Definition
Pointment is an archaic contracted form of "appointment" as used in the law of powers — specifically, the exercise of a power of appointment by an appointor directing the disposition of property to one or more appointees. The term appears almost exclusively in older English and American equity treatises and legal dictionaries as a shorthand reference to the act of appointing under a power, rather than as an independent legal concept. It does not carry a meaning distinct from "appointment" in the technical sense; its significance is structural and historical.
In the law of powers, a pointment (appointment) is the instrument or act by which a person holding a power of appointment — the appointor — directs property to pass to a designated recipient — the appointee — in accordance with the terms of the instrument creating the power, typically a trust deed, will, or settlement.
Common Confusion
POINTMENT vs. APPOINTMENT: Pointment is not a separate doctrine. Researchers encountering the term in historical sources should treat it as equivalent to "appointment" in the powers-of-appointment sense. The truncated form was occasionally used by English equity writers and compilers of legal dictionaries in the nineteenth century as a stylistic convenience, particularly in cross-references and headnote entries. It should not be read as signaling a narrower or distinct legal concept.
POINTMENT vs. APPORTIONMENT: These terms are visually similar and address related but distinct equity concepts. Apportionment concerns the division of income, rent, or other periodic payments between successive interests. Pointment (appointment) concerns the exercise of a power directing capital or income to a beneficiary class. Confusion between the two in historical indices is a genuine research hazard.
Why It Matters in Research
Researchers using the Law Mind corpus will encounter "pointment" primarily as a headword or cross-reference variant in nineteenth-century English and American legal dictionaries and digests. Its appearance signals that the surrounding material concerns the law of powers of appointment — a body of equity doctrine governing how property held under a trust or settlement can be directed to beneficiaries by an authorized party.
Several navigational traps are worth flagging:
First, historical indexes and digests sometimes separated "appointment" entries by placing doctrinal sub-topics under contracted headings. A corpus search limited to "appointment" may miss material filed under "pointment" in older sources, and vice versa.
Second, the law governing powers of appointment underwent substantial development between the seventeenth and twentieth centuries. Rules on what constitutes a valid exercise, whether a general residuary clause exercises a power, fraud on a power, and revocability varied considerably across periods and jurisdictions. Material found under "pointment" in a mid-nineteenth-century digest reflects English equity doctrine of that era, not necessarily modern American trust law.
Third, the Rapalje & Lawrence entry — the primary source here — addresses the appointor's right to reserve a power of revocation within the deed of appointment itself, even without express authorization in the instrument creating the power. It further notes that such a power may be reserved toties quoties (as often as desired), and that upon revocation the original power revives. Where no power of revocation is reserved, the appointment is absolute and irrevocable. These are substantive doctrinal points about the mechanics of appointment instruments, not merely definitional content.
Historical Dictionary Support
Rapalje & Lawrence treat pointment as a functional entry point into the doctrine of powers, embedding substantive rules about revocability within a definition-adjacent format. The entry's focus on the appointor's reserved power of revocation reflects a central preoccupation of nineteenth-century English equity: whether an appointor could retain ongoing control over property ostensibly disposed of by appointment. The rule that revocation revives the original power — rather than requiring fresh creation — is a doctrinal point with practical significance for trust administration and estate planning.
What Rapalje & Lawrence do not address, and what researchers should seek elsewhere: the distinction between general and special powers of appointment, the rule against perpetuities as applied to appointed interests, the doctrine of fraud on a power (exercising a power for a purpose not authorized by the instrument), and the treatment of imperfect or defective appointments. These topics were extensively developed in English equity and adopted with modifications in American jurisdictions, but fall outside the scope of this contracted headword entry.
Jurisdictional Note
The doctrine embedded in this entry derives from English equity. American jurisdictions adopted the core framework but modified it significantly, particularly through the Uniform Powers of Appointment Act (2013) and predecessor uniform acts. Researchers applying historical pointment/appointment doctrine to modern American trust law should verify which rules have been superseded by statute.