Definition
In legal usage, "pleasure" carries a technical meaning distinct from its ordinary sense. The term refers to the will, discretion, or sovereign authority of a person or body in power — most commonly the Crown, a government, or a superior officer — particularly as it determines the duration or conditions of another's appointment, tenure, or service. An office or position held "at pleasure" (or "at the pleasure of" an appointing authority) may be terminated at any time, for any reason or no reason, without cause shown and without procedural formality.
The phrase most frequently appears in its prepositional forms:
1. AT PLEASURE / AT THE PLEASURE OF: Describes a tenure, appointment, or grant terminable by the grantor or appointing authority at will. An officeholder at pleasure acquires no vested right to continue in the position and may be removed without notice, hearing, or stated cause.
2. DURING PLEASURE: A temporal formula of grant or appointment meaning the interest continues only so long as the grantor or superior authority wills it to continue. Historically used in Crown grants of office and land to signal that no fixed term or freehold interest was created.
3. DURING THE PLEASURE OF THE CROWN: The standard formulation in English public law for offices held at executive will, as distinguished from offices held for good behavior (durante bene placito vs. quamdiu se bene gesserit). The phrase signals that removal is a prerogative act requiring no judicial process.
Common Language
Modern common usage (Wiktionary): A state of being pleased or contented; gratification; enjoyment; also, one's preference or will.
Historical common usage (Webster's 1913): The gratification of the senses or of the mind; agreeable sensations or emotions; amusement; self-indulgence.
Editorial note: The legal term "pleasure" carries no hedonic content whatsoever. Where common usage centers on enjoyment or satisfaction, legal usage centers on power and discretion — specifically, the authority to withdraw a benefit or terminate a tenure unilaterally. A researcher reading "at pleasure" in a legal instrument should register it as a term of art signaling precarious or will-based tenure, not an expression of preference or approval.
Common Confusion
"During pleasure" and "during good behavior" are easily confused because both appear as limiting phrases in grants of office and are frequently contrasted in the same instruments. They are opposites in effect: during pleasure means terminable at the grantor's will; during good behavior means the grantee has a qualified right to continue and may be removed only for cause. Historically, the shift of English judicial tenure from at-pleasure to good-behavior was a major constitutional development. Researchers should not assume that a grant's silence on the question defaults to either standard without examining the applicable law and period.
Why It Matters in Research
The word "pleasure" appearing in a historical instrument almost always signals one of these technical tenure formulas, not an expression of sentiment. The primary research risk is reading the word in its ordinary sense and missing its operative legal effect.
In English and early American sources, the at-pleasure / good-behavior distinction is essential for understanding judicial independence, the removal power over executive officers, and the nature of colonial appointments. Documents spanning the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries will use "pleasure" in these technical contexts routinely, and the phrasing is not always explicit — "at our pleasure," "during pleasure," or simply "at pleasure" may appear without further elaboration.
In American constitutional and administrative law, the at-pleasure removal question migrated into debates about presidential removal power over executive officers, where the functional equivalent of "at pleasure" became the contested baseline. Researchers moving between English sources and American materials should track how the concept translated across constitutional systems.
"Pleasure" in this sense also appears in property sources — grants of land "during pleasure" created no estate of freehold and were revocable at will. Researchers in early land tenure, Crown grants, or colonial charters should be alert to this usage alongside the public-office context.
The Rapalje & Lawrence entry for this term is unhelpfully indirect, pointing to related phrases rather than defining the term itself. Researchers relying solely on that source will need to supplement with English legal dictionaries and treatise material to reconstruct the full doctrinal framework.
Historical Dictionary Support
Rapalje & Lawrence does not provide a direct definition of "pleasure" as a legal term. The entry cross-references related phrases — to suppress and restrain, to that effect, to the poor inhabitants, to the three children of A. — which appear to be editorial signposts to companion phrases rather than explanatory content. This is a gap in the source. The cross-references do not illuminate the technical legal meaning of "at pleasure" or "during pleasure" as tenure formulas.
Historical English legal dictionaries, including Jacob's Law Dictionary and Tomlin's, treat "at pleasure" and "durante bene placito" directly, linking the English-language formula to its Latin equivalent and explaining the contrast with "quamdiu se bene gesserit." Blackstone's Commentaries address the good-behavior versus pleasure distinction in the context of judicial tenure and public office, and remain a more reliable guide to this term's legal content than the Rapalje & Lawrence entry as preserved here.
Jurisdictional Note
In English and Commonwealth systems, "at the pleasure of the Crown" retains constitutional significance in relation to prerogative appointments. In the United States, the federal constitutional framework transformed the question into one of statutory and constitutional interpretation regarding executive removal power, where "at pleasure" as a phrase appears less often but the underlying concept — at-will removability — remains central to administrative law doctrine.