Definition
Pretences (also spelled pretenses) is the plural form of pretence. In legal usage, the term refers to false representations of existing fact made with intent to deceive—most commonly encountered in the phrase "false pretences," the foundational common law and statutory offense of obtaining property by deception.
As a standalone plural noun in legal texts, "pretences" appears primarily in two contexts:
1. FALSE PRETENCES (the offense): The crime of obtaining money, goods, or other property from another by knowingly making a false statement of an existing fact, with intent to defraud, and where the victim parts with property in reliance on that false statement. This is the dominant legal use of the term and the context in which historical sources address it most fully.
2. PRETENCES AS GROUNDS OR COLORABLE BASES: In older equity and common law pleading, "pretences" could refer to a party's claimed justification or asserted basis for an action—a usage now largely displaced by terms like "pretext" or "colorable claim."
Common Language
Modern common usage (Wiktionary): Plural of pretence; the acts of pretending or claiming something falsely; false appearances or claims.
Historical common usage (Webster's 1913): Claims put forward to conceal actual purposes; false appearances maintained to deceive; ostensible reasons as distinguished from real ones.
The gap between common and legal meaning is real but narrow. Ordinary usage captures the deceptive quality but misses the technical legal requirement that a pretence, to ground criminal liability, must be a false statement of an existing fact—not a false promise, opinion, or prediction. A person who lies about what they will do in the future commits a moral wrong but not, at common law, a false pretence. Researchers encountering "pretences" in criminal indictments or pleadings should read the term with that technical boundary in mind.
Common Confusion
PRETENCES vs. PROMISES: The most consequential distinction in false pretences doctrine is between a false statement of present or past fact (actionable as false pretences) and a false promise about future conduct (historically not actionable as false pretences at common law, though many modern fraud statutes have narrowed or eliminated this gap). Historical indictments that fail to allege a false existing fact may be jurisdictionally defective under older authorities.
PRETENCES vs. CHEATING: At common law, "cheating" was the broader category. Cheating by false pretences was a specific statutory refinement, codified in England by the Statute of 33 Henry VIII and later re-enacted. Not every common law cheat was a false pretence in the technical sense. Rapalje & Lawrence treat cheat and false pretences as related but distinct concepts. Researchers should not assume that sources discussing "cheating" are applying the same elements as sources discussing "false pretences."
Why It Matters in Research
The term "pretences" is almost always a pointer toward the false pretences offense, and that offense carries significant historical complexity that affects how older authorities should be read.
First, the spelling variation matters in corpus searching. British sources and American sources before the mid-twentieth century use "pretences" (with a c); modern American statutes and cases overwhelmingly use "pretenses" (with an s). A corpus search limited to one spelling will miss a substantial body of material.
Second, the false pretences offense evolved substantially across the nineteenth century. Early American authorities, including those cited by Rapalje & Lawrence (7 Johns. 201; 12 Johns. 292; 14 Johns. 371), were working out what conduct was indictable as a cheat or false pretence at common law versus what required a statute. The answer varied by jurisdiction and period. A rule stated in an 1810 New York case may not reflect the law as it stood after statutory codification in that same jurisdiction.
Third, "pretences" in equity pleading carries a different valence. In chancery practice, a party's "pretences" were their stated claims to equitable relief or their asserted rights—not necessarily criminal. When reading equity pleadings, do not reflexively import the criminal law meaning.
Fourth, the relationship between false pretences and modern fraud offenses requires care. Most American jurisdictions have subsumed false pretences into consolidated theft or fraud statutes. Historical research into "false pretences" cases may be directly relevant to modern fraud analysis, but the elements may not map cleanly.
Historical Dictionary Support
Rapalje & Lawrence do not have a standalone entry for "pretences" or "false pretences" as such, but address the conceptual terrain under CHEAT. Their entry treats cheating and fraud as substantially overlapping, citing Massachusetts and New York authorities for what conduct is indictable. The entry for CHEAT AND DEFRAUD (citing 1 Cush. 227 and 5 Wheel. Am. C. L. 460) suggests the compilers recognized that these terms required definition precisely because their boundaries were contested.
The historical dictionaries are notably thin on the technical elements that distinguish false pretences from other fraud-adjacent offenses. Researchers relying solely on Rapalje & Lawrence will not find a systematic treatment of the existing-fact requirement or the reliance element. For those specifics, nineteenth-century treatises on criminal law (Bishop, Wharton) are the more useful shelf sources.
Jurisdictional Note
The false pretences offense was codified unevenly across American jurisdictions throughout the nineteenth century. Some states retained common law definitions; others enacted specific statutes with varying elements. Modern American jurisdictions have largely consolidated false pretences into general theft or fraud statutes, making direct citation to historical false pretences authorities potentially misleading without verifying whether the jurisdiction's statutory scheme has materially altered the elements.