If the evidence offered conduces in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in controversy, it should go to the jury.1 Inferences from inferences are not permitted: only immediate inferences from facts proved. If the presumed fact has no immediate connection with or relation to the established fact from which it is inferred, it is regarded as too remote. Thus, the presumption that a public officer has done his duty does not supply proof of independent and substantial facts.2 In a case where the ultimate fact was whether a renewal premium had been paid to the defendant, it was held that the jury could not infer (1) that the policy did not lapse but was renewed; (2) that the renewals were paid to the plaintiff's sub-agent; and (3) paid over by the agent to the defendant.3 A judge, in deciding that evidence of a particular circumstance is not receivable, impliedly decides that no presumption can be drawn from it which ought to have effect with the jury. A presumption which the jury is to draw is not a circumstance in proof, and it is not, therefore, a legitimate foundation for a presumption. There is no "open and visible connection" between the facts out of which the two presumptions arise. An inference from an inference, if allowed at all, has little probative force. See PRÆSUMPTIO; EVIDENCE. Representation; simulation; device. False pretenses. The offense of "obtaining property by false pretenses." An offense variously defined by statutes; as generally understood: a knowingly false statement of a supposed by-gone or existing fact with intent to defraud, and an obtaining of property thereby.7 Many statutes are copied from 30 Geo. II (1757), c. 24-"knowingly and designedly, by false pretenses," obtaining "from any person money, goods, wares, or merchandise, with intent to cheat and defraud any person of the same;" and from 24 and 25 Vict. (1861), c. 96obtaining "any chattel, money, or other valuable security with intent to defraud." A representation of some fact or circumstance, calculated to mislead, which is not true.9 1 Home Ins. Co. v. Weide, 11 Wall. 440 (1871). • United States v. Ross, 92 U. S. 283-84 (1875), Strong, J.; Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Richardson, 91 id. 470 (1875). • Manning v. Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 100 U. S. 698 (1879), Strong, J. A false pretense prima facie imports a misrepresentation as to something existing. The offense and the facts constituting it must be stated; where these facts consist in words, the words must be set forth.1 Four things must concur: an intent to defraud; actual fraud committed; false pretenses used; the fraud accomplished by means of those pretenses.* There must be a scienter and a fraudulent intent. The representation must relate to past events: a representation for the future may be only a promise; it may be made in any of the ways by which ideas are communicated; and it may be inferred. The reason of the law is to protect the weak and credulous from the stratagems of the artful and cunning; it does not extend to those who, having the means in their own hands, neglect to protect themselves. The law gives a different effect to a representation of existing facts, from that given to a representation of facts to come into existence. To make a false representation the subject of an indictment, or of an action, two things are necessary, viz., that it should be a statement likely to impose upon one exercising common prudence and caution, and that it should be the statement of an existing fact. A "promissory" statement is not, ordinarily, the subject either of an indictment or of an action. The law also gives a different effect to promissory statements based upon general knowledge, information, and judgment, and to representations which, from knowledge peculiarly his own, a party may certainly know will prove to be true or false. Collecting money by falsely personating a creditor constitutes false pretenses. When the owner parts with the possession of his property, a felonious receiving is "larceny." When he parts with the possession and title (his right of property), the offense is false pretenses. In England, and Massachusetts, and perhaps in other States, obtaining money as a charitable gift by false pretenses, is indictable; but otherwise, it seems, in New York.7 Any words equivalent to "by means of a false pretense," may be used in the indictment.8 The indictment must set forth distinctly that there was an actual transaction between the parties, a payment of money or a delivery of property; that it was 1 Bardlaugh v. The Queen, L. R., 3 Q. B. D. 623 (1878), Bramwell, L. J. Commonwealth v. McDuffy, 126 Mass. 470 (1879), cases. $ Commonwealth v. Drew, ante. 4 Sawyer v. Prickett, 19 Wall. 160 (1873), Hunt, J.; 4 Hill, 9; 22 N. Y. 413; 99 Pa. 575; 26 Alb. Law J. 105-6 Douglass v. Mitchell, 35 Pa. 446-47 (1860), Strong, J.; (1882), cases. McAleer v. McMurray, 58 id. 126 (1868). • Ayer v. Glaucus, 4 Cliff. 171 (1870). State v. Goble, 70 Iowa, 447 (1883). Loomis v. People, 67 N. Y. 326-29 (1876), cases; L. prætensus: præ-tendere, to spread before, hold Zinc v. People, 77 id. 114 (1879), cases; 53 id. 111; 43 III. out, pretend. Spelled also pretence. [Broom, Common Law, 966. 82 Whart. Cr. L. §§ 1130, 1175, 1186-89; Broom, Com. L. 963. • Commonwealth v. Drew, 19 Pick. 184-86 (1837), Morton, I. 397; 57 Ind. 341; 39 Mich. 505; 26 Ohio, 15; 11 Ind. 154; 12 Johns. 292. Commonwealth v. Whitcomb, 107 Mass. 486 (1871), cases; People v. Clough, 17 Wend. 351 (1837). • Commonwealth v. Walker, 108 Mass. 312 (1871), cases.