Definition
A postponement of trial is the deferral of a scheduled trial to a later date, granted by a court upon application by one or both parties. The term is largely synonymous with continuance in modern American practice and encompasses any court-ordered delay in the commencement or resumption of a trial proceeding.
The postponement may be sought before trial begins or, less commonly, after proceedings have commenced but before their conclusion. Relief is discretionary: the court weighs the moving party's stated grounds against the opposing party's interest in proceeding and, in criminal cases, the defendant's constitutional interest in a speedy resolution.
Why It Matters in Research
The primary research trap here is terminology. In modern American practice, the word "postponement" rarely appears in procedural rules or reported decisions as a formal term of art. Courts and rules use "continuance" almost exclusively. Researchers working in historical sources — particularly pre-twentieth-century treatises, English reports, or early American practice guides — will encounter "postponement" as the operative term where a modern court would say "continuance." Failing to search both terms will produce gaps in a historical corpus search.
In criminal cases, postponements intersect directly with two constitutional provisions: the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial and, in the opposite direction, the due process right to adequate time to prepare a defense. A defendant can both seek and oppose postponements, depending on posture. Prosecutors seeking postponement over defense objection face speedy trial scrutiny; defendants seeking postponement may be found to have waived speedy trial rights for the period of delay they caused. This bidirectional pressure is a recurring theme in the case law and should shape how researchers approach criminal procedure sources.
In civil practice, the calculus is different. Courts apply a multi-factor abuse-of-discretion review that balances diligence of the moving party, length of the requested delay, prejudice to the non-moving party, and docket management interests. Civil postponement doctrine is largely common law overlay on procedural rules and varies considerably across jurisdictions and court levels.
Researchers should also note that the grounds Rapalje & Lawrence identify — absent witnesses and inflamed public opinion — remain live doctrine, but each has developed its own specialized terminology and case law. Absent-witness postponements are now governed largely by rules of court and specific showings of materiality, necessity, and diligence. Public-feeling postponements survive as change of venue doctrine more often than postponement doctrine; modern courts more readily transfer venue than delay trial to wait for passions to cool.
Historical Dictionary Support
Rapalje & Lawrence treat postponement as a practical remedy governed by equitable conditions: the moving party must show grounds by affidavit, must move before the opposing party has been put to the expense and preparation of trial, and takes the postponement on terms imposed by the court. The entry identifies two principal grounds — the short-term unavailability of an important witness and a state of public feeling likely to prevent a fair trial — and signals that the court retains discretion over the conditions attached to any grant.
This formulation is consistent with the English common law practice from which American courts derived the doctrine. The insistence on affidavit grounds reflects the longstanding rule that postponement is not available on counsel's bare representation; it must be supported by sworn facts showing both the importance of the witness or circumstance and the reasonable expectation that the deficiency can be cured within a defined period.
What the historical entry does not address — and what modern doctrine has substantially developed — is the constitutional dimension in criminal cases, the statutory framework (including federal and state speedy trial acts), the standards for appellate review of denial, and the consequences of repeated or strategic postponement requests. Researchers relying solely on historical dictionary sources will find the procedural skeleton but none of the constitutional or statutory overlay that now dominates the field.
Jurisdictional Note
Federal practice is shaped by the Speedy Trial Act (18 U.S.C. § 3161), which sets specific time limits and enumerates excludable delays, creating a structured framework that constrains judicial discretion in criminal cases in ways that have no direct parallel in most state systems. State courts vary significantly in whether continuance standards are codified by rule, left to common law discretion, or governed by a mix of both.
Encyclopedia Cross-Reference
Right to Speedy Trial (Sixth Amendment and Speedy Trial Act) — The Law Mind Criminal Law Encyclopedia (criminal_178)
Bench Trials — The Law Mind Criminal Law Encyclopedia (criminal_205)
Right to Public Trial — The Law Mind Criminal Law Encyclopedia (criminal_179)