Definition
Per e (from the Latin "per," meaning "by" or "through") is a term of art drawn from the ancient common law writ of entry. It identifies the first degree of unlawful possession in the graduated formulaic structure used by writs of entry to trace how a claimant was wrongfully dispossessed of land.
In the writ of entry framework, the per designated the original wrongdoer — the person who first entered or held land without right. A writ of entry "in the per" alleged that the tenant (the current possessor) had no entry except through that original wrongdoer personally. This was the simplest, most direct form of the writ: one degree of wrongful possession, one wrongdoer, no intermediate transfer.
The full formula ran roughly: the plaintiff claims land into which the defendant "hath not entry unless by [name of original wrongdoer]" who originally entered without right. When the land had passed one step further — from the original wrongdoer to another — the writ escalated to the per and cui. When it had passed another step, to the cui in vita or beyond, stricter forms applied.
Common Confusion
Per e is easily confused with per and cui, its immediate successor in the degree structure. The distinction is one of alienation: per e involves a single degree — the wrongdoer who dispossessed the plaintiff still holds, or transferred directly to the current tenant. Per and cui involves two degrees — an intermediate holder now stands between the original wrongdoer and the current possessor. Research in medieval and early modern property records must track this distinction carefully, because the degree alleged in the writ determined which form was available and, critically, what the plaintiff had to prove. Misidentifying the degree rendered the writ defective.
Why It Matters in Research
Per e is not a freestanding substantive doctrine; it is a procedural marker within the now-obsolete writ of entry system. Researchers will encounter it almost exclusively in three contexts: (1) historical property law treatises explaining the real actions available at common law before the action of ejectment displaced them; (2) English Year Books and early American court records where writs of entry in the per appear on the pleading rolls; and (3) secondary literature on the abolition of real actions tracing the progressive narrowing of the writ of entry system.
The key navigational point is this: writs of entry in the per were available only at the first degree of unlawful possession. If the wrongdoer had aliened the land, or if descent had occurred, the writ had to allege the per and cui or a higher form — and the failure to use the correct form was fatal. Historical sources sometimes treat "per e" and "writ of entry in the per" interchangeably; they refer to the same thing.
American researchers should note that writs of entry survived in several states — notably Massachusetts — long after they were abolished in England. Massachusetts retained a statutory writ of entry well into the modern period, making the per/cui/cui in vita degree structure a live question in New England property litigation through the nineteenth century and influencing early title dispute jurisprudence there.
In the Law Mind corpus, per e appears primarily as context for understanding how medieval real property actions functioned and why ejectment (a far simpler fictional action) came to replace them. The degree system the writ of entry required — tracking exactly how many hands land had passed through since the original wrong — proved unworkable in practice and was one of the principal reasons the real actions fell into disuse.
Historical Dictionary Support
Burrill's Law Dictionary situates per e within its treatment of the writ of entry, quoting Blackstone's Commentaries (Book III) and Reeves' History of English Law. Burrill presents the hierarchy clearly: the writ in the per addresses the first degree; the writ in the per and cui addresses the second. This matches Blackstone's own treatment precisely.
Blackstone is the most useful secondary source for understanding the internal logic of the degree system. He explains that the writ of entry in the per was so called from the words in which the count or declaration was framed — specifically the allegation that the defendant "hath not entry" except "per" the original wrongdoer. Reeves provides additional historical depth, locating the development of these forms within the broader evolution of the real actions in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.
What historical dictionaries generally do not address is the practical litigation consequence of the degree rules: that a plaintiff who misstated the degree — alleging a writ in the per when the per and cui was required — lost the writ entirely. This procedural trap is better treated in treatises on common law pleading than in dictionary entries, but it is the fact that gave the per/cui distinction its operational significance.
Jurisdictional Note
The writ of entry in the per was an English common law form adopted in the American colonies. England abolished real actions by statute in 1833. In the United States, abolition came at varying times by state; Massachusetts preserved a statutory writ of entry substantially longer than most jurisdictions, making per e a term with genuine nineteenth-century American legal life in that state.