dispensing complete justice, unless they are before the court in such a manner as to entitle them to be heard in vindication or protection of their interests. See Chandler v. Ward, 188 Ill. 322, 58 N. E. 919; Phoenix Nat. Bank v. Cleveland Co., 58 Hun, 606, 11 N. Y. Supp. 873; Chadbourne v. Coe, 51 Fed. 480, 2 C. C. A. 327; Burrill v. Garst. 19 R. I. 38, 31 Atl. 436; Castle v. Madison, 113 Wis. he 89 N. W. 156; Iowa County Sup’rs v. Minera Point R. Co.,:24 Wis. 132. Nominal parties are those who are joined as plaintiffs or defendants, not because they have any real interest in the subject-matter or because any relief is demanded as against them, but merely because the technical rules of pleading require their presence on the record. It should be noted that some courts make a further distinction between “necessary” parties and “indispensable”’ parties. Thus, it is said that the supreme court of the United States divides parties in equity suits into three different classes: (1) Formal parties, who have no interest in the controversy between the immediate litigants, but have such an interest in the subject-matter as may be conveniently settled in the suit, and thereby prevent further litigation; (2) necessary parties, who have an interest in the controversy but whose interests are separable from those o the parties before the court, and will not be directly affected by a decree which does complete and full justice between them; (3) indispensable parties, who not only have an interest in the subject-matter of the controversy, but an interest of such a nature that a final decree cannot be made without either affecting their interests or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and pox conscience. Hicklin v. Marco. 56 Fed. How. 139, 15 L. Ed. 158; Ribon v. Railroad . Ed. 367; Williams Bankhead, 19 Wall. 571. 22 L. Ed. 184; Kendig v. Dean, 97 U. S. 425, 24 L. Ed. 1061. —Parties and privies. Parties to a deed or contract are those with whom the deed or contract is actually made or entered into. By the term “privies,” as applied to contracts, is frequently meant those between whom the contract is mutually binding, although not literally parties to such contract. Thus, in the case of a lease, the lessor and lessee are both parties and privies, the contract being literally made between the two, and also being mutually binding; but, if the lessee assign his interest to a third party, then a privity arises between the assignee and the original lessor, although such assignee is not literally a party to the original lease. Brown. ; Parpart, 106 U. 8. 679, 1 Sup. Ct. 456, 27 L. Ed. 256. ~—Gwelty of partition. See OWELTY. Partition, deed of. In conveyancing. A species of primary or original conveyance between two or more joint tenants, coparceners, or tenants in common, by which they divide the lands su held among them in severalty, each taking a distinct - part. 2 Bl. Comm. 323, 324.—Partition of a succession. ‘The partition of a succession is the division of the effects of which the succession is composed, among all the co-heirs, according to their respective rights. Partition is voluntary or judicial. It is voluntary when it is made among all the co-heirs present and of age, and by their mutual consent. It is judicia] when it is made by the authority of the court, and according to the formalities prescribed by law. Every partition is either definitive or provisional. Definitive partition is that which is made in a permanent and irrevocable manner. Provisional! partition is that which is made provisionally, either of certain things before the rest can be divided, or even of everything that is to be divided, when the parties are not in a situation to make an irrevocable partition. Civ. Code La. art. 1293, et seq.