PHONE COMPANIES

2 definitions found across Law Mind sources

PHONE COMPANIESAuthored
The Law Mind • 1014 words
Definition
"Phone companies" is not a formal term of art in American law. It functions as a colloquial descriptor for entities engaged in the business of providing voice, data, or telecommunications services over telephone networks. In legal and regulatory contexts, these entities are more precisely identified by one of the following classifications: 1. Common Carriers (Traditional Telephony). Wireline telephone companies — historically including local exchange carriers (LECs) and long-distance interexchange carriers (IXCs) — have long been regulated as common carriers under federal and state law. As common carriers, they are obligated to provide service to all customers on nondiscriminatory terms. This status imposes duties of interconnection, universal service contribution, and tariff compliance. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) exercises primary federal authority over interstate telecommunications under the Communications Act of 1934, as amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996. 2. Wireless Carriers / Commercial Mobile Radio Service (CMRS) Providers. Companies providing cellular, mobile broadband, and related wireless services operate under FCC licenses and are classified as CMRS providers under 47 U.S.C. § 332. Wireless carriers occupy a hybrid regulatory status: their voice services are treated as common carriage, while data services have been subject to ongoing reclassification disputes. 3. Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) Providers. Companies transmitting voice communications over broadband internet (e.g., interconnected VoIP services) occupy a contested regulatory space, with ongoing federal and state debates over whether and how common carrier obligations apply. 4. In Tort and Privacy Law. "Phone companies" frequently appear as defendants or third-party record holders in litigation involving wiretapping, surveillance, data privacy, and distracted driving. The legal duties and immunities applicable depend heavily on whether the company is acting as a carrier, a data custodian, or a platform.
Common Confusion
Phone companies are sometimes conflated with internet service providers (ISPs) or technology platforms, particularly as telecommunications and internet services have converged. The distinction matters for regulatory purposes: common carrier status triggers nondiscrimination obligations and potential immunity or liability under different legal frameworks. A company may simultaneously function as a phone company, an ISP, and a content platform — each role potentially governed by different rules. Researchers should also avoid conflating the common carrier doctrine as applied to phone companies with its application to railroads, trucking, or maritime transport. While the underlying principle is shared, the regulatory regimes are distinct. The Bouvier's source material excerpted for this entry addresses tug-boat liability and freight forwarders — analogous common carrier doctrine, but not directly applicable to telephony.
Why It Matters in Research
The term "phone companies" will rarely appear in statutes, regulations, or formal legal instruments. Researchers must translate the colloquial term into the precise regulatory category — common carrier, CMRS provider, interconnected VoIP provider, or telecommunications carrier — before locating applicable law. Historical sources, including Bouvier's, treat telephone companies under the general common carrier framework, alongside railroads and express companies. This historical grouping is useful for understanding the doctrinal roots of nondiscrimination duties and liability rules, but it can mislead researchers who apply pre-digital common carrier doctrine to modern wireless or VoIP disputes without accounting for intervening statutory and regulatory changes. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 is the most significant modern inflection point. Post-1996 sources will use the Act's defined terms (local exchange carrier, telecommunications carrier, information service provider) rather than the older regulatory vocabulary. Searching pre-1996 sources using modern terminology — or vice versa — will produce gaps. In tort research, phone companies appear in two distinct clusters: (1) third-party liability for distracted driving (the carrier as the entity whose product or service enabled the distraction), and (2) privacy and surveillance litigation (the carrier as record holder subpoenaed for call data, location data, or content). These are doctrinally separate lines of cases requiring separate research paths. State public utility commission (PUC) records are a frequently overlooked primary source for rate disputes, service obligation complaints, and interconnection agreements involving phone companies. These records are often not fully digitized and require targeted archive research.
Historical Dictionary Support
Bouvier's Law Dictionary addresses telephone companies indirectly, through the general common carrier framework. The excerpted passage addresses the liability of tugboat operators and freight forwarders — illustrative of the broad common carrier category within which telephone companies were historically situated. Bouvier's core principle — that a carrier undertaking to transport and deliver goods to a specified address is liable as a common carrier — maps onto early telephone jurisprudence, where courts asked whether telephone companies, by undertaking to transmit messages, assumed common carrier duties analogous to telegraph companies. Historical legal dictionaries generally do not treat telephone companies as a distinct legal category. They appear, when at all, as a subspecies of the common carrier or public utility. This reflects the regulatory reality of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when telephone service was a novelty and courts borrowed doctrine from railroad and telegraph cases. Researchers using Bouvier's or similar period sources should treat telephone company entries as illustrative of general principle rather than authoritative on modern telecommunications law.
Jurisdictional Note
Federal law (the Communications Act and FCC regulations) governs interstate and international telecommunications, while state public utility commissions retain authority over intrastate rates and service quality for wireline carriers. Wireless services are largely preempted from state rate regulation under federal law. The precise boundary of federal preemption in telecommunications is a live and frequently litigated issue, and varies by service type and regulatory classification.
Encyclopedia Cross-Reference
The Law Mind Torts & Personal Injury Encyclopedia: Motor Vehicle and Transportation Torts — Distracted Driving (Texting, Cell Phone) [torts_46] — relevant for tort liability research involving phone companies and distracted driving. The Law Mind Business Organizations & Corporate Law Encyclopedia: Banking — Bank Holding Company Act and Financial Holding Companies [business_121] — tangentially relevant where phone companies are organized as holding company structures subject to financial regulation.
Related Terms
Common Carrier; Telecommunications Carrier; Local Exchange Carrier; Interexchange Carrier; Commercial Mobile Radio Service (CMRS); VoIP; Public Utility; Tariff; Universal Service; FCC; Wiretapping; Electronic Surveillance; Communications Act of 1934; Telecommunications Act of 1996; Distracted Driving; Privacy; Subpoena (Records)
PHONE COMPANIESmain
Bouvier's Law Dictionary • 1928
The liability of the owner of a tug-boat to his tow is not that of a common carrier; 77 Pa. 238; 13 Wend. 387; 24 La. Ann. 165; 1 Black 62; 6 Cal. 462. And although the carrier receives the goods as a forwarder only, yet if his con- tract is to transport and to deliver them at a specified address, he is liable as a common carrier; 5 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 16; 48 Ν. H. 339. Common carriers are responsible for all loss or damage during transportation, from whatever cause, except the act of God or the public enemy; Ang. Carr. 70, § 67; 1 Term 27; 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 918; 1 Salk. 18 and cases cited; 25 E. L. & Eq. 595;2 Kent 597, 598; 7 Yerg. 340; 3 Munf. 239; 21 Wend. 190; 5 Strobh. 119; Rice 108; 4 Zabr. 697; 12 Conn. 410; 4 N. H. 259; 11 Ill. 579; 129 U. S. 897; 15 Minn. 279; 66 Ala. 167; 55 Тех. 323. The act of God is held to ex- tend only to such inevitable accidents as occur without the intervention of man's agency; Wood, Ry. L. 1877; 21 Wend. 192; 4 Dougl. 287; which could not be avoided by the exercise of due skill and care; 2 Watts 114; 10 Wall. 176; but where freight cars are stopped by a flood and the contents stolen, the loss is not due to inevitable acci- dent, act of God, or insurrection; 154 'Pa. See ACT OF GOD. 342. The carrier is not responsible for losses occurring from natural causes, such as frost, fermentation, evaporation, or natural decay of perishable articles, or the natural and necessary wear in the course of trans- portation, or the shipper's carelessness, provided the carrier exercises all reasonable care to have the loss or deterioration as little as practicable; Bull. N. P. 69; 2 Kent 299, 300; Story, Bailm. §492a; 6 Watts 424; Redf. Railw. § 141; 86 Me. 225; 53 Fed. Rep. 936; 21 S. W. Rep. (Tex.) 622; 28 Рас. Rep. (Or.) 894. See 115 Ill. 407; 1 L. R. A. 702. In every contract for the carriage of goods by sea, unless otherwise expressly stipulated, there is a warranty on the part of the ship- owner that the ship is seaworthy when she begins her voyage, and his undertaking is not discharged because the want of fitness is the result of latent defects; 157 U. S. 124. Carriers, both by land and water, when they undertake the general business of car- rying every kind of goods, are bound to carry for all who offer; and if they refuse, without just excuse, they are liable to an action; 4 B. & Ald. 32; 8 M. & W. 372; 1 Pick. 50; 5 Mo. 36; 15 Conn. 539; 2 Sumn. 221; 6 Railw. Cas. 61; 6 Wend. 335; 19 id. 261; 2 Story 16; 12 Mod. 484; 4 С. В. 555; L. R. 1 C. P. 423; 19 S. C. 353; 6 How. 344; 30 L. J. Q. B. 273. But the business of a common carrier may be restricted within such limits as he may deem expedient, if an individual, or which may be prescribed in its grant of powers, if a corporation, and he is not bound to accept goods out of the line of his usual business. But should the carrier accept goods not within the line of his business, he assumes the liability of a common carrier as to the specific goods ac- cepted; 23 Vt. 186; 14 Pa. 48; 10 N. H. 481; 30 Miss. 231; 4 Exch. 369; 17 Wall. 357;6 Wend. 335; 26 Vt. 248; Schouler, Bailm., 2d ed. § 372; Redf. Railw. Ca. 116. The car- rier may require freight to be paid in ad- vance; but in an action for not carrying, it is only necessary to allege a readiness to pay freight; 8 M. & W. 372; 18 III. 488; 14 Ala. N. S. 249. It is not required to prove or allege a tender, if the carrier refuse to accept the goods for transportation. The carrier is entitled to a lien upon the goods for freight; 2 Ld. Raym. 752; and for ad- vances made to other carriers; 6 Humpnr. 70; 16 Ill. 403; 16 Johns. 356; 13 B. Monr. 243. The consignor is prima facie liable for freight; but the consignee may be liable when the consignor is his agent, or when the title is in him and he accepts the goods; 3 Bingh. 383; 4 Den. 110; 3 E. D. Sm. 187; Schouler, Bailm., 2d ed. § 535. Common carriers may qualify their com- mon-law responsibility by special contract; 4 Coke 83; Ang. Carr. § 220; 1 Ventr. 238; Story, Bailm. § 549, and note 5; 17 Wall. 357; 16 Wall. 318; 63 Pa. 14; 4 Ind. App. 326. A carrier cannot exact as a condition precedent that a shipper must sign a con- tract in writing limiting the common law liability; 48 Kan. 210; 29 S. W. Rep. (Tex.) 565. A contract to qualify the common-law liability may be shown by proving a notice, brought home to and assented to by the owner of the goods or his authorized agent, wherein the carrier stipulates for a qualified liability; 8 M. & W. 243; 6 How. 344; 3 Me. 228; 11 N. Y. 491; 9 Watts 87; 8 Pa. 479; 31 id. 209; 2 Rich. 286; 12 B. Monr. 63; 23 Vt. 186; 4 Har. & J. 317. Or it may be re- duced to writing, in the form of a bill of lading. See BILL OF LADING. A contract by carrier limiting his liability for negli- gence is governed by the lex loci contractus; 148 Pa. 527. But the carrier cannot contract against his own negligence or the negligence of his employés and agents; 15 Am. Law Reg. N. s. 140; 50 Pa. 313; 1 Fed. Rep. 382; 41 Conn. 33

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