Definition
In Roman law, postulare means to formally demand, request, or petition a judicial tribunal. The term carries two related but distinct senses in Roman legal usage: (1) to make a formal request or demand before a magistrate or court, particularly in the sense of initiating or advancing a legal proceeding; and (2) to accuse or formally denounce another person before a judicial authority.
The term is the verbal root from which postulatio derives, and in procedural contexts it describes the act of presenting a claim or petition to a tribunal with the expectation of a formal response.
Common Confusion
Postulare and postulatio are closely related but not identical. Postulare is the verbal act — the demanding or petitioning itself. Postulatio is the noun form, referring to the formal petition, request, or accusation as a procedural instrument. Researchers encountering either term in Roman law sources should be attentive to which form appears, as legal texts may treat the act and the document or proceeding as distinct concepts.
Why It Matters in Research
Postulare appears primarily in sources dealing with Roman civil and procedural law, and its significance is largely historical. Researchers working with Digest citations or canonical civil law texts will encounter it in discussions of how proceedings were formally initiated before a magistrate.
The dual meaning — requesting relief versus accusing another — is a trap for researchers. In procedural contexts, postulare tends toward the neutral sense of petitioning the court. In criminal or quasi-criminal contexts, it shifts toward formal accusation or denunciation. The surrounding passage usually clarifies which sense is operative, but careless reading can produce misinterpretation, particularly in translated or summarized sources.
Because postulare is a Roman law term with no direct common law analogue, it will not appear in English or American case law except as historical reference or in scholarly treatment of Roman legal influence. Researchers should not expect to find it functioning as operative legal vocabulary outside of civil law jurisdictions or historical legal scholarship.
The Digest references cited by Burrill — Dig. 39.2.4.8 and Dig. 3.1 — place the term in the context of cautiones (security obligations) and the rules governing who may appear or speak before a praetor, respectively. Dig. 3.1 in particular concerns postulandi ius, the right to plead before a court, making postulare in that context specifically about the capacity to advocate or present demands on behalf of oneself or another. This connection to procedural standing is worth noting for researchers studying representation and advocacy in Roman procedure.
Historical Dictionary Support
Burrill's entry is brief but accurate. He correctly identifies both primary meanings — formal petition before a tribunal and formal accusation — and supplies Digest citations that anchor the term in its procedural context. He also appropriately cross-references Postulatio, signaling that the substantive content for this term is largely treated under that entry.
What Burrill does not address is the distinction between postulare in the sense of personal petition (appearing for oneself) and postulare on behalf of another, which Roman law regulated carefully. The right to postulare for others — postulandi ius — was restricted by the praetor and formed an important part of Roman procedural law governing advocates. This dimension, absent from Burrill's condensed entry, is relevant for researchers studying Roman advocacy, disability from practice, or the historical roots of standing and representation.
Calvin's Lexicon (Calv. Lex.), also cited by Burrill, was a standard Roman law reference work, and its inclusion here confirms that the term was well-established in the civilian lexical tradition.