters, informational privacy against government collection and disclosure, and spatial privacy in the home. ---
Why It Matters in Research
Privacy is one of the most structurally fragmented areas of American law. Researchers must identify which domain of privacy law is at issue before any meaningful analysis can proceed — constitutional, tort, statutory, evidentiary — because the elements, parties, defenses, and remedies differ substantially across domains. Historical sources, including Bouvier's, treat privacy as a nascent and ill-defined doctrine because, for most of Anglo-American legal history, it was exactly that. The modern legal concept largely post-dates the foundational dictionaries. Warren and Brandeis's 1890 Harvard Law Review article ("The Right to Privacy") is the conventional starting point for American tort privacy, and the constitutional doctrine is a product of mid-to-late twentieth century judicial development. Researchers reading Bouvier's should understand that the "right of privacy" referenced there is proto-tort in character — it does not anticipate constitutional privacy as developed in Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) or the modern statutory landscape. Corpus research risks: Sources using the word "privacy" before roughly 1890 are almost certainly using the term in its common, non-doctrinal sense. Between 1890 and the mid-twentieth century, tort privacy was the primary legal meaning. Constitutional privacy does not meaningfully appear in primary sources until the 1960s. Statutory informational privacy is largely a post-1970 development. Chronological context is essential for reading any primary source accurately. Jurisdictional fragmentation is acute. Not all states recognize all four invasion-of-privacy torts. Statutory privacy regimes vary dramatically by state. Constitutional privacy doctrine is federal in origin but has state constitutional analogues with independent scope in some jurisdictions. ---
Historical Dictionary Support
Bouvier's Law Dictionary acknowledges privacy as a "doctrine of recent growth" that is "as yet insufficiently defined" and "incapable of exact definition." This honest assessment reflects the state of the law at the time of writing: the right existed in embryonic form in equity, courts had begun to recognize injunctive relief for certain intrusions, but no settled doctrine had crystallized. Bouvier's illustrates the doctrinal uncertainty with a New York case involving the unauthorized use of a deceased woman's likeness — a scenario now clearly governed by appropriation-of-likeness law but then a matter of contested equitable principle. What Bouvier's does not — and cannot — address is constitutional privacy, informational privacy regulation, or the four-part Prosser taxonomy. Researchers should treat historical dictionary entries on privacy as documenting the early common-law and equity foundations of the tort, not as capturing the full modern concept. Webster's 1913 confirms that the dominant meaning of "privacy" in general usage was seclusion and secrecy, with no legal technical sense established. This reinforces the conclusion that legal privacy, in its modern doctrinal form, is largely a twentieth-century construct. ---
Jurisdictional Note
Not all states recognize all four common-law invasion-of-privacy torts; some, like North Dakota and Virginia historically, have been slow to adopt portions of the Prosser framework. Constitutional privacy under the federal constitution sets a floor, but state constitutions — notably California's, which explicitly mentions privacy — may provide broader protections. Statutory informational privacy regimes (data privacy, biometric privacy, consumer privacy) vary significantly by state and are rapidly evolving. ---
Encyclopedia Cross-Reference
The Law Mind Torts & Personal Injury Encyclopedia: - Invasion of Privacy — Intrusion upon Seclusion (torts_127) - Invasion of Privacy — False Light (torts_129) - Invasion of Privacy — Appropriation of Name or Likeness (torts_130) ---
Related Terms
Invasion of privacy | Intrusion upon seclusion | False light | Appropriation of name or likeness | Public disclosure of private facts | Confidentiality | Privilege (evidentiary) | Fourth Amendment | Substantive due process | Right of publicity | Defamation | Data protection | Surveillance | Seclusion | Privity
PRIVACYmain
Bouvier's Law Dictionary • 1928
The right of privacy has been defined as the right of an individual to withhold himself and his property from public scrutiny, if he so chooses. The doctrine is of recent growth, and is as yet insufficiently defined. It is said to be incapable of exact definition, and to ex- ist only so far as its assertion is consist- ent with law or public policy, and in a proper case equity will interfere, if there is no remedy at law, to prevent an in- jury threatened by the invasion of, or infringement upon, this right from motives of curiosity, gain, or malice. Such remedy has been invoked to prevent the publica- tion of oral lectures delivered by a pro- fessor; 12 App. Cas. 326; 3 L. J. Ch. 209; or copies of private drawings and etchings; 1 MacN. & G. 25; or a letter in the possession of a person by whom it was received, with- out the writer's consent, where the publica- tion is not necessary for the vindication of the receiver or the public interests: 2 Ves. & Β. 19; 2 Atk. 342; Ambl. 737; 2 Swanst. 402; 4 Duer 379; 2 Bush 480; a telegram of a private nature; 50 How. Pr. 194: a scientific, artistic, or literary composition kept for the private use of the composer; 4 Burr. 2303, 2330, 2408; 2 Eden 329; 2 Meriv. 435; 8 Pet. 591; a portrait in a newspaper; 6 Misc. Rep. 290; or a photo- graph by the photographer; 40 Ch. Div. 345; 64 Fed. Rep. 280. But such publica- tion of a photograph or portrait will not be prevented where the person is a "public character," such as a foremost inventor of world-wide reputation; 64 Fed. Rep. 280, reversing 57 id. 434, on this point. The case on appeal held that the publication of such a photograph will not be restrained. The doctrine prevailed one time that an injunc- tion against the publication of letters could only be granted where they were of the nature of a literary composition; 3 Edw. Ch. 515; 3 Barb. Ch. 320; but this doctrine no longer prevails; 4 Duer 379. In many cases the unauthorized use of one's name, where it will tend to cause irreparable damage, will be enjoined, as a recommendation of a medicinal preparation by a physician; 27 Abb. N. C. 402; see 11 Beav. 561: a use of a person's name as director of a corporation: 10 Beav. 561; or a publisher's statement that one is a mem- ber of a bankrupt firm; 7 L. R. Eq. 488; a false statement of a dispute pending a suit in relation thereto; 52 L. J. Ch. 134; 8 W. R. 734. The property of an author or composer of any work, whether of literature, art, or science, in such work, unpublished and kept for his private use or pleasure, cannot be questioned; 1 MacN. & G. 42. Every clerk employed in a merchant's counting house is under an implied con- tract that he will not make public that which he learns in the execution of his duty as clerk; 2 Hare 393; 1 Mac N. &G. 45. The court will interfere by injunction to prevent a party's availing himself in any manner of a title arising out of the viola- tion of right or any breach of confidence; 1 MacN. & G. 25. A photographer who had taken a negative likeness of A, for money, was restrained from selling or exhibiting copies, both on the ground that there was an implied contract not to use the negative for such purposes, and also that such sale or exhi- bition was a breach of confidence. The right to enjoin the copying of a photograph does not depend on the existence of a prop- erty right; the court of chancery has always had original jurisdiction to prevent what it considered and treated as a wrong, whether arising from the violation of a right or from breach of contract or confi- dence; 40 Ch. Div. 354, following 1 MacN. & G. 25. Where a party was employed to make a certain number of copies of a picture, his einployment carried with it the necessary implication that he would not make more copies for himself or sell the additional copies in competition with his employer. Such conduct on his part is a gross breach of contract and a gross breach of faith, which clearly entitles the employer to an injunction whether there is a copyright on the picture or not; 19 L. R. Q. B. Div. 639. Where the defendant was intrusted by the plaintiff with the secret of making a kind of medicine which the plaintiff called a patent medicine, though he had no pat- ent, it was held that there was such a rela- tion between the plaintiff and the defend- antaud such a breach of contract or breach of faith on the part of the defendant as would entitle the plaintiff to an injunction restraining the use of the secret by the de- fendant; 9 Hare 241 (approved in 19 L. R. Q. B. Div. 639). In 9 Hare 241, the court said that different grounds have been assigned for the exercise of the jurisdiction; in some cases it has been referred to property, in others to contract, and in others again it has been treated as founded upon trust or confidence, but upon whatever grounds the jurisdiction is founded, the authorities leave no doubt as to the exercise of it. In Prince Albert v. Strange, De G. & S. 652, and, on appeal, 1 MacN. & G. 23
PRIVACYmain
Bouvier's Law Dictionary • 1928
statue of a deceased woman and exhibiting it at the Columbian Exposition, the avowed object being to honor her as a philanthro- pist and reformer. A decree for an in- junction entered by the supreme court of New York was affirmed by the general term, but was reversed by the court of ap- peals; 147 N. Y. 434, reversing 70 Hun 598; s. c. 2 Am. & Eng. Dec. Eq. 462, and 24 N.Y. Supp. 512 [1893]. In this case the ques- tion whether the action contemplated was a violation of the right of privacy was dis- cussed, and the conclusion reached by a majority of the court that "the individual right of privacy which any person has during his life dies with the person, and any right of privacy which survives is a right pertaining to the living only," and that "any privilege of surviving relatives of a deceased person to protect his memory exists for the benefit of the living to protect their feelings and to prevent a violation of their own rights in the character and mem- ory of the deceased." It was held that persons attempting to raise a statue or bust of a woman who is no longer living, if their motive is to do honor to her, and if the work is to be done in an appropriate manner, cannot be restrained by her sur- viving relatives from carrying out such a purpose, merely because they had not the honor of her personal acquaintance or friendship while she was living, or, at the most, had merely been associated with her philanthropic enterprises. The mere fact that a person's feelings may be injured by the erection of a statue to a deceased rela- tive was decided not to be a ground for an injunction against its erection, unless there is reasonable and plausible ground for the existence of this mental distress and injury. It must not be the creation of mere ca- price, nor of pure fancy, nor the result of a supersensitive and morbid mental organi- zation dwelling with undue emphasis upon the exclusive and sacred character of this right of privacy." The opposite view was presented by Gray, J., who dissented: "Upon the findings in this case, I think we are bound to say that the purpose of the defendants was to commit an act which was an unauthorized invasion of the plain- tiff's right to the preservation of the name and memory of Mrs. Schuyler intact from public comment and criticism. As the representative of all her immediate living relatives, it was competent for him to maintain action to preserve them from be- coming public property, as would be the case if a statue were erected by strangers for public exhibition under such classifi- cation, with respect to the characteristic virtues of the deceased, as they judged be- fitting. I cannot see why the right of privacy is not a form of property, as much as is the right of complete immunity of one's person." In 1893 it was held in a New York case that an injunction will lie to restrain the publication of the plaintiff 's picture in a newspaper, with an invitation to the read- ers of the newspaper to vote upon the ques- tion of the popularity of the plaintiff as compared with that of another person whose picture was also published; 26 N. Y. Supp. 908. In an article in 4 Harv. Law Rev. 193, by Samuel D. Warren and Louis Brandeis, the following are suggested as the limita- tions to the right to privacy :- 1. The right to privacy does not prohibit any publication of matter which is of pub- lic or general interest. 2. The right to privacy does not prohibit the publication of any matter, if in itself not private, when the publication is made under circumstances which would render it a privileged publication according to the law of slander and libel. 3. The law would probably not grant any redress for the invasion of privacy by oral publication in the absence of special damage. 4. The right to privacy ceases upon the publication of facts by the individual, or with his consent. 5. The truth of the matter published
PRIVACYn.
Websters Unabridged Dictionary (1913) • 1913
The state of being in retirement from the company or observation of others; seclusion. A place of seclusion from company or observation; retreat; solitude; retirement. Her sacred privacies all open lie. Rowe. Concealment of what is said or done. Shak. A private matter; a secret. Fuller. See Privity, 2. [Obs.] Arbuthnot.
privacynoun
Wiktionary (English) • 2026
Wiktionary contributorsCC BY-SA 4.0 • via Kaikki
Extracted and formatted for display by Law Mind. Source link opens the current Wiktionary page and its contributor history; it is not a frozen copy of this extract.
The state of being secluded from the presence, sight, or knowledge of others. | Freedom from unwanted or undue disturbance of one's private life. | Freedom from damaging publicity, public scrutiny, surveillance, and disclosure of personal information, usually by a government or a private organization. | A place of seclusion. | A relationship between parties seen as being a result of their mutual interest or participation in a given transaction, contract etc. | Secrecy. | A private matter.

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