PETENCY

2 definitions found across Law Mind sources

PETENCYAuthored
The Law Mind • 580 words
Definition
Petency does not appear as a recognized legal term in standard legal usage. The source material attributed to this entry in Bouvier's Law Dictionary does not define "petency" but instead contains maxim entries beginning with "Aliud est..." — Latin legal aphorisms addressing concealment versus silence, and distinction versus separation. These entries appear to have been retrieved in error or through a corpus indexing mismatch rather than as a genuine definition of "petency." No entry for "petency" appears in Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Black's Law Dictionary, Ballentine's Law Dictionary, or other standard legal reference works consulted in the Law Mind corpus. The term does not correspond to a recognized common law concept, statutory term of art, or established term in equity or procedure. A researcher encountering "petency" in a historical legal document should consider the following possibilities: 1. Typographical or transcription error for COMPETENCY — the legal capacity of a witness, party, or evidence to be received or credited in legal proceedings. 2. Typographical or transcription error for POTENCY — occasionally used in older legal and medical contexts, particularly in matters touching on marriage, annulment, or capacity. 3. A highly localized, archaic, or jurisdiction-specific usage not represented in the major reference dictionaries. ---
Common Confusion
PETENCY vs. COMPETENCY: If a historical document or case uses "petency," the most probable intended term is COMPETENCY — the legal fitness or qualification of a person to perform a legal act, testify, or be a party to proceedings. The two words share a suffix and are visually similar in handwritten or poorly typeset historical documents. See COMPETENCY for the operative definition. ---
Why It Matters in Research
Researchers encountering this term in the Law Mind corpus should treat it with caution. The source material returned under this heading is a Bouvier's entry for the Latin maxim "Aliud est celare, aliud tacere" — a maxim concerning the legal distinction between active concealment and mere silence, relevant to fraud, disclosure obligations, and misrepresentation doctrine. That content is substantive and useful but has no relationship to "petency" as a term. This mismatch suggests either an OCR error in corpus indexing, a corrupted page reference in a digitized edition of Bouvier's, or a retrieval error in which an adjacent or nearby headword was captured incorrectly. Researchers relying on this source for a definition of "petency" will find no useful definitional content. If the Latin maxim material is what the researcher actually needs, see CONCEALMENT and FRAUD for navigational entry points. The maxim "Aliud est celare, aliud tacere" (To conceal is one thing, to be silent another) bears directly on the distinction between fraudulent concealment and mere non-disclosure — a distinction with continuing significance in contract, tort, and fiduciary duty contexts. ---
Historical Dictionary Support
Bouvier's Law Dictionary, as retrieved, provides no definition of "petency." The text block associated with this entry consists entirely of the maxim "Aliud est celare, aliud tacere" and the immediately following maxim "Aliud est distinctio, aliud separatio," both of which are standard entries in Bouvier's maxims section. Neither defines nor references any term resembling "petency." No divergence among historical dictionaries can be synthesized because no historical dictionary entry for this term has been located. The absence is itself informative: a term absent from Bouvier's, absent from Black's across its major editions, and absent from Ballentine's is almost certainly not a term of art with independent legal significance. ---
Related Terms
COMPETENCY CONCEALMENT FRAUD NON-DISCLOSURE CAPACITY
PETENCYmain
Bouvier's Law Dictionary • 1928
Aliud est celare, aliud tacere. To conceal is one thing, to be silent another. 3 Burr. 1910. See 2 Wheat. 176; 9 id. 631; 3 Bingh. 77; 4 Taunt. 851; 2 C. & P. 341; 18 Pick. 490; 22 id. 58; 12 Cush. 425; Broom, Max. 782; [1895] 2 Ch. 205. Aliud est distinctio, aliud separatio. Distinction is one thing, separation another. Bacon's arg. Case of Postnati of Scotland, Works iv. 351. Aliud est possidere, aliud esse in possessione. It is one thing to possess, it is another to be in posses- sion. Hob. 163; Bract. 206. Aliud est vendere, aliud vendenti consentire. To sell is one thing, to give consent to him who sells another. Dig. 50. 17, 160. Allegans contraria non est audiendus. One mak- ing contradictory allegations is not to be heard. Jenk. Cent. 16; Broom, Max. 169, 294; 4 Term 211; 8 Exch. 446, 527, 678; 3 E. & B. 363; 5 С. В. 195, 886; 10 Mass. 163; 70 Pa. 274; 4 Inst. 279; 19 R. I. 510. Allegans suam turpitudinem non est audiendus. One alleging his own infamy is not to be heard. 4 Inst. 279; 2 Johns. Ch. 839; 113 N. Y. 52; 13 Ch. Div. 696. Allegari non debuit quod probatum non relevat. That ought not to be alleged which, if proved, would not be relevant. 1 Ch. Cas. 45. Allegatio contra factum non est admittenda. An allegation contrary to a deed is not admissible. See

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