Definition
In legal usage, "possible" carries two distinct and sometimes opposing senses depending on context:
1. Capable of existing or occurring; feasible; not contrary to the nature of things. This is the baseline meaning — if something is possible, it is within the realm of what can happen or be done, without regard to probability.
2. Extremely improbable, though not impossible. Courts and legal writers have long recognized that "possible" can shade into near-impossibility — as in "it is possible, but highly unlikely." This usage appears in evidentiary and damages contexts, where "possible" is contrasted with "probable" or "reasonably certain."
3. Equivalent to "practicable" or "reasonable" in timing clauses. When a contract or statute requires action "as soon as possible," courts frequently read this not as demanding the literal earliest moment but rather with all reasonable promptitude given the circumstances.
Common Language
Modern common usage (Wiktionary): Able but not certain to happen; neither inevitable nor impossible. Capable of being done or achieved; feasible. Also used to describe something apparently valid or plausible.
Historical common usage (Webster's 1913): Capable of existing or occurring, or of being conceived or thought of; able to happen; capable of being done; not contrary to the nature of things — sometimes used to express extreme improbability; barely able to be, or to come to pass.
The gap matters in legal research because "possible" in ordinary speech usually implies meaningful probability. In legal texts, however, it can mean the precise opposite — something so remote as to be barely conceivable. Confusing the two readings distorts analysis of damages standards, evidentiary sufficiency, and especially future-interest doctrine, where a "bare possibility" is a term of art signifying something legally inferior to a vested interest.
Common Confusion
POSSIBLE vs. PROBABLE vs. REASONABLY CERTAIN: These three terms form a graduated scale in legal analysis, and historical sources often use "possible" precisely to mark the lowest rung. A possible harm or loss is not compensable in damages; a probable or reasonably certain one typically is. Researchers reading older cases must resist importing modern colloquial weight into "possible" — when a nineteenth-century court says a future event is "merely possible," it is excluding recovery or vesting, not hedging ambiguously.
POSSIBLE INTEREST vs. CONTINGENT INTEREST: In property law, a "bare possibility" (sometimes called a possibility coupled with an interest, or a naked possibility) was historically distinguished from a contingent remainder or executory interest. The bare possibility was so speculative it was not treated as a property interest capable of transfer or devise. This distinction is often collapsed carelessly in secondary sources.
Why It Matters in Research
The word "possible" is a high-stakes qualifier across multiple doctrinal areas, and its meaning shifts with context in ways that are easy to miss.
In damages law, the possible/probable divide is dispositive. Courts refusing speculative damages frequently rest the denial on characterizing the harm as "possible" rather than "probable" or "reasonably certain." When reading historical opinions, note which side of this line the court places a claimed loss — the vocabulary is doing real legal work.
In contract interpretation, "as soon as possible" clauses generated substantial nineteenth-century litigation. Bouvier and Black both flag that courts read this phrase to mean reasonable promptitude in light of the promisor's actual circumstances, not instantaneous performance. Researchers tracing the evolution of good-faith performance obligations will find these cases useful.
In future interests and property law, "possibility" is a technical term, not merely descriptive. A possibility of reverter is a recognized future interest; a "bare possibility" is not a property interest at all. Rapalje & Lawrence gestures at this distinction in the context of the eldest son's expectation of inheritance — an expectation that was a "bare possibility" carrying no enforceable property right. The Encyclopedia entry on Future Interests develops this fully and is essential reading before working with historical property sources.
Jurisdictional and temporal variation is real: what common law treated as a bare possibility (non-transferable, non-devisable) some equity courts would protect under specific circumstances. Chancery sources and common law sources do not always agree on where the line falls.
In criminal law and evidence, "possible" marks the floor below reasonable doubt. Understanding the hierarchy — possible, conceivable, probable, beyond reasonable doubt — is necessary for reading judicial instructions and sufficiency-of-evidence analysis across different eras.
Historical Dictionary Support
Black's (both editions) and Bouvier agree on the core double meaning: feasible on one end, extremely improbable on the other. This tension is acknowledged rather than resolved — both sources note that context controls which sense applies. The Wisconsin case cited by both (Palmer v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 44 Wis. 208) is used to illustrate the "as soon as possible" equals "reasonable" reading, making it a useful anchor for that line of contract interpretation.
Bouvier adds the limiting qualifier that a "possible" event must still not be contrary to the nature of things — distinguishing the legally cognizable (however remote) from the logically impossible, which is a meaningful line in both property and contract doctrine.
Rapalje & Lawrence approaches the term from the property side, connecting bare possibility to possession and inheritance expectation. The dictionary's framing reinforces that a bare possibility was understood as legally inferior — near-nothing in terms of property rights — even if philosophically something could happen.
Anderson's Dictionary of Law does not appear to address the term directly in the available excerpts; researchers should not rely on it for this entry.
What the historical dictionaries collectively underserve: they do not adequately trace how "possible" functions in criminal law and evidence, nor do they address the possibility/contingency distinction in future interests with precision. Modern sources and the Encyclopedia entry fill these gaps.
Jurisdictional Note
The treatment of "possible" in future-interests law — particularly the distinction between a bare possibility and a possibility of reverter — varies between common law jurisdictions and was further altered in states that adopted the Restatement (Third) of Property or the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities. Researchers working across jurisdictions should not assume uniform treatment.
Encyclopedia Cross-Reference
Future Interests — Reversion, Possibility of Reverter, Right of Entry (The Law Mind Property Law Encyclopedia)